Benefits of state welfare reform spill over to all citizens.
Bartik 02 – [Timothy J, Senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; “Spillover Effects of Welfare Reforms in State Labor Markets”, Journal of Regional Science, 2002, https://web-p-ebscohost-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=0&sid=8d973e1b-d268-47ec-9030-f21d69f0e5b7%40redis]
State governments are carrying out welfare reforms to increase the employment of welfare recipients. A state's welfare reforms may have large effects on wages and employment rates of many state residents, including those who never receive welfare benefits. This paper reports new estimates of labor market effects of a state's welfare reform policies. Estimates are reported for several types of welfare reforms, including work requirements, financial incentives for working, wage subsidies to employers, and community service jobs. Such estimates of the effects of welfare reform on the earnings of persons not receiving welfare benefits -- the ``spillover'' effects of welfare reform -- are unprecedented in the research literature. Moreover, spillover effects are rarely estimated for any labor market policies.
State welfare reforms have often been evaluated. However, these evaluations focus on the effects of welfare reforms on the welfare recipients who participate in the reforms. However, if a state's welfare reform increases the labor supply or demand for reform participants, labor market models suggest the reforms will change prevailing wages and employment rates, which will affect many persons who do not receive welfare, or who do receive welfare but did not participate in the reform program. For example, suppose that a state reform increases the labor supply of some welfare recipients. In most labor market models, this increase in labor supply will decrease wage rates. The jobs obtained by those welfare recipients added to the labor market will reduce job vacancies, making it harder for nonparticipants to find jobs, thereby increasing the unemployment rate of nonparticipants. The decrease in state wage rates and increase in state unemployment rates will cause some increase in employers' demand for labor, and some decrease in labor force participation and net migration.
This paper estimates a structural model of the state's labor market that describes the labor supply, demand, and wages of different demographic groups. The model allows for involuntary unemployment. The model is estimated using pooled time-series cross-section data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), with annual observations on average labor market variables for the 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1979 to 1997. The model includes five groups: men and women, each divided into a less- and a more-educated group, and with less-educated women divided into a single mother group and the remainder of less-educated women. This model is used to simulate the effects of state welfare reforms on the wages and employment of single mothers and the overall population. The state reforms include increasing the ``quantity'' of labor supply or demand of single mothers, and paying wage subsidies to single mothers or their employers.
The simulation results suggest that spillover effects of state welfare reforms are large. Policies that increase the quantity of labor demanded or supplied for welfare recipients have significant displacement effects. The net increase in jobs due to a community service jobs program is considerably less than the number of participants holding these jobs; the net increase in jobs due to work requirements for welfare recipients is considerably less than the number of jobs found by those forced to work. Wages change due to welfare reforms. For example, wage subsidies to labor demand for single mothers increase overall wages by an amount similar in magnitude to the wage subsidies. Spillover effects vary with the state's unemployment rate. For example, displacement effects of labor supply policies are worse when state unemployment is high, whereas displacement effects of labor demand policies are worse when state unemployment is low.