(2NC) TANF reform can solve inequality by encouraging states to hire ELR’s.
Justin Schweitzer, 4-5-2022, Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress and a masters from John Hopkins in Applied Economics "TANF Must Be Able To Respond Faster and Stronger to Economic Crises," Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/tanf-must-be-able-to-respond-faster-and-stronger-to-economic-crises/ Accessed 7/19/2023. 🔔
Replace the work participation rate and caseload reduction credit with new success measures that incentivize covering more families, not less
The main performance measure imposed on state TANF programs by the federal government is the work participation rate.57 In order for states to keep their full federal TANF funding, they must ensure that 90 percent of TANF recipients in two-parent families and 50 percent of all participating households meet requirements on work activities, including participating in subsidized or unsubsidized employment, job search activities, and training. States can also receive a caseload reduction credit that reduces the WPR requirement by 1 percentage point for every percent below the base year—currently 2005—that their TANF caseload is, meaning that the more a state lowers the number of families it assists through TANF, the easier it is for that state to meet its federal requirement on work participation.58
Combined, the WPR and CRC directly incentivize states to reduce the number of people they assist through TANF; to assist only the people for whom it will be easiest to find employment rather than those with the greatest need; and to employ a “work first” mentality whereby rapidly placing recipients in any job is more important than addressing significant barriers in their lives and setting them on a stable and sustainable career path.59 In 2020, 30 out of 54 states and territories had caseloads that were less than half the size they were in 2005—when caseloads were already fairly low—meaning they received a 50 percentage-point CRC and faced a WPR requirement of 0 percent for all TANF households. (see Figure 3) Again, states were rewarded despite the fact that for every 100 families in poverty in 2020, only 21 received TANF cash assistance.60
During the Great Recession, a federal “hold harmless” provision allowed states to apply the lowest annual caseload from 2007 to 2011 to the CRC in order to lower their WPR requirements as they took on more families in need.61 However, in 2012 and 2013 many of the states that did increase caseloads were financially penalized after the “hold harmless” provision expired because those states then had a lower CRC and consequently failed to meet their WPR requirement.62
In the COVID-19-induced recession, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services granted relief from financial penalties to states that did not meet their WPR requirements and encouraged them to grant broad good-cause waivers of work requirements to their TANF recipients.63 Despite this temporary relief, many states were still reluctant to increase caseloads in the past two recessions because they accurately foresaw that the additional federal TANF funds would expire or be spent before the additional costs of increasing caseloads dissipated.64
The WPR and CRC should be permanently replaced, and the federal government needs to create better success measures for TANF programs that incentivize states to focus on outcomes and deliver assistance to as many families in need as possible. This is particularly necessary to ensure that states are being pushed to increase caseloads during a recession, rather than to decrease them as they are currently incentivized to do.
These improved performance measures should include some combination of metrics for the following:
The number of families in poverty who receive assistance—for example, the TANF-to-poverty ratio65
The size of the benefits—particularly direct cash assistance—that participating families receive
The percentage of total funds that each state spends on core supports such as cash assistance, child care, and subsidized employment
The quality and long-term stability of the jobs into which people on or leaving TANF get matched
To incentivize states to help as many people as much as possible, the federal government should reward them with additional funds when they reach higher levels in each of these metrics. The federal government should also set stricter national standards for minimum allowable levels in each of these performance measures.
If the WPR and CRC are not permanently replaced, they should, at the very least, automatically be suspended until the economy has fully recovered.66 The base year for the CRC also must automatically be adjusted to either the last year before the downturn is determined to have ended or some future year, so that states are assured they will not be punished for helping their residents by increasing caseloads during recessions.