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Negative Income Tax does not solve average poverty and welfare in the long-run.

Chang et al, 23, Chang, Y., Han, J., & Kim, S. (2023). Chang is on the Monetary Policy Board in the Bank of Korea, Han is affiliated with the Economics Department in Ajou University in South Korea, Kim is affiliated with the Department of Economics in Yonsei University in South Korea “Negative income tax and universal basic income in the eyes of Aiyagari”. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 1-13. doi:10.1017/S1365100523000263 https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/macroeconomic-dynamics/article/negative-income-tax-and-universal-basic-income-in-the-eyes-of-aiyagari/00FEC4C9D02026504E18270ABF9ED82D

We compare two welfare programs that are popular in public and political debates: the universal basic income (UBI) and a means-tested negative income tax (NIT). Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021) illustrated that within the class of linear income tax-and-transfer system, the NIT can replicate the same allocation as the UBI by providing an identical marginal effective tax schedule. According to Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021), “The two policies are equivalent because the net payment—that is, taxes less transfers—is identical under the two policies The difference is only a matter of framing.” However, Mankiw (Reference Mankiw2021) was not explicit about the total amount of the budget of the policy. The size of the budget differs vastly between the two programs. Although the two programs can generate an identical allocation, we analytically show that the total budget of the NIT is always smaller than that of the UBI.

Based on a standard heterogeneous agents general equilibrium model [a la Aiyagari (Reference Aiyagari1994)], calibrated to approximate the income and wealth distributions in the United States, we perform quantitative analyses on various versions of the UBI and NIT (within the class of linear income tax). While the UBI that pays everyone 20% of the average income costs about 15.4% of the GDP, the NIT (that replicates the identical outcome) costs only 3.8% of the GDP. Neither program improves the average welfare significantly in the long run (in fact, it decreases slightly by 0.27% in consumption-equivalence units), as the reduction in capital and labor (owing to a tax distortion and a weakened motive for precautionary savings and work) roughly offsets the insurance benefit. Furthermore, the aggregate output, capital, and hours worked decrease by 12%, 22%, and 10%, respectively, in the long run.

Among the UBI programs (within the class of a linear income tax schedule), the economy achieves the highest average welfare when everyone receives 7.2% of the average income (and pays 8% of their income as tax). The average welfare improves slightly (0.4%) compared with a laissez-faire economy. An NIT can perform nearly as well (actually slightly better) with a much smaller budget, that is a mere 2.3% of the GDP. This (optimal) NIT program features a piece-wise linear effective marginal tax schedule: an 8% tax rate above the 45th income percentile, and a subsidy that is generous to the very poor (i.e. 19.5% of the average income for those with zero income) and quickly diminishes (at a 27% phase-out rate) with income.

We simulate the political outcome of introducing a welfare program. While the three welfare programs we consider (UBI with a 20% income tax rate, optimal UBI, and optimal NIT) easily win the majority votes (with approval rates of 70% or higher), the simulation reveals the interesting heterogeneous impacts of the welfare programs across workers. In general, the proportion of the workers in favor of a welfare program decreases with wealth. However, extremely rich workers may also be in favor of a redistribution policy owing to so-called pecuniary externalities [e.g. Dávila et al. (Reference Dávila, Hong, Krusell and Ríos-Rull2012)], according to which a welfare program often raises the equilibrium interest rate by reducing the aggregate supply of capital (via a weakened precautionary savings motive).

Our analysis makes a modest contribution to the literature on optimal income taxation [e.g. Conesa and Krueger (Reference Conesa and Krueger2006), Corbae et al. (Reference Corbae, D’Erasmo and Kuruscu2009), Heathcote et al. (Reference Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante2017), Chang et al. (Reference Chang, Chang and Kim2018, Reference Chang, Chang and Kim2022), Heathcote and Tsujiyama (Reference Heathcote and Tsujiyama2021), Wu (Reference Wu2021)]. The literature examined comprehensive income tax-and-transfer systems and highlighted that it is the effective marginal income tax schedule that matters for household decisions. Our study distinguishes itself from previous studies in two ways. First, our analytical analysis shows (i) the equivalence between the UBI and NIT regardless of particular macroeconomic models or specific parameterization and that (ii) the government budget is always smaller under the NIT. Second, we numerically find an optimal UBI and NIT using a quantitative general equilibrium model.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analytically shows that the NIT can always replicate the allocation of the UBI with a smaller budget within the class of a linear income tax system, Section 3 lays out a benchmark model economy for the quantitative analysis and computes the optimal UBI and (means-tested) NIT, Section 4 provides the sensitivity analyses, and Section 5 summarizes the study.

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