The aff uses welfare capitalism as a means of making imperialism more palatable to residents of Puerto Rico
[Cristopher Abel, Colin Lewis, 10-9-2019, "Welfare, Poverty and Development in Latin America", https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-349-11325-5_12, Accessed 7-19-2023, LASA-LR]
Welfare policy evolved in a context of political and economic ambiguity. Political ambiguity was observed in the status that Puerto Rico Puerto Rico: A Model of Welfare Capitalism? 259 acquired under US supervision and the second-class citizenship that accompanied it. Economic ambiguity was visible in the uncertainty surrounding the extent to which Puerto Rican decision-makers (business and political) influenced the pace and direction of industrialization and economic change. These discrepancies shaped an environment in which social policy was shot though with imprecision. Ambiguities of political status made for a lack of synchronization between insular and federal initiative and a shuttling of responsibility between insular and federal agencies when policies faltered. Insular resources could finance only modest programmes; hence these tended to be merely complementary to those undertaken by federal agencies. But funding by federal agencies was discontinuous. Federal aid arrived unexpected -like a windfall gain; it was employed energetically; and was withdrawn for reasons seldom directly connected to Puerto Rico. There was no guarantee that a federal programme would be completed. Since the insular authorities had negligible control over the size and disbursement of federal funds, stagnation of welfare initiative usually occurred where federal funding was abruptly terminated.
Economic ambiguities were equally important. Welfare initiative was undertaken on the assumption that the process of industrialization would be self-sustaining, that its positive consequences for the Puerto Rican economy would be general throughout the island, and that they would be sufficient to ensure self-sustaining welfare gains. The reality was otherwise. The process of industrialization, never self-sustaining, was always dependent on the performance of the US economy; the benefits of growth were heavily concentrated in the urban zones, especially San Juan and contiguous areas; and an absence of self-sustaining growth precluded the evolution of selfsustaining welfare expansion.
These problems were masked by the PPD government which was precociously attuned to the benefits derived from costly public relations exercises. According to official propaganda, an expansion of political rights for Puerto Rico was accompanied by an expansion of social rights. These, together with the economic changes wrought by the 'industrialization by invitation' programme, made the island the showcase for democracy of the region. 5 Yet political rights were circumscribed. The 1954 constitution denied Puerto Ricans indispensable features of sovereignty - control of foreign, foreign economic and defence policy; the right to an independent currency and the right to vote for the US president and congress, which enlisted them in federal armed forces. 6 Nevertheless, the official view that the 260 Christopher Abel autonomous status enshrined in the 1954 Constitution maximized the advantages of both independence and integration with the United States while minimizing the disadvantages enjoyed considerable public acceptance in the 1950s and early 1960s. This was reflected in the electoral success of the PPD, which between 1944 and 1964 never drew under 58.00 per cent of total votes cast in elections (in which turnout never fell below 73.99 per cent.f Second-class citizenship was persuasively projected by the PPD - controlled communications media as the best deal possible for Puerto Rico at a time when decolonization was gradually rising to the top of the regional political agenda.
A transition from colonial to autonomous status whose main feature was a pragmatic trade-off between status, growth, welfare and citizenship had several consequences. It had the effect of reassuring US liberals of their country's essential altruism and lack of imperial ambition. Secondly, it smothered some of the debates surrounding the Cold War: the exemption of Puerto Rico from contributions to federal taxes that funded US military bases in the island meant that insular budgetary debates were focused on other matters. Thirdly, the transition to Commonwealth status forestalled the evolution of effective independence movements, and prevented the formation of a Puerto Rican military force capable of declaring independence. Instead, the PPD fostered the notion that autonomy might be perfected or 'culminated' without offence to Washington or to powerful interests. Meanwhile, an articulate governing elite emerged which managed the relationship with the United States and which, with the multinational manufacturers, was its chief beneficiary. And the ruling elite recruited to the PPD a following from which small propertyowners, secondary beneficiaries of the 'Commonwealth' experiment, came to form an intermediate leadership. 8 Opportunities for debate about Puerto Rico's status reassured international observers about the viability of her democracy; yet debate was subtly managed so that politics - welfare politics included - were usually presented in the island as a technical, not an ideological matter. Once the Commonwealth Constitution was enacted, issues involving policy implementation were freely discussed by the ruling PPD; but essential questions about citizenship were sidestepped where possible. The conundrum of what constitute social and political rights in a framework where patriotism is ill-defined (and, indeed, where the slogan 'To be patriotic is to emigrate' was coined) was hardly addressed.
Welfare policy performed one other significant function. It was an Puerto Rico: A Model of Welfare Capitalism? 261 instrument for making personalized rule palatable and for smoothing the transition from personal rule in the early 1940s to a more collegiate form of government by the mid-1960s. The last Governor appointed by a US president, Rexford Guy Tugwell, brought the language and practice of intervention (in, for example, food distribution and telecommunications) during the Second World War. Starting from the assumption that the effective administration of relief and reconstruction in the 1930s had been impeded by the unwillingness of US administrators to leave scope for initiative to Puerto Ricans, Tugwell begin to build a permanent civil service manned by island professionals enjoying career structures based on merit. Explicitly committed to comprehensive planning, Tugwell embraced the institutionalized pursuit of public interest, and questioned the value of freedom without social welfare. 9 Tugwell's successor Governor Luis Muiioz Marin, was equally committed to notions of economic and social planning. According to a close colleague, a reading of Beveridge's Full Employment in a Free Society persuaded Muiioz of the urgency of an economic development programme. 10 The overall consequence of policy pursued by Tugwell and Muiioz was that an incipient technocratic apparatus that delivered welfare benefits to large parts of the electorate reinforced the legitimacy of a government that was already conferred by election results.
The self-congratulatory language of official documentation gives the impression that the twin policies of social welfare and industrialization constituted a carefully planned and calibrated strategy. 11 The island government tempted cheap venture capital, brought in branch plants of blue-chip US firms, reduced their risks, widened profit margins, and recruited labour. Furthermore, the island government gave clients thorough guidance on statutory regulation, located appropriate industrial sites, and even provided buildings and equipment. The availability of generous funds for vocational training under the GI Bill of Rights was also fortuitous. 12
Already by the late 1950s cautionary observations about the Puerto Rican model were made that had an immediate significance for welfare performance. Werner Baer, who was sufficiently optimistic to forecast self-generating growth, warned of over-optimistic official predictions. These were founded in an assumption of a falling reliance on US savings, rising mainly from a growth in domestic personal savings, that would result from high incomes accompanied by a higher propensity to save and an increasing availability of savings institutions. 13 Meanwhile, the failure to integrate industry with island 262 Christopher Abel agriculture was remarked upon as early as 1951: only a few industrial inputs like coconut fibres and bamboo were locally produced. Crisis in the model of the 1950s loomed, as productivity increases, while large, were insufficient to offset wage rises; and employment shrank relative to both capital and output. 14 These problems were not solved. They were smothered by a partial restructuring: by diversification away from a limited range of modest industries like textiles and leather goods into new areas of manufacturing. Unforeseen success in the electrical machinery industry encouraged the Planning Board to identify more advanced industries, like the pharmaceuticals, metal products, machine tools and precision instruments, oil refining and petrochemicals industries that might be lured to Puerto Rico. And government evolved 'fishbaiting' feasibility studies ranging over such areas as patents and royalties, viability and minimum plant size, and comparative costs and profits relative to the mainland which were included in new incentive packages. 15 The adjustment from the first to the second version of the 'industrialization by invitation' model was achieved smoothly, and assured continued material improvement, observed in Table 12.1.
Expansion of welfare provision continued until the second version of the industrialization model was thrown into crisis in the early 1970s. The transition from the first to the second version had been relatively smooth owing to the congenial international climate. The harsher realities that prevailed from about 1973 - dollar and oil crises, softness in tourism, contraction in the USA - exposed the fragility of the Puerto Rican model. While the manufacturing of labour-intensive industries shifted to other Caribbean locations, much capital was repatriated to the mainland. 16 Export industrialization, once the panacea, was now, according to pessimistic prognoses, a doomed strategy. It would inescapably fail to solve Puerto Rican problems of mounting unemployment; and the only alternative course was to develop agricultural potential to its limits, while undertaking a new drive to promote linkages between agriculture and manufacturing/processing. 17
Earlier, pro-PPD authors had argued that independence posed a threat to welfare, as to the physical and economic sec.urity of Puerto Rico. 18 As it became clear that Puerto Rican industrialization had run its full course of options, 19 the closeness of welfare capitalism to collapse was exposed; and the argument grew in strength that the welfare gains of the 'Commonwealth' solution were no more than temporary palliatives. Far from assuring self-sustaining welfare gains, fomento strategies had failed to create the economic structure necessary to provide sufficient employment or to generate sustained welfare. 20 These were conditions in which the alternatives to autonomy gained momentum. The statehooders, who had won the 1968 elections as consensus began to break, were established as a viable alternative governing party. The independentistas recovered some selfconfidence and impetus. Now the fourth largest customer of the United States on a per capita basis and fifth worldwide,21 Puerto Rico 264 Christopher Abel became an object of concern for Washington decision-makers. Suddenly the island was the object of the federal foodstamps programme. Imposed like a 'hurricane relief expedition', the foodstamps programme represented welfare capitalism entering a new, unpredictable, uncalculated and unexportable phase. Only one feature of that new phase could be confidently predicted: that, despite success in developing speciality export food crops, a proposal in 1981 that part of the $1 billion food subsidy should be directed to a programme of agrarian rehabilitation and food self-sufficiency was not acted upon. 22