(2NC) TANF should be used as an automatic stabilizer for the economy.
Justin Schweitzer, 4-5-2022, Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress and a masters from John Hopkins in Applied Economics "TANF Must Be Able To Respond Faster and Stronger to Economic Crises," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/tanf-must-be-able-to-respond-faster-and-stronger-to-economic-crises/ Accessed 7/19/2023. 🔔
Nevertheless, TANF is still vital to the families who do receive assistance, providing them with critical funds to buy basic necessities when their incomes are low, as well as connecting them to jobs, training, and other supports such as child care and domestic violence services.7 Yet most families in need either do not receive this assistance or receive too little of it. Making matters worse, since TANF is federally structured in a way that disincentivizes and hinders states from fully matching the amount of aid to the level of need, these problems are exacerbated during economic crises, when the number of people facing poverty and hardship rises rapidly.8
The solution to this problem: automatic stabilizers. In contrast to TANF’s current structure, automatic stabilizers are programs or features of the budget designed to quickly respond to changing economic conditions by expanding or contracting with the level of need, without waiting for a vote or new action from policymakers.9 Importantly, automatic stabilizers simultaneously protect individuals and stimulate the broader economy by providing vital assistance when people experience sudden drops in their incomes; supporting critical spending power; and multiplying in effectiveness during major economic downturns, when many households are facing big budget crunches. For example, unemployment insurance (UI) is an automatic stabilizer that significantly increases spending during recessions to cover the additional people losing their sources of income—although many still do not receive their benefits due to deteriorated administrative capacity, flawed eligibility rules, and defective verification or anti-fraud systems.10 In addition, UI’s Extended Benefits program kicks in automatically during periods of high unemployment after workers exhaust their regular UI benefits.11
Automatic stabilizers are programs or features of the budget designed to quickly respond to changing economic conditions by expanding or contracting with the level of need, without waiting for a vote or new action from policymakers.
In many ways, TANF is the opposite of an effective automatic stabilizer. Because the program is a block grant, it is provided the same amount of funding every year, regardless of need across the country, and it is resistant to efforts to make it more responsive. Due to inflation, TANF is getting stretched thinner each year. At present, however, most states do not spend nearly enough of even just their current allocations on core elements of the program—such as direct cash assistance, child care, and work supports—that are most helpful for low-income families.12 Additionally, the performance measures, rules, and incentives that the federal government enforces for state TANF agencies such as WPR requirements and lifetime use limits—as well as the lack of national minimum standards for spending—actually discourage states from providing assistance to more families in need, especially during recessions. While Congress could give the federal government the ability to set strong minimum standards for TANF benefits, states still have significant flexibility to better spend their TANF funds.
The speed of an automatic stabilizer’s response to increased need is a critical feature.13 As the pandemic has shown, Congress—even when in emergency mode—can take months to pass a bill expanding safety net benefits and will typically set arbitrary end dates that do not reflect conditions on the ground.14 For this reason, it is crucial that Congress establish strong automatic stabilizers with programs such as TANF during stable economic times, instead of waiting for a crisis to hit to recognize their importance.
Unlike TANF, programs that are closer to being true automatic stabilizers—such as UI, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and Medicaid—significantly increase the total amount of benefits paid out as the number of eligible households grows, albeit still with some shortcomings in the benefit amounts and delivery.15 As Figure 1 shows, during the past three recessions, TANF lagged noticeably behind these other programs in expanding to cover newly eligible participants as the number of households facing economic hardship grew. And as Figure 2 shows, approval rates for TANF applications have been steadily declining since the program’s founding in 1996 and, in fact, dropped significantly in 2020 at the onset of the pandemic.
In periods of financial hardship, even seemingly small amounts of assistance from TANF can be immensely beneficial to low-income families trying to afford necessities such as clothes and groceries. This assistance can make a profound difference in local economies by supporting families’ abilities to spend. TANF need not be a catch-all automatic stabilizer that solves every problem in society in order to be effective—but it should be able to quickly expand to provide meaningful assistance to everyone falling into financial hardship, fulfilling some of their basic needs and working in conjunction with other aid programs that make up the country’s economic safety net. If TANF were set up to more rapidly respond at the onset of economic downturns, it would be able to help prevent individuals and families from being trapped in poverty and halt recessionary spirals that always fall hardest on low-income households.
Lessons from TANF’s structure in past downturns
TANF was originally created with a $2 billion Contingency Fund that was intended to act partially as an automatic stabilizer itself by providing more funding to states when economic conditions worsened. However, the Contingency Fund quickly proved to be inadequately funded, too difficult to access, and too loose in what it allowed states to spend the extra money on.29
Only seven states were able to receive money from the Contingency Fund in fiscal year 2008, and only 18 states received money in FY 2009.30 This was due to restrictive and somewhat arbitrary economic triggers: In any given year, states either had to have SNAP caseloads 10 percent above 1994–1995 levels or unemployment rates 10 percent higher than those from the same period during either of the previous two years—meaning that a state with slowly decreasing unemployment could lose eligibility while the rate was still high. In addition, the more stringent MOE requirements on contingency funds were hard for many states to meet during recessions, when their budgets were contracting.31 Moreover, states that did access the fund were not obligated to spend that money on needs related to the weak economy and heightened individual hardship; they could instead cut benefits and eligibility—as several did during the Great Recession—while using the funds to fill other budget holes.32 In the face of a significant ongoing recession, the Contingency Fund was fully depleted by December 2009, with the $334 million added for FY 2011 exhausted in just two months.33
Recognizing that the Contingency Fund was not effective enough during the Great Recession, Congress established the TANF Contingency Emergency Fund34—more commonly known as the “Emergency Fund”—to distribute additional money to state TANF programs. During COVID-19, Congress created the Pandemic Emergency Assistance Fund35 to serve the same purpose. However, in both cases, these TANF emergency funds were developed with significant flaws that made them insufficient to meet the full level of need.36
While the Emergency Fund was an effective tool, its funding was finite and came with an expiration date—September 30, 2010—that seriously limited its impact.37 Despite ongoing need due to a slow economic recovery and despite the relative effectiveness of the funds that had been spent—particularly the subsidized jobs programs that the Emergency Fund enabled states to expand38—the fund’s success was stunted because most states cut off or significantly reduced the additional aid after or even months before the expiration date.39 Additionally, the state allocations were based on the original TANF block grant allotments, so the Emergency Fund perpetuated and exacerbated the initial inequities among states.40
It is crucial that safety net programs such as TANF are accessible and available to provide assistance during periods of hardship.
On a positive note, the Emergency Fund’s nonrecurrent short-term (NRST) benefits—such as temporary emergency cash, rent, or utility payments—and subsidized employment were not classified as “assistance” and therefore were not required to go only to Americans eligible for TANF cash assistance, nor did they count toward time limits for TANF benefits.41 Yet states were not explicitly prevented from lowering time limits, tightening eligibility, or increasing work and behavior requirements and sanctions, such as docking cash assistance, so many families were still denied opportunities for help.42
In many ways, the Pandemic Emergency Assistance Fund, created in 2021 in response to the devastating economic pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic, seemed to improve upon past iterations, but it still suffered from the same fundamental problems. More restrictions were placed on how states could spend the funds—limiting them to only offering NRST benefits that would go directly to families in need without counting against time limits43—rather than allowing states to shift money around to plug other budget holes.44 State allocations of the emergency fund, meanwhile, were improved by basing the allotments on the child population and prior TANF spending on cash and emergency assistance and NRST benefits in each state and Washington, D.C., as well as by reallocating any unspent funds to other states that did spend all of theirs.45 However, total funding across states was just $1 billion and will expire in September 2022, less than two years after the fund’s inception, and individual families are not permitted to use NRST benefits for more than four months.
Even if lawmakers learn from past TANF emergency funds and pass new ones with marginal improvements to spending and eligibility rules during future recessions, these funds will likely still have the same fundamental flaws of being enacted too late in the crisis, being too limited in funding, and being too short in timespan—flaws that exacerbate suffering among the families that can least afford it. Without significant reforms that tie meaningful additional funding to accessible automatic triggers, TANF will never be structured to respond effectively to economic downturns.