State Governments are terrible at fiscal redistribution.
Paul E. Peterson ’96, is the Henry Lee Shattuck Professor of Government and Director of the Program on Education Policy and Governance at Harvard University, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and Senior Editor of Education Next, a journal of opinion and research. “When to Devolve” October 1. https://webarchive.urban.org/UploadedPDF/pub_06.pdf Rxie
The Redistributive Capacity of States and Localities For the same reason that local governments are well-suited to providing economic development—to attract labor and capital—they are not effective at serving the needs of the poor, the sick, and the disabled. Programs that serve these needs may be characterized as primarily redistributive, because they shift resources from the “haves” to the “have nots.” Generally speaking, local governments shun such programs. For example, they avoid progressive income taxes. Only about 3 percent of local revenues comes from this source. Any locality making a serious attempt to tax high-income groups for programs targeting the poor will attract more poor citizens and drive away the most productive local contributors elsewhere. No amount of determination on the part of local political leaders can make redistributive efforts succeed. If no other force is able to stop their efforts, bankruptcy will. The smaller the territorial reach of a local government, the less its capacity for redistribution. Most small suburbs in metropolitan areas have almost no capacity to meet the special needs of low-income citizens, because the effects of such actions would be immediately felt in the suburb’s tax rate, property values, and attractiveness to business. The greater territorial reach of states makes them better at redistribution than most local governments. The costs of moving across state lines are more substantial than those of changing residence within a metropolitan area. In contrast to the 17 percent of the population who change residence every year, only 3 percent move across a state line. Even so, labor and capital can and do move, and states must take that possibility into account in their policymaking. Since 1962, state and local redistributive spending has edged up slightly, from a very low 2.2 percent of GNP in 1962 to 3.5 percent in 1990. Over the same period, national government redistributive spending has more than doubled, rising from 4.9 percent to 10.3 percent of GNP. Thus, as a share of the nation’s expenditures on the elderly, the poor, and the needy, state and local redistributive spending has declined. In 1962, states and localities contributed 31 percent of the nation’s redistributive expenditures; in 1990, they contributed only 25 percent. The trend is particularly striking, since it took place during the period when the civil rights movement awakened the country to problems of poverty, the government introduced the Great Society program, and entitlements became an entrenched part of American social policy. State and local reluctance to participate in the redistributive movement cannot be attributed to the political climate. Over most of the period between 1962 and 1990, Democrats controlled at least part of state government in most states and held unified control in many. Less state and local involvement in redistribution is rooted not in partisan politics but in the competitive pressures that limit state redistributive capacities. To understand these pressures, Kenneth Scheve, Jr., Mark Rom, and I estimated the effects of the benefit THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR No. 6 2 Less state and local involvement in redistribution is rooted not in partisan politics but in the competitive pressures that limit state redistributive capacities. States act as if they fear becoming a magnet for the poor and the sick, resulting in a “race to the bottom” as each state tries to shift redistributive costs to other states. levels of neighboring states on a state’s average cash welfare benefits and Medicaid expenditures per recipient. Our estimate, based on annual data for the years 1976 to 1989, took into account interstate differences in tax capacity, poverty rates, and partisan control. We found that a state cuts its average benefits per recipient by $30 for every $100 that benefits during the previous year exceeded those of the average contiguous state. Welfare benefits were further cut if a state’s poverty population was on the increase. We also found that Medicaid benefits were subject to similar downward pressures. These findings suggest that states act as if they fear becoming a magnet for the poor and the sick, resulting in a “race to the bottom” as each state tries to shift redistributive costs to other states. Current economic trends are further limiting state and local redistributive capacity. Capital, entrepreneurial activity, and skilled labor have become ever more mobile. State and local governments now face increasingly competitive relationships with each other and must attend ever more strictly to economic development. The result is that they are growing ever more reluctant to provide for the needy within their ranks.