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The 1AC’s view of the world through suffering and its belief in the power that rests above self-influence leads to endless loss of life and self-harm.

McGowan 4—Todd McGowan, Professor of English at the University of Vermont, The End of Dissatisfaction?. EBSCO PUBLISHING, 2004, pp. 4-7) // skohli

Though Marxism has certainly fallen on hard times today, this funda-mental thesis of Marxism has not. Cuba Gooding’s mantra in the film Jerry Maguire—“Show me the money!”—has become the automatic explanation of all varieties of behavior. Why does Alex Rodriguez decide to play baseball for the Texas Rangers? Why does Monica Lewinsky appear in an interview with Barbara Walters to tell her story? If Alex Rodriguez mentions the passion for the game he found in the Ranger franchise or Lewinsky mentions her need to tell her side of things, we respond with a wink or a cynical aside. In the spirit of Marx, we know that self-interest (i.e., money) is always the chief motivation. But if Marx errs, his error does not lie, as his critics often allege, in underestimating “innate human selfishness.” Instead, his error—and, again, it is the common error today—lies in the other direction, in underestimating the capacity of subjects to act against their self-interest.

Psychoanalysis, however, calls into question the idea that we primarily act on behalf of our own interest. It allows us to see another power operating beneath the apparent predominance of self-interest. Of course, the common-sensical understanding of psychoanalysis is exactly the opposite of this, con-tending that psychoanalysis reduces everything to self-interest. This is often the basis for the most scathing criticisms leveled at Freud himself and at psychoanalysis as a whole. For instance, John Farrell claims that under the spell of psychoanalysis “every appearance of good must be exposed as unconscious hypocrisy, every commitment to public interests and to social institutions must be recognized for what it is—a disguise for narcissistic gratification or a painful instinctual concession.”10 Farrell, like so many critics of psychoanaly-sis, sees Freud as a prophet of human selfishness. But this attack on psycho-analysis—perhaps the most popular of all attacks—completely misunder-stands what is at stake in psychoanalytic interpretation. Rather than uncovering narcissistic self-interest behind a benevolent act, Freud uncovers the abandonment of self-interest that is at stake behind a seemingly self-inter¬ested act. In Seminar V, Lacan points out that Freud discovers the self-destructiveness of desire, that “what we find at the foundation of the analytic exploration of desire is masochism.”11 Anyone can point out why human subjects act self-interestedly—and many thinkers before Freud (Hobbes, Machiavelli, etc.) did so—but it is the province of psychoanalysis to explain why they are able to act against their self-interest, to transcend their narcissism. Because of this ability to act against our interest, Freud claims that “the normal man is not only far more immoral than he believes but also far more moral than he knows.”12 It is on this point that Freud directly questions Marx: for Marx, there is only self-interest; for Freud, there is something more, and this some¬thing more is enjoyment—the jouissance factor.13

Ironically, it was Freud’s belief that human subjects were prone to act against their self-interest that led him to doubt the possibility of a socialist utopia. If we always acted in our self-interest, Marx would be right, and the contradictions of capitalist society would lead to a socialist utopia. However, our ability—and our tendency—to act against our self-interest makes such a utopia inconceivable for Freud. As Joan Copjec notes, “The psychoanalytic subject, in short, being subject to a principle beyond pleasure, is not driven to seek his own good.”14 When Freud formulated the concept of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he did so in order to account for the fact that we often act in complete disregard of our self-interest and instead act out of a compulsion that we do not understand. The concept of the death drive means that we will sacrifice anything and everything (even life itself) for our particular Thing—which is to say, for our enjoyment. Oftentimes this Thing is a national Thing, the bond that constitutes national identity. Marxism has consistently underestimated the importance of the enjoyment of the national Thing, but, as Slavoj Zizek points out, at no time as dramatically as at the beginning of the First World War. The working class of Europe, well-informed by the Communist International, seemed to know that the war would not advance their interests, that it was an imperialist struggle. And yet, when the moment of decision came, the working class in Europe supported the war almost unanimously, much to the surprise of Lenin. Why? What did Lenin fail to take into account? He failed to consider enjoyment—specifically the degree to which the working class shared in nationalistic jouissance. What drove them was not their self-interest—the war didn’t speak to interest—but their relationship to enjoyment. This is one indication why it is through its consideration of enjoyment that a psychoanalytic understanding of history can supplement the Marxian version.15 Marxism allows us to understand the role of economic and social contradictions in driving the movement of history, but it often provides an inadequate explanation of the actual politics of historical transformation—why change does or does not occur at a given time. It is on this question that psychoanalysis proves indispensable.

Psychoanalysis allows us to rethink sociopolitical history around the question of enjoyment. This involves understanding the nature of the transition from a society of prohibition to a society of enjoyment. Recognizing what is at work in the society of enjoyment does not imply that the proper response is the nostalgic one, the one so often proffered by conservative cultural critics. These conservative critics call for a return to “family values,” to a world in which prohibition kept us safe from outbreaks of enjoyment. This desire for a return to the past, however, is rarely genuine. Which is to say, such proclamations don’t really want the return to the past that they claim to want. Instead, they want the best of both worlds—the “benefits” of modernity (computers, cars, televisions) without their effects (isolation, enjoyment, narcissism)—and fail to grasp the interdependence of the benefits and the effects. More importantly, however, what such a position fails to realize is that enjoyment is implicit not in the content of, say, the internet (that is, in the pornography, etc., that appears there), but in the very form that we experience it: hooked on to a computer, in isolation from the rest of the world. It is not what one experiences in the mod¬ern world, but that one is experiencing it in the modern way which is decisive, which produces the negative effects of modernity that the nostalgic position hopes to avoid. This is why once we have the “benefits” of modernity, we also have the painful drawbacks; one cannot have one without the other. Which means that the “family values” response, unless it is combined with a radical renunciation of all aspects of modern society, is not an authentic alternative. In fact, its promise of the spoils of modernity without its requisite disruption of tradition and traditional authority simply repeats the promise of fascism, which insists that we can have all the advantages of modern industry and technology without sacrificing our connection to “blood and soil.” Even when it avoids this fascist contradiction and does actually involve a complete rejection of moder¬nity, such a solution is still not viable. Any return to the past, to traditional val¬ues, will necessarily be mediated by the present.

The other alternative common today is the cynical embrace of the soci¬ety of enjoyment—an attitude that proclaims that things simply are as they are, that there is no changing the structure of the social order. The cynic knows well enough the problems with the way things are but acts as if she/he doesn’t know, conducting her/his daily life certain that the social order, despite its problems, cannot be changed. This attitude resigns the subject to the pri¬vate realm: for the cynic, change is possible on a personal level (i.e., I can change my weight, my degree of happiness, my lover, etc.), so that’s where I should keep my focus. As Paul Gilroy puts it, “A language of revolution may persist, but these days it is more like to turn away from the complexities of wholescale societal transformation and promote an ‘inward,’ New Age turn.”17 We can see evidence of the turn from wide-scale political activity to an emphasis on personal transformation throughout contemporary popular cul¬ture, but perhaps nowhere as dramatically as in the case of the rock band U2. Whereas in the 1980s they wrote songs with an overt political significance, such as “Pride” and “Sunday Bloody Sunday” (both celebrations of the struggle for civil rights), in the 1990s such songs disappear completely from their oeuvre, having been replaced with songs about personal struggle and romance, such as “Mysterious Ways” and “One.” It is as if U2 felt disappointed with the ineffectiveness of their larger political project and decided to turn to a more promising avenue—the personal.18 What this increasingly widespread conclu¬sion misses is the performative function of its own—seemingly descriptive— statement about the impossibility of large-scale change. That is, the gesture of confining oneself and one’s actions to the private realm is precisely what fuels the predominance of the society of enjoyment, which makes large-scale change seem impossible. In proclaiming the inevitability of this type of world, we help to make it inevitable, to make the status quo all the more unassailable. In this way, the strategy of cynical embrace of the society of enjoyment is every bit as flawed as the nostalgic attempt to return to a previous epoch. Both positions share a fundamental refusal to recognize their own complicity with the society of enjoyment.

Despite their ultimate bankruptcy, nostalgia and cynicism predominate today to the extent that there seems to be no other path open to us. The key to discovering an alternate path does not, as we might believe, depend on our ability to imagine a different future, but on our ability to properly recognize the present. Thus, the chapters that follow will not try to imagine alternatives to nostalgia and cynicism; instead, the focus will remain on inquiring into the prevailing society of enjoyment. This is not because alternatives do not exist, but because the wager of this book is fundamentally a Hegelian one—that thought cannot arrive at future alternatives through bypassing the present. It must instead recognize the future as having already arrived, inhering implic-itly in the present. Our task, according to Hegel, is to reconcile thought to the present, to grasp the rationality of the real. Any attempt to imagine an alter-native—that is, any utopian speculations about a possible future—will neces-sarily express that alternative in terms of the present, thereby stripping it of its alternative status a priori. Our efforts to find a political alternative to the soci¬ety of commanded enjoyment—and to contemporary late capitalism—depend on our ability to recognize our status within the society of enjoyment.

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