Federalism fails – exacerbates inequality and political disunity.
Douglas Walker, 6-28-2020, "The Divided States of America: Why Federalism Doesn’t Work, by Donald F. Kettl," OUP Academic, https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/50/3/e8/5864197
In The Divided States of America, Donald F. Kettl, a professor at the University of Texas–Austin, assesses federalism and its effects in the contemporary United States. Beginning with the dubious premise that federalism has fallen out of both popular and scholarly discourse—the latter in particular ignores the ever-increasing scholarship on the topic—Kettl concludes pessimistically that federalism is in “deep crisis” and must be restructured (p. 7). The book’s thesis can be stated briefly. Federalism exacerbates inequality by permitting states to pursue different policies, leading to different policy outcomes for citizens depending on where one lives. Moreover, inequality is both morally unacceptable and a significant cause of poor life outcomes and political disunity. Therefore, greater federal control of policymaking is essential to the health of the nation. In fleshing out this narrative, Kettl identifies “four generations of federalism” in the United States. The first lasted from the founding to the Fourteenth Amendment and emphasized the legal limitations that the Tenth Amendment placed on federal power. The second comprised the time from 1868 to 1954 during which the U.S. Supreme Court espoused the “separate but equal” doctrine that gutted the protections intended by the Fourteenth Amendment. The third generation was inaugurated by the Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 and ended in 1968 at the close of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society. Since the Richard Nixon administration, Americans have been living in the fourth generation. While each of these periods reveals federalism to be deeply implicated in inequality, the first three deal with racial inequality, whereas the last one deals with inequality in government services. Paired with Kettl’s belief that federalism has become increasingly significant and problematic since the 1960s (p. 13), this periodization curiously implies that federalism was less harmful when states could appeal to decentralization to protect racially discriminatory policies. The first three generations are discussed in cursory fashion. In Kettl’s telling, American federalism primarily served as a mechanism to accommodate slavery and racial discrimination (e.g., 32, 87). He implies that slavery was the primary reason the Constitution protected state autonomy. And, while he does discuss the fight over the national bank and McCullough v. Maryland, he ignores ignore important non-racial topics such as the Alien and Sedition Acts, the War of 1812, and the Nullification Crisis. One gets the impression that if slavery had not existed, neither would federalism. Scholars disagree on federalism’s relationship to racism, but Kettl fails to provide a balanced or nuanced treatment of the complex debate over early American federalism. While the Southern states certainly would not have ratified an abolitionist Constitution, opposition to centralization did not track along sectional lines and discussions of race did not intersect much with discussions of centralization. Some of the strongest supporters of centralization hailed from Virginia, while many prominent Anti-Federalists lived in Northern states. In any case, the bulk of the book focuses on the fourth generation of federalism in the post-1968 era. Throughout the 20th century, traditional restraints on federal spending and regulation subsided, enabling the federal government to use fiscal incentives as a tool to accomplish policy objectives. The government used intergovernmental grants to funnel money to cities during the New Deal and to build the interstate highway system after World War II. Yet for Kettl, fiscal federalism became more destructive in the 1970s. He frequently asserts that Johnson’s Great Society program in the 1960s represented a “national consensus … that inequality was unacceptable,” (p. 79) entailing that “the nation had committed itself to shrinking the gaping inequalities in American society” (p. 129). However, this promise was betrayed by repeated compromises that secured political support for new programs, such as Medicaid, by giving state governments the power to administer them. States were given federal dollars and relatively free rein to pursue national policy goals in their own way. Inevitably, states chose different policies, and some worked harder than others to combat inequality. In the wake of the Affordable Care Act of 2010, for instance, some states created their own health care exchanges while others used federally created exchanges, and some states expanded Medicaid while others did not. Some states spend more money per capita than other states on public goods such as infrastructure, schools, or clean air. The result, Kettl concludes, has been ever-widening inequality that threatens quality of life in the United States. The U.S. is the world’s most unequal wealthy country. Some states have more poverty or inequality than others (pp. 80–85). States differ across a range of outcomes, such as health care, education, crime, and infrastructure. Citing better-performing federal countries such as Canada, Germany, and Switzerland, Kettl concludes that it is not federalism in general but “the particular American version that is the source of the problem” (p. 89). Inequalities occur in large part because some state governments have more money to spend than others. If the Great Society programs were managed centrally from Washington, the federal government could redistribute money from wealthier states to poorer ones, ensuring that outcomes do not depend on where one lives (ex. 18). In addition to being morally unacceptable in itself, Kettl believes that inequality literally is tearing America apart. He cites studies showing that higher inequality is associated with lower levels of societal trust, and that lower trust is associated with less confidence in governmental decisions (p. 140). Moreover, trust in government—especially the federal government—has declined since the 1950s. These trends, Kettle concludes, pose “real and profound” threats to the “American experiment” (p. 142). Kettl ultimately calls for a new Great Society, but with less state control of policy implementation. Federal money would be shifted to prioritize “inequality-busting initiatives,” with much of this money transferred directly to local governments (p. 198). States would continue to implement many policies, but under greater federal oversight and accountability. Kettl is confident that a stronger commitment to fighting inequality by the federal government—combined with enough dollars to force the states to cooperate—would check the tendency toward inequality, misery, polarization, and distrust.