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Federalism especially fails in environmental contexts – pollution spillover and race to the bottom

Daniel Fiorino and Carley A. Weted Environmental Federalism in a Polarized Era First Published January 8, 2021 journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0160323X20986225

A central justification for a federal role in environmental policy is pollution spillovers (Millimet 2014). Air and water pollution cross state lines, and many common property resources extend beyond political boundaries. In water policy, the Chesapeake Bay, Great Lakes, and Missouri River exemplify such spillovers. An entirely state-centered system would be cumbersome, costly, and ineffective. Take air quality as an example: Much of the ozone and particulate pollution on the East Coast can be traced to origins in Appalachia and the Midwest. This causes issues when states like Maryland and New Jersey cannot meet the National Ambient Air Quality Standards if the federal EPA does not require controls on pollution from other states.

A second argument for a federal role is concern over a “race to the bottom,” where “states compete for economic growth by enticing industry with less stringent—and less costly—regulations” (, 335; ). Research finds evidence of a race-to-the-bottom in federal rules and oversight (Konisky and Woods 2012; Sjoberg and Xu 2018) and in enforcing surface mining regulation (). Still, there is conflicting evidence. States may exceed federal standards if voters and activists prefer it (), and “for some states, regulatory behavior in competitor states pulls their own regulatory efforts up, not down” (Konisky 2007, 868). Studies of state enforcement of federally-delegated programs find limited evidence of a race-to-the-bottom, but this is with federal rules and oversight (Konisky and Woods 2012; Sjoberg and Xu 2018). Research has found evidence of strategic interaction leading to less enforcement effort in surface mining regulation when regional competitor states were less stringent, supporting a race-to-the-bottom thesis (). A study of air, water, and hazardous waste programs (all with a substantial federal presence) found evidence that states reduced enforcement in response to laxity by other states but increased their efforts when competitors were tougher: “for some states, regulatory behavior in competitor states pulls their own regulatory efforts up, not down” (Konisky 2007, 868). Federalism may minimize pressure for laxity while, in some conditions, encouraging a race-to-the top, leading to a “California Effect” that can enhance standards overall ().

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