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NIT is counterproductive and insufficient to solve poverty.

Gibson, 15 (Preceding the existence of MSNBC, Gibson hosted a news program for America’s Talking. Gibson began his broadcasting career as a West Coast correspondent for NBC News Channel, where he supplied NBC affiliates with live reports on various breaking stories and events such as the O.J. Simpson trial, Wiley Online Library, “Expand Social Protection May Do More Harm than Good: A Pessimistic Review, Sept. 9, 2015, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/app5.106, Roasdo)

What is a sensible effective marginal tax rate to use in this illustration? The International Monetary Fund (IMF) () shows that the income tax rate that maximises tax paid by top income earners ranges from 45 to 70 per cent and averages around 60 per cent. It would be counterproductive for the t in Figure  to be higher than any of these rates, since that would likely reduce the revenue available to fund the social protection transfers. If perhaps t = 0.5 was used, then the breakeven point would be twice the poverty line. In the PNG context, that requires taxing 27 per cent of the population to fund transfers to 73 per cent (given the shape of the density). Putting aside risk of exit by the highly skilled amongst the taxpaying 27 per cent, even a t = 0.5 rate may be too high and could result in dulled incentives to work. For example, the current author faces a marginal tax rate of 33 per cent and it seems unfair for poor people in poor countries to face higher tax rates than professors in rich countries.

How would Figure  look if t = 0.33? The answer is shown by the line labelled (b). Any person consuming less than three times the poverty line gets a transfer, and anyone living above this level pays tax to fund the transfer. This may violate condition (iii) that transfers be targeted just to the (relatively) needy since living above three times the poverty line might be considered ‘middle class’ in a country with mass poverty like PNG. A bigger problem is that just 12 per cent of the PNG population is sufficiently affluent to have a consumption level above three poverty line units, so there are likely to be too few of these affluent people to tax heavily enough to raise the revenue to fund transfers. The dashed line in the top part of Figure  shows the cumulative tax shares of households, starting from the right-hand side axis; the 12 per cent of the population living above three times the poverty line already pay about 43 per cent of the income tax and it is not clear how much more tax could be obtained from them before they sought greener fields in less-taxing countries.

One way to maintain incentives, using an effective marginal tax rate of just t = 0.33, and also to make the transfer program more affordable, is to slide the sloping line joining −1 to 3 left, so it intercepts the x-axis at, say, twice the poverty line. But the guaranteed minimum income then is just two-thirds of the poverty line, violating condition (i) that those solely reliant on transfers have a minimally acceptable standard of living. Figure  makes clear that cash transfers, even in the most efficient situation of a negative income tax, are either insufficient to lift people completely out of poverty, or dull incentives, or need a small group in the population to subsidise the vast majority. In an increasingly globalised world of much greater competition for skilled labour, whether that minority would be willing to fund such transfers will be a question of first-order importance.

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