Instead of the question of can we afford it – the question is can we afford to not act – The Green New Deal is our best hope at creating a future forward sustainable society.
Yeva Nersisyan and L. Randall Wray Can we afford the Green New Deal? 2020 JOURNAL OF POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2020.1835499
Proposals for a Green New Deal (GND) that tackles climate change have sprung into the debate, both in the US and across the Atlantic. Some of these proposals echo the original New Deal by including comprehensive economic and social reform, in addition to addressing climate change. Advocates of the GND argue that many of problems facing society, such as climate change, rising inequality, and an economy that leaves too many with inadequate access to food, shelter, healthcare, and affordable education are linked. They, therefore, insist on tackling them with an array of programs that have hitherto been seen as disconnected: a carbon-neutral energy policy and reversing climate change; universal single-payer healthcare; student debt relief and free public college; prison reform; ending “forever wars”; increasing care for the young, sick, and old; and the job guarantee.
The cost of the GND is usually estimated in financial terms, adding the projected costs of the various programs which leads to the conclusion that large tax hikes would be needed to pay for it. In this paper, we argue that the cost of the GND must be measured in terms of real resources, not financial costs. Whether or not we can “afford” the GND or any other government program depends not on finance, but on the availability of real resources to implement it. This question cannot be answered by adding up the financial costs of the various components of GND. What is required instead is a careful accounting of the resources the GND will require, weighing those against resources it will release and what is already in excess supply. The difference between resources required and what can be made available is the true cost of the GND. Only once we know this cost can we determine whether a reduction of aggregate demand is needed, and consequently, whether we need counter-inflationary measures, such as tax hikes. We provide a first step toward real resource accounting for the GND estimating resources that can be released from current uses and resources needed for GND projects while acknowledging the major uncertainties involved in such an exercise.1 Our analysis is rooted in Modern Money Theory (MMT) and Keynes’s methodology in How to Pay for the War. Keynes’s approach is simple but also profound: calculating resources available to prosecute the war while sustaining the consumption needs of the population. If the available resources fall short of what is needed, the solution cannot be found in the finances. Government can always spend more to shift resources to the war effort, but without reducing private spending the result is inflation that generates a combination of voluntary saving and excess profits while consumption in real terms falls. To prevent this undesirable outcome, government must relieve pressure on scarce resources by reducing private demand. Keynes’s methodology illustrates what Modern Money Theorists (MMT) have long explained—what constrains government spending is the availability of real resources, not finance. As MMT explains, a government with its sovereign currency, such as the United States federal government, does not face financial constraints. A sovereign government’s finances are not like the budgeting by households and firms; the government uses its monetary system to mobilize the nation’s real resources and to move some of them to pursuit of the public purpose. As long as real resources are for sale in the government’s currency, it can financially afford to buy them. As J. Fagg Foster (1981) said, “what is technically feasible is financially possible.” It is possible that tax hikes and spending cuts elsewhere in the government budget might be necessary to implement the GND. That depends on whether or not we need to constrain aggregate spending in order to release resources for the GND in a noninflationary manner. Even then, the problem is not that we cannot financially afford the GND—government can always bid resources away from private use by paying higher prices—but that spending on the GND will generate private income that can support higher bids in competition with the government for scarce resources. This is the real reason that tax hikes might be desirable: to reduce private income and thereby remove competition for resources. Admittedly, uncertainties remain concerning the technologies, the quantity of resources needed, the suitability of those made available, the political feasibility, and the capacity of our democracy to successfully face the challenges ahead. But we believe our approach provides more guidance about the question of the GND’s “affordability” than does the conventional approach that merely adds up the dollar costs of GND projects. Keynes believed his proposal would “snatch from the exigency of war positive social improvements” (1940, iii). Not only would it move the necessary resources to the war effort with a minimum amount of inflation, it would also make “an advance towards economic equality greater than any which we have made in recent times” (1940, iii–iv). This turned out to be a prescient description of the social and economic conditions of the postwar democracies—the build-up of productive capacity provided the base for the “Golden Era” of capitalism. The GND promises a similar outcome if done correctly. Its benefits would go far beyond the reversal of climate change to include environmental sustainability, greater equality, shared prosperity, jobs for all, healthcare for all, childcare for all, and an end of the forever wars. In order to build the necessary political consensus, whatever sacrifices might be required during the implementation of GND must be more than compensated for by tangible benefits.