War---Impact---2NC
Renewables drive global conflict.
Ahern 23, MA in Philosophy from Memorial University of Newfoundland and environmental and outreach coordinator for numerous climate justice programs. (Andrew, 2-21-2023, “How Degrowth Can Help Reduce Global Conflict,” Science for the People, https://magazine.scienceforthepeople.org/online/how-degrowth-can-help-reduce-global-conflict/)
Let’s use the example of electric vehicles. The batteries in these vehicles rely on minerals like nickel, cobalt, and lithium, which, according to the World Bank, could drive demand up to 500 percent depending on the mineral, all else being equal. Indonesia, for instance, holds the world’s largest nickel reserves and environmental degradation is already underway in the pursuit of such a mineral. According to the Environmental Justice Atlas, “Fisheries are declining and health is deteriorating in Kawasi since the local nickel mining and smelting project started dumping waste in the sea.” Such local deterioration is explored in visual detail in the Yale Environment 360 film contest winner “From Dreams to Dust,” which shows how the pursuit of materials for green technologies result in polluted drinking water, barren landscapes, and threatened workers and communities. Since 2012, at least fourteen Indonesian environmental defenders have been killed. This extractive logic applies to other green technologies like solar panels and wind turbines as well, since renewables are still materially intensive (although less so than fossil fuels). While it is no doubt true that we need to get off fossil fuels, there are choices to be made about how much energy we use, where it comes from, and who is faced with the risks and benefits.
We are already seeing these conflicts play out in real time all over the world, and while still at the earliest stage of the energy transition—if we can even call it that. According to Global Witness, an international nongovernmental organization that tracks the deaths of environmental defenders, the rise in murders among people defending their local land or natural resources has risen almost every year for the last two decades, with the largest source of conflict typically in the mineral sector. It is no coincidence that at the same time environmental protection is most needed, environmental conflict has reached its highest point yet. To add insult to injury, the US military is well aware of the importance of these minerals. In the words of the US Department of Defense, “Strategic and critical materials are vital to our national defense and economic prosperity, enabling the United States to develop and sustain emerging technologies. They also improve our warfighting capability, support family-sustaining jobs, and strengthen our alliances and partnerships.” In no uncertain terms the US military sees access to these “strategic and critical minerals” as vital to sustain economic growth and the United States’ dominance on the world stage. Unfortunately, without drastic changes in energy demand, this trend will only continue.
AND two more causes of war:
1. Scarcities
Renewable energy will cause a security crisis over land and resources.
Tom Johansmeyer 22, Tom Johansmeyer is head of PCS, a Verisk business, which estimates the industry-wide insured losses from disaster events around the world, 11/01/2022, “HOW RENEWABLE ENERGY COULD SET THE STAGE FOR FUTURE RESOURCE CONFLICT,” https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-renewable-energy-could-set-stage-future-resource-conflict, eb
The push for renewable energy sources through 2035 and 2050 makes the need for wind and other forms of renewable power obvious. Unfortunately, you can’t just pop up a wind turbine or lay out some solar panels. Geography matters. Renewable energy requires favorable conditions, creating a linkage between energy security and physical locations that could result in future military threats. Taking action to prevent wars over renewable resources starts with experience, which is in short supply. However, the conflict in Ukraine offers some early insights, even if there is a slight a mismatch of circumstances.
Location, Location, Location
There’s no doubt that renewable energy will shape the global energy mix over the coming decades. We won’t be able to achieve IPCC emissions reduction targets without a mix of renewable sources. A wide range of factors could impede progress, from the economic security of extractive resources exporters to a shortage of high-quality green investment alternatives to entrenched large fossil fuel companies. However, those are likely more manageable than what could be the most significant barrier: Geography. Wind and solar require specific characteristics, as do geothermal and hydro. The connection between certain regions and favorable renewable energy characteristic entails a natural scarcity of renewable energy production, simply because some locations better than others.
The relative scarcity of regions favorable to renewable energy production could cause some to become contested, in much the same way that fossil fuel producing regions have been. Wind power illustrates the issues associated with geography that shrink the amount of viable wind power production location and creates scarcity, which could ultimately lead to shortages and thus conflict. Wind requires space – a lot of it, with a 200-megawatt facility potentially occupying 13 square miles. Sheer space isn’t enough, though. Wind farms need a lot of space in the right place. They need to be close to sources of demand, reasonably unobtrusive for trade and aesthetic purposes, and in jurisdictions familiar enough with the technology. Further, wind farms require conditions that make sense, to include target average wind speeds enabled by “nonforested, ice-free, nonurban areas.”
Plenty of locations around the world meet the criteria necessary for wind power generation suitability, but they remain reasonably scarce – with similar situations for other renewable energy sources. It’s not inconceivable, therefore, that access to optimal renewable energy areas could become an international security issue, particularly for countries that see renewable energy as a contributor to energy independence, rather than just as a way to manage climate risk, as Ukraine and Taiwan do. The need to protect land favorable to renewable energy production takes the notion of energy security into the realm of military security, as well. Such areas could be exposed to threats from adversaries seeking either to destabilize through disruption of energy production or simply take control of renewable energy capabilities.
The truism that wars are fought over oil may not be broad enough. A successful energy transition could mean that wars will be fought over wind and other renewable natural resources, as long as there is a strong geographical connection. And while we aren’t seeing wars fought for wind yet, the impact of conflict on renewable energy has found early precedent. The conflict in Ukraine was not driven by strategic considerations related to geography suitable for wind and other forms of renewable energy, but it has found the part of the country with most of its wind and renewable energy capabilities.
Security Includes Recovery
Most of Ukraine’s wind power assets are located from Odesa to Luhansk and are directly exposed to the conflict. In fact, 90% of Ukraine’s wind farms sit along that stretch. Damage has already begun, with at least two turbines from different owners destroyed and more affected. The insurance tab alone for wind farms in Ukraine could exceed $800 million, a number that still could go higher. Solar power plant economic and insured losses have yet to be revealed but are expected to be significant. Although the circumstances of damage do not align perfectly with the notion of renewable resource conflict sketched out above, the current conflict in Ukraine can offer important lessons for future renewable energy security.
Foremost is the importance of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction of renewable energy assets, which may be as important as traditional defense considerations. While you wouldn’t want to leave such infrastructure exposed, no defense is perfect, and plans for rapid and cost-effective recovery are crucial, especially for facilities that may be owned by private companies based in other jurisdictions. Several factors have arisen from the impact of the conflict on renewable energy so far.
Renewable energy may be natural, but the components used to harness it are not. Energy independence is only as resilient as the sourcing of components and raw materials necessary for the likes of solar panels and wind turbine, such as cobalt, nickel, and other minerals. While the affected nation may not need to source them directly, the necessary raw materials need to be available to the manufacturer of renewable energy equipment, which could be complicated in cases where an aggressor nation is also rich in relevant resources.
In addition to raw materials, demand for renewable energy equipment could frustrate the recovery and reconstruction process. Recent supply chain challenges for renewable energy equipment resulting from the pandemic are worth noting, but they have also occurred during a period of increased demand. Wind power installations are growing rapidly, as are renewables in general. Repair demand has to compete with new installation demand, which could elongate the time needed for recovery, increasing attendant post-conflict security risks – including political, economic, and societal concerns. Developing a renewable energy mix that includes faster and less expensive restoration of service can reduce that risk, as evidenced by the possibility of having solar facilities installed in western Ukraine by the end of the year.
Finally, the importance of predictable capital flows can’t be overstated. Recovery is fueled by cash, and conflict aftermath can involve plenty of competing interests. A quick scan of the Kyiv School of Economics assessment of the implications of the conflict so far provides an indication of the potential cost. The process of post-conflict remediation is further frustrated by the fact foreign aid tends to be negotiated during and after a conflict – i.e., during a period of peak need. Securing resources can be a volatile process, with distribution compounding that volatility. The fact that the wind farms in Ukraine are insured offers an additional lesson for renewable energy security. Pre-negotiated terms should result in higher-velocity capital with increased certainty of use. The wind farms have greater predictability of capital flow because of their insurance, which should factor into future considerations of the economic aspects of renewable energy security.
2. International Law
Renewables causes international conflicts and crushes I law.
Madison Freemam 18, Madison Freeman is a research associate for energy and U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and an energy and environment fellow with Young Professionals in Foreign Policy, Morgan Bazilian, Morgan Bazilian is the executive director of the Payne Institute and a professor of public policy at Colorado School of Mines. He is also a non-resident fellow at the Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy and a non-resident senior associate with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10/8/2018, "How Renewable Energy Could Fuel Future Conflicts," , eb
Renewable energy technologies promise to help our world avert some of the worst impacts of climate change. However, some of the minerals and metals they require could contribute to conflict.
In the past, fossil fuels were the primary link between energy and conflict, as control and transport of oil and gas drove political unrest, wars over territory, and interventions by powerful countries concerned with securing their supply chains.
However, the energy landscape is changing rapidly, with cleaner sources of electricity swiftly replacing fossil fuels. The energy transition now seems inevitable, with renewable energy technologies forecasted to constitute almost half of global electricity generation by 2050. While the global transition to clean energy promises a more sustainable energy future, the switch also creates new challenges through the control of critical minerals used for clean energy technology.
Investment in clean energy technologies totaled over $330 billion in 2017 and is expected to accelerate over the coming decades, which will cause the demand for minerals critical to these technologies to change accordingly.For example, the global lithium-ion battery market could more than quadruple to $93 billion by 2025. Driven by the booming electric vehicle market and expanding energy storage sector, demand will increase for lithium, cobalt, and magnesium.
Clean energy minerals and metals, similar to fossil fuels, are concentrated in certain geographic areas, and may be subject to similar contests over their control. As the world continues to transition from oil, gas, and coal to solar and wind, policymakers must take careful steps to ameliorate the risk of negative externalities from the changing landscape of mineral extraction.
Clean Energy Risks Multiple Forms of Conflict
Growth of clean energy technologies may increase the risk of at least three types of conflict: outbreaks of violence in states with weak institutions, competition over global resource commons, and weaponization of minerals essential to these technologies in trade disputes.
First, reserves of metals and minerals for clean energy technologies can motivate violent conflict in states with weak institutions and rule of law. Similar to the “resource curse” of many oil-rich states, developing nations with large natural resource endowments often experience corruption and violence as different groups vie to control wealth-generating extractive operations. For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) produces more than 60 percent of the world’s cobalt, a key component of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles and electricity storage. The country already suffers from widespread violent conflict, perpetuated by mining wealth, that has driven the creation of at least seventy armed groups, resulted in massive humans rights violations, and displaced millions. An increase in demand for cobalt for electric vehicles and grid-scale battery storage could further intensify conflict in the country.
Second, these minerals could also increase competition among states over the global commons. The Arctic Ocean and the South China Sea, two contested maritime areas, both contain considerable mineral and metal deposits along undersea fault lines. As ice retreat opens up more of the Arctic Ocean, exploration for deep-sea deposits of minerals useful for clean energy technology could drive countries that claim territory in the region to assert their claims more forcefully. In the South China Sea, Beijing has begun to develop deep sea mining capacities, which will contribute to its effort to establish control of the mineral-rich seabed. China has demonstrated its willingness to flaunt international law and violate other countries’ sovereign claims to the seabed. Conflict over deep-sea minerals would aggravate these disputes.
Finally, China’s hegemony over the global mining operations of many of these critical minerals creates a risk that it will use these elements as trade weapons. China produces 95 percent of rare earth elements and leads production in many other minerals and metals critical to clean energy technologies. This control is highly centralized within specific Chinese companies – one Chinese firm, Tianqi Lithium, controls nearly half of the world’s lithium. As part of China’s strategy to become the “center of the clean energy universe,” these minerals are integral to its economic future. Past trade disputes, including China’s withholding of rare earths from Japan in 2010, should cause concern, as they show Beijing is willing to ignore international trade norms surrounding critical metals and minerals. As the trade war between the United States and China escalates, there is a risk that China may leverage these minerals’ geopolitical power and restrict their export to the United States.
Transition towards renewables will require massive increase in resources—results in petrostate like autocracies and violent coups
Lind 22 [Michael Lind, 4-5-2022, a columnist at Tablet and a fellow at New America, "Limited Resources and the Problem with Clean Energy," Tablet Magazine, | czx]
It may be that financial and economic sanctions are enough to force Russia to retreat or negotiate. But Germany, the major NATO economy after the United States, is dependent on Russian oil and gas, which Germans continue to buy, partly subsidizing Putin’s military. At the same time, the world’s largest nation and its biggest economy (in purchasing power parity terms), China, which has surpassed the United States in many areas of manufacturing if not yet software, is in a position to help Russia endure Western sanctions as part of a common crusade to drive the United States out of their regional spheres of influence.
Even the beneficiaries of U.S. dependence on China—Silicon Valley, universities, Wall Street, “green” technologies that need Chinese imports—are being forced to acknowledge that we still live in a material world in which countries can be great powers even if they do not dominate global banking and insurance markets, on the basis of mining energy and minerals, growing crops, and making physical things. Russia and Ukraine together are responsible for more than a quarter of global wheat exports. Russia and Belarus together produce nearly half of the global exports of potash, a critical nutrient used in fertilizers, while Russia produces more than a fifth of the ammonia exports used in global agriculture.
For its part, China dominates global production of many essential minerals, both directly—producing 63% of rare earths and 45% of molybdenum—and indirectly, by investing in lithium mines in Australia, platinum mines in South Africa, and cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
A few decades ago, the United States mined and refined many of the minerals it now imports. But thanks to cheap labor abroad, excessive environmental regulations at home, and the fantasy of the post-material “information economy,” the U.S. government allowed corporations to shut down many American mines even as other firms shuttered American factories. The energy analyst Mark P. Mills describes the result:
As recently as 1990, the U.S. was the world’s number-one producer of minerals. Today, it is in seventh place. …
More relevant, as the United States Geological Survey (USGS) notes, are strategic dependencies on specific critical minerals. In 1954, the U.S. was 100% dependent on imports for eight minerals. Today, the U.S. is 100% reliant on imports for 17 minerals and depends on imports for over 50% of 29 widely used minerals. China is a significant source for half of those 29 minerals.
Along with free market globalism, the environmental movement has crippled and endangered the economies of the United States and its allies. Rejecting the asceticism of the old Malthusian left that called for voluntary poverty, edgrowth, and population decline through anti-natalism, establishment environmentalist leaders like Al Gore and his European counterparts have optimistically claimed that existing technology permits a rapid “green transition” from fossil fuels and nuclear energy to solar, wind, and hydro power, with no need to lower Western living standards or cripple what remains of Western industry.
But according to experts on global mineral production who belong to SoS Minerals, in a letter delivered to the British Committee on Climate Change:
The metal resource needed to make all cars and vans electric by 2050 and all sales to be purely battery electric [in the UK] by 2035. To replace all UK-based vehicles today with electric vehicles (not including the LGV and HGV fleets), assuming they use the most resource-frugal next-generation NMC 811 batteries, would take 207,900 tonnes cobalt, 264,600 tonnes of lithium carbonate (LCE), at least 7,200 tonnes of neodymium and dysprosium, in addition to 2,362,500 tonnes copper. This represents, just under two times the total annual world cobalt production, nearly the entire world production of neodymium, three quarters the world’s lithium production and 12% of the world’s copper production during 2018. Even ensuring the annual supply of electric vehicles only, from 2035 as pledged, will require the UK to annually import the equivalent of the entire annual cobalt needs of European industry. …
Challenges of using ‘green energy’ to power electric cars: If wind farms are chosen to generate the power for the projected two billion cars at UK average usage, this requires the equivalent of a further years’ worth of total global copper supply and 10 years’ worth of global neodymium and dysprosium production to build the windfarms.
There is not enough cobalt, neodymium, or lithium being mined and refined in the entire world today for Britain to meet its green transition goals in the next generation. And Britain has only 67 million people. The United States has 330 million. The world has nearly 8 billion. Do the math.
“Clean” energy is not clean. No less than natural gas and oil extraction, extracting the minerals required for solar, wind, and hydro power equipment requires massive mines and destruction of local landscapes and ecosystems. For pointing out this obvious fact, the left-wing filmmaker Michael Moore’s documentary Planet of the Humans was denounced by the organized green lobby, and Moore himself has been canceled by the left.
While some democracies like Australia, Canada, and the United States have significant mineral resources, many of the countries with large mineral resources and reserves are autocracies or fragile postcolonial regimes: China (gold, tin, and bauxite, used to make aluminum), Indonesia (nickel, tin, gold), and Russia (oil, gas, nickel). Half of global cobalt reserves are found in one country—the Democratic Republic of Congo. Substitutes for some of these minerals may be discovered or synthesized. But in other cases, natural deposits of elements that are essential to an advanced industrial society may give particular countries enormous economic windfalls.
During and after the first Cold War, many Westerners assumed that capitalism was associated with democracy and liberalism, and communism with autocracy. But economies based on resource capitalism or a single commodity crop (“banana republics”) have so often been ruled by dictatorships or oligarchies that the phenomenon is known as the “resource curse.”
To excel in global manufacturing, a country has to have a well-educated workforce, while innovation requires a high degree of intellectual (if not political) freedom. But if a government or economic elite derives its income simply by selling other countries the products of its mines or farms or ranches, what Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson call an “extractive” regime, it has no incentive to educate most of the population or respect their rights and every incentive to enserf or enslave the miners or agricultural workers. And if the route to personal political power and wealth in a nation lies through control of the nation’s oil fields, mines, or agricultural estates, ambitious individuals will be tempted to dispense with cumbersome elections and to seize power and resources directly through assassination and coup d’etat.
We Americans should recognize this pattern in our own history. The “original sin” of the United States was not slavery or racism; it was plantation agriculture. The Southern planters—oligarchs who raised first tobacco and then cotton for export—did not care what race their unfree workers were, settling on African and African American slaves only after experiments with exploiting Native American labor and European indentured servants had failed. And as Barbara Fields and other scholars have observed, Southern racism was formulated and enforced to rationalize labor exploitation in the plantation system, both before and after the abolition of slavery.
Far from being “backward” or “premodern,” the 19th-century Southern planter oligarchy, like the theocratic monarchy in 21st-century Saudi Arabia, was a product of modernity. As Britain and the Northern United States industrialized, the demands of their factories for Southern cotton grew and enriched the lords of cotton, just as global industrial development has enriched the monarchs and military dictators of various contemporary petrostates. Southern planters and Saudi princes, like Russian oligarchs, recycled the wealth they gained from the industrial regions by importing manufactured goods and vacationing and buying luxury real estate abroad.
This kind of elite “co-dependency” is built into industrial capitalism. The more advanced the technology becomes, the richer become those who, through fair means or force and fraud, control the appropriate industrial inputs and energy supplies. The genius of the creative entrepreneur in the diversified industrial economy who improves the quality of life of working class people with innovative goods may indirectly create corresponding fortunes in poor countries with deposits of essential minerals ruled by hereditary cliques or military dictators.
A green transition, then, will not necessarily lead to a liberal democratic world. Rather, it may simply ensure that petrostate oligarchs will have to share Swiss banks and swank London and New York neighborhoods and New England prep schools with counts of cobalt and lords of lithium, whose yachts and mansions may be as impressive as those of Jeff Bezos or Putin’s fellow kleptocrats. Generations of politicians from liberal democracies who are yet unborn may find themselves forced to flatter the president-for-life who controls a large bauxite deposit or the junta whose country sits atop a lot of samarium.
Last but not least, great powers like the United States that have decided to forgo entire areas of manufacturing as well as resource mining and refining may find that cornering the global market in insurance, investment banking, and adolescent action movies may not help them in the global resource competition to come.
Renewables will incite wars to control more land
Johansmeyer 22 [Tom Johansmeyer, 09-26-22, Tom Johansmeyer is head of PCS, a Verisk business, which estimates the industry-wide insured losses from disaster events around the world. He writes and speaks regularly on natural catastrophes, cyber attacks, and political violence events. How Renewable Energy Could Set the Stage for Future Resource Conflict, | czx]
We’ve heard about wars fought for oil for the past century, even if the concept has been exaggerated a bit. In the future, the contested commodity could shift from fossil fuels to water. More than 15% of the world’s water conflicts over the past 4,000 years have arisen since 2020. The notion that wars are fought for resources is almost beyond dispute, and there could be more drivers of conflict coming. Often seen as an alternative to fossil fuels, for which wars clearly have been fought, renewable energy could lead to its own resource conflicts.
The push for renewable energy sources through 2035 and 2050 makes the need for wind and other forms of renewable power obvious. Unfortunately, you can’t just pop up a wind turbine or lay out some solar panels. Geography matters. Renewable energy requires favorable conditions, creating a linkage between energy security and physical locations that could result in future military threats. Taking action to prevent wars over renewable resources starts with experience, which is in short supply. However, the conflict in Ukraine offers some early insights, even if there is a slight a mismatch of circumstances.
There’s no doubt that renewable energy will shape the global energy mix over the coming decades. We won’t be able to achieve IPCC emissions reduction targets without a mix of renewable sources. A wide range of factors could impede progress, from the economic security of extractive resources exporters to a shortage of high-quality green investment alternatives to entrenched large fossil fuel companies. However, those are likely more manageable than what could be the most significant barrier: Geography. Wind and solar require specific characteristics, as do geothermal and hydro. The connection between certain regions and favorable renewable energy characteristic entails a natural scarcity of renewable energy production, simply because some locations better than others.
The relative scarcity of regions favorable to renewable energy production could cause some to become contested, in much the same way that fossil fuel producing regions have been. Wind power illustrates the issues associated with geography that shrink the amount of viable wind power production location and creates scarcity, which could ultimately lead to shortages and thus conflict. Wind requires space – a lot of it, with a 200-megawatt facility potentially occupying 13 square miles. Sheer space isn’t enough, though. Wind farms need a lot of space in the right place. They need to be close to sources of demand, reasonably unobtrusive for trade and aesthetic purposes, and in jurisdictions familiar enough with the technology. Further, wind farms require conditions that make sense, to include target average wind speeds enabled by “nonforested, ice-free, nonurban areas.”
Plenty of locations around the world meet the criteria necessary for wind power generation suitability, but they remain reasonably scarce – with similar situations for other renewable energy sources. It’s not inconceivable, therefore, that access to optimal renewable energy areas could become an international security issue, particularly for countries that see renewable energy as a contributor to energy independence, rather than just as a way to manage climate risk, as Ukraine and Taiwan do. The need to protect land favorable to renewable energy production takes the notion of energy security into the realm of military security, as well. Such areas could be exposed to threats from adversaries seeking either to destabilize through disruption of energy production or simply take control of renewable energy capabilities.
The truism that wars are fought over oil may not be broad enough. A successful energy transition could mean that wars will be fought over wind and other renewable natural resources, as long as there is a strong geographical connection. And while we aren’t seeing wars fought for wind yet, the impact of conflict on renewable energy has found early precedent. The conflict in Ukraine was not driven by strategic considerations related to geography suitable for wind and other forms of renewable energy, but it has found the part of the country with most of its wind and renewable energy capabilities.
Most of Ukraine’s wind power assets are located from Odesa to Luhansk and are directly exposed to the conflict. In fact, 90% of Ukraine’s wind farms sit along that stretch. Damage has already begun, with at least two turbines from different owners destroyed and more affected. The insurance tab alone for wind farms in Ukraine could exceed $800 million, a number that still could go higher. Solar power plant economic and insured losses have yet to be revealed but are expected to be significant. Although the circumstances of damage do not align perfectly with the notion of renewable resource conflict sketched out above, the current conflict in Ukraine can offer important lessons for future renewable energy security.
Foremost is the importance of post-conflict recovery and reconstruction of renewable energy assets, which may be as important as traditional defense considerations. While you wouldn’t want to leave such infrastructure exposed, no defense is perfect, and plans for rapid and cost-effective recovery are crucial, especially for facilities that may be owned by private companies based in other jurisdictions. Several factors have arisen from the impact of the conflict on renewable energy so far.
Renewable energy may be natural, but the components used to harness it are not. Energy independence is only as resilient as the sourcing of components and raw materials necessary for the likes of solar panels and wind turbine, such as cobalt, nickel, and other minerals. While the affected nation may not need to source them directly, the necessary raw materials need to be available to the manufacturer of renewable energy equipment, which could be complicated in cases where an aggressor nation is also rich in relevant resources.
In addition to raw materials, demand for renewable energy equipment could frustrate the recovery and reconstruction process. Recent supply chain challenges for renewable energy equipment resulting from the pandemic are worth noting, but they have also occurred during a period of increased demand. Wind power installations are growing rapidly, as are renewables in general. Repair demand has to compete with new installation demand, which could elongate the time needed for recovery, increasing attendant post-conflict security risks – including political, economic, and societal concerns. Developing a renewable energy mix that includes faster and less expensive restoration of service can reduce that risk, as evidenced by the possibility of having solar facilities installed in western Ukraine by the end of the year.
Finally, the importance of predictable capital flows can’t be overstated. Recovery is fueled by cash, and conflict aftermath can involve plenty of competing interests. A quick scan of the Kyiv School of Economics assessment of the implications of the conflict so far provides an indication of the potential cost. The process of post-conflict remediation is further frustrated by the fact foreign aid tends to be negotiated during and after a conflict – i.e., during a period of peak need. Securing resources can be a volatile process, with distribution compounding that volatility. The fact that the wind farms in Ukraine are insured offers an additional lesson for renewable energy security. Pre-negotiated terms should result in higher-velocity capital with increased certainty of use. The wind farms have greater predictability of capital flow because of their insurance, which should factor into future considerations of the economic aspects of renewable energy security.
Conclusion
Energy transition should entail a security transition, as well. Moving from fossil fuels to renewables may lessen demand for the former and the attendant risk of conflict from resource competition, but that does not mean the risk of energy-related conflict will subside. Air and sunshine may seem to be everywhere, but some parts of the world are more favorable to capturing their power than others, which could form the basis for a new form of energy competition – one particularly suited to the age of renewable energy.
To keep pace with the evolving nature of energy security, plans should adapt to the specific nature of the assets involved. Beyond the basic tenets of protecting critical national infrastructure, special attention should be paid to reconstruction and recovery. Already, the conflict in Ukraine has yielded new insights that could become important inputs into refreshed national energy strategies, from sourcing input raw materials to financing post-conflict recovery. With renewable energy set to become an increasingly important part of the global energy mix over the next 30 years, absorbing and implementing the lessons from the effects of the Ukraine conflict on wind and solar farms will be fundamental to energy security throughout the transition