The aff’s acts of financial redistribution only further proves their attempt to create a perfect market through the desire to achieve maximal efficiency. To escape this desire and obsession they must realize that a perfect market does not exist and is theoretically and empirically impossible. Continuing down the path of perfecting a market without realizing that it is impossible only leads to complacency through incorrect, biased conclusions
Schroeder 98, (Jeanne L. Schroeder is a professor at Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva U, “The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, Harvard Law Review” Dec 1998, p. 483-558, JSTOR//JzLim
Mainstream economics is driven by a number of closely related ideals that I call, collectively, the "perfect market." Achieving the effi- ciency'03 of the perfect market is the object of the economist's desire. In this sense, the perfect market is the ideal or end to which an actual markets are the means. According to one school of law and economics, 1'04 efficiency would be achieved if the ideal perfect market were implemented. We should, therefor modify our legal and political institutions in order to make the act we can or, if that is impossible, to replicate the results of the perfect market as nearly as possible.105
Given the centrality of the ideal of the stream economics, one would expect that economic literature delineating its characteristics. Yet there is remarkable silence among law and economics advocates on the issue. I started this project largely because over the years I had heard numerous critics of law and economics assert that the concept of perfect markets was surprisingly poorly worked out, considering its importance. As a student of economics, I would reply, "That's nonsense. Every introductory economics textbook contains a discussion of the perfect market." Indeed, I thought I remembered reading such discussions, albeit twenty-plus years ago when I was a college student. "Show me," my interlocutors would challenge. In an attempt to prove them wrong, I searched for such a discussion. To my surprise, the only discussions I could find were generally sketchy and conclusory. This Commentary contains the results of my search for a coherent analysis of the perfect market. The surprising silence of the literature led me to try to understand not only the underlying logic of the concept of the perfect market so imperfectly described in the literature, but also the reason economists and lawyers (including myself) fail to attempt such an analysis and then repress this failure.
For example, Richard Posner's standard introduction to law and economics, Economic Analysis of Law,'06 does not define the concept of the perfect market. Classically trained economists, such as Ronald Coase and George Stigler, are scarcely braver.'07 Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus's introductory economics textbook on classic price theory108 contains only a few passing sentences about the parameters of this founding ideal.109 In works by other scholars, if discussed at all, selected conditions of the perfect market are alluded to in an in- complete and unsystematic way. Presumably, these authors assume that its characteristics are generally known and, therefore, need not be explicated.
Compare this phenomenon with William Blackstone's famous observation about property which opens his Commentaries: There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property .... And yet, there are very few, that will give themselves the trouble to consider the original and foundation of [property]. Pleased as we are with the possession we seem afraid to look back ... as if fearful ....110
I suggest that this embarrassed reticence relates to the essentially erotic nature of markets. Confronting what I have called the erotic origins of market theory causes us to blush with the same shame we feel when forced to consider our own erotic origins in the parental marriage bed. In both cases, we fear to gaze into the abyss. Why?
I believe the answer lies in the psychoanalytic nature of the perfect market. The ideal of the perfect market is located in the Real, while actual markets are located in the intersubjective order of the "Symbolic." The perfect market is therefore the death of the actual market.
The perfect market is an extraordinary no time, no space, no desire, no exchange objects – no subjectivity. Consequently, we cannot bear to contemplate the ideal of the perfect market directly, even as we cannot we erect in the "Imaginary" unthreatening fantasy images of the market that seem more satisfying than act than perfect markets. Indeed, being R Symbolic, the perfect market is not m unimaginable and unspeakable.
In order to continue to create, we must follow our desire. Yet we will lose the object of desire if we try to confront the fantasies we erect to stand in its place, as Orpheus found out when he tried to embrace Eurydice. Moreover, if we were actually to achieve our desire, we would lose not only our desire, but also our very existence as free sub- jects, as Orpheus and Lot's wife learned when they achieved jouissance.
Consequently, for the ideal of the perfect market to function, two things are necessary. First, its contours must be repressed and re- placed with a fantasy image. Second, desire must always be postponed. The ideal of the perfect market can never be achieved because to do so would destroy the actual market and our freedom. We dare not give way to our desire. What I am suggesting is that scholars may resist confronting their own ideal of the perfect market because they unconsciously fear that if they do so, they will have to abandon their fantasy structure. I argue that a close examination of the "perfect market" reveals that it is not merely empirically, but also theoretically, impossible. As such, it is not merely a poor tool for the study of actual markets - it may also impede that study. One might suggest that the impossibility of the perfect market is irrelevant to economic analysis. All ideals, this argument would posit, are impossible. And yet, it would continue, this does not mean that we should not strive to be as close to the ideal as possible. Although a more sophisticated analysis may be of some interest, this specific simplistic analysis is inept
First and foremost, I agree that one should not necessarily give up an ideal one has adopted for logical, religious, or other grounds- such as freedom, justice, grace, or whatever - just because it is empirically impossible. Rather, such ideals serve as one's inspiration even if they are not reasonable aspirations. My complaint about this strain of law and economics is not the empirical impossibility of the ideal, but the failure of economists to consider the implications of having a theoretically impossible ideal. This failure can lead to the incorrect conclusions that the goal has already been reached or is within sight, or that one's policy recommendations will result in the achievement of something close to the ideal, which can in turn result in complacency.
Let me clarify the nature of the impossibility of the perfect market (and of the Lacanian Real) that lies at the heart of my critique. It is common to compare the ideal of the perfect market to the impossible ideals of science."' This reveals a grave misunderstanding. The Real of the perfect market is not merely impossible to achieve as an empirical matter; it is also theoretically impossible. To understand this, it is useful to compare the impossibility of the Real to the empirical impossibility of scientific models. For example, the laws of motion posited by physics describe a perfectly frictionless world. This frictionless world is probably empirically impossible to replicate perfectly. The laws of motion are theoretically possible, however, in that they are in- ternally consistent. We can predict how objects would behave in such a world. We can use this idealized model to predict how objects should behave in the actual world, in which friction exists. We can develop empirical experiments in an attempt to falsify the hypothesis of the laws of motion."12 That is, the laws of motion are an attempt to give an affirmative description of actual motion in the empirical world through abstraction and simplification.
In contrast, the Lacanian Real is not just empirically, but also theo- retically, impossible. Unlike the hypothetically perfect conditions of physics, the ideals of the Real are not an abstracted, simplified version of the Symbolic order they explain. Rather, the Real is the negative of the Symbolic and serves as its border, its limit. Each is defined in terms of what the other is not. Consequently, the Symbolic concept cannot exist in the Real ideal and vice versa - the two are mutually inconsistent. To achieve the Real would, therefore, be to obliterate the Symbolic.