No transition---centuries of history prove societies can’t and won’t shift fast enough.
Rogelio Luque-Lora 21, MSci in History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge, M.A. in Natural Sciences from the University of Cambridge, “Engaging imaginaries, rejecting utopias: The case for technological progress and political realism to sustain material wellbeing,” Political Geography, Vol. 86, 02-21-2021, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2021.102358
Gómez-Baggethun is right to suspect that the modern myth of progress has theological origins. In fact, it is largely a product of the Christian conception of human history as an inherently meaningful story that has salvation as its end point. Without the belief that there is a teleological coherence to the history of humanity, and that salvation (whether the Christian version of the Kingdom of God on Earth, or the humanist faith in an emancipated and harmonious future) is an earthly event that lies ahead of the present, the idea of progress is groundless. In cultures that are not historically steeped in Western monotheism, the belief that humanity is inexorably marching toward a better state of affairs is largely absent (Gray, 2007, pp. 29–39). Where Gómez-Baggethun's reading of progress misses the mark is in limiting its scope to technology. The central tenet of modern belief in progress is that ethics and politics advance in line with the growth of knowledge, so that as scientific and technological understandings accrue, so too do humans increasingly learn to arrange their societies in rational and ethical ways (Gray, 2002).
Contrary to Gómez-Baggethun's assertions, technological progress is a fact. Throughout their history, humans have increasingly learnt to manipulate the environment around them to serve their interests. The reason for this is that scientific knowledge grows cumulatively: past discoveries are not necessarily lost with the advent of new knowledge, but rather can be built upon or thrown into question by these new understandings. In contrast, any historical ‘gains’ in politics and ethics (placed between inverted commas to reflect that such evaluations will depend on the particular values of each generation) are easily undone by regime and cultural changes. It is progress in ethics and politics, not in technology, that is a myth.
Viewed in this light, Gómez-Baggethun's assertion that utopias are concrete and plausible if they are scientifically informed, while saying nothing about how assumed radical social change may come about, begs the question of why scientific plausibility is given categorical priority over social and political feasibility. Gómez-Baggethun's analysis fits within a broader tradition; the belief that humans can radically remake the world at will commonly presents itself as having the authority of science (Gray, 2007, p. 20). An historically and politically informed view may well reveal degrowth to be utopian, in the true sense of being a projection into the future of an unrealisable society (Gray, 2007, pp. 20–29).
There are no historical examples of humans showing the intelligence or will to voluntarily restructure their societies in the measure that would be required for a global shift to degrowth, let alone at the speed required to avert the climatic changes and ecological collapses predicted for this century. Further complicating things for advocates of degrowth, no contemporary democratic state has been able to survive without sustaining economic growth over the medium and long terms (Gray, 1992, p. 83). Recently, Gray (2019) has written,
The trouble is that Green proposals involve a drop in material living standards for large numbers of people, and any such fall will be unsustainable in political terms. Macron's tax on petrol fuelled the rise of the gilets jaunes in France, while the principal beneficiary of Hilary Clinton's election pledge to shut down the coal industry has been Donald Trump. When Green policies impose heavy costs on the poor and the working majority – as they often do – the result is a popular blowback.
Gómez-Baggethun's mistake here is to think that degrowth is feasible simply because it is desirable. In political terms, the evidence suggests that it is unfeasible. To resist these facts and to consider degrowth to be the only realistic imaginary reflects a pseudo-religious faith in humans' willingness and ability to convert to an ecological worldview and to radically adjust their institutions accordingly.