No Russian diversionary war – the world still relies on Russia for nuclear power.
Suriya Jayanti [March, 15, 23 Jayanti is an Eastern Europe energy policy expert. She served for ten years as a U.S. diplomat, including as the Energy Chief at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine “Russia Is Vital to the Clean Energy Transition. That's a Problem” https://time.com/6262116/russia-vital-to-the-clean-energy-transition/ NPAT]
Nuclear power is the only electricity generation technology that can reasonably satisfy the voracious energy demands of an ever growing world while also not contributing to climate change. There are approximately 440 nuclear reactors operating now, spread across 32 countries and Taiwan. That makes for about 390 gigawatts of electricity, roughly 10% of global demand. Sixty new reactors are currently under construction, mostly in Russia and China, and also India. Another 100 are formally in planning stages, with 300 more under discussion. While much of the activity is in countries with existing nuclear programs, dozens of new ones are jumping in. This nuclear renaissance depends on uranium. Russia has 8% of known deposits. That may not seem like enough of a share to make for market dominance when Australia and Kazakhstan together have 43%, but Russia also has 40% of the world’s uranium conversion capacity and 46% of global enrichment capacity. In 2021, the U.S. bought 14% of its uranium from Russia and used Russian enrichment services for 28% of its needs. For Europe, 20% of its uranium and 26% of enrichment comes from Russia. Most immediately, countries that are already operating Russian VVER nuclear power plants (NPPs), such as Ukraine, have been somewhat stuck because only one company outside Russia makes the necessary fuel. Nor is Russia’s nuclear industry dominance in decline. A full 50% of NPPs currently under construction are Russian models going up in Turkey, Bangladesh, and Hungary, among others. The near future is no less compromised. Much of the new generation of U.S. nuclear technology, on which hopes of the U.S. reclaiming the nuclear vanguard from Russia and China rest, relies on a higher enrichment level fuel called HALEU. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that demand will hit 40 metric tons of HALEU just by 2030. But it is only made in Russia. Bill Gates-backed TerraPower, for one, was forced in 2022 to delay by years the rollout of its Natrium Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor because of the lack of HALEU fuel. With this reality, sanctioning Russia’s nuclear industry remains a fantasy. If the West is serious about fully isolating Russia economically or about the energy transition, it needs to at very least expand its own enrichment capacity. DOE is busily investing in U.S. enrichment aspirations, and the European Atomic Energy Community, Euratom, is also exploring options for the continent. But these things take time. Construction can take years, and the uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment itself takes at least one year. Unfortunately, current global fuel supplies are estimated to be no more than 18 months. Other countries could probably move faster but are precluded by non-proliferation and nuclear safety regimes, which in the U.S. are praised as the “gold standard” of nuclear regulation but which have essentially prevented any commercial scale nuclear development in the U.S. for 40 years. In the meantime, Russian nuclear dominance persists and its keystone position in the world’s nuclear industry continues. The Kremlin’s ongoing energy leverage also encompasses the metals and minerals essential to the energy transition. Wind turbines require several critical minerals, and electric vehicles are heavy in lithium, nickel, cobalt, zinc, and other rare earth commodities. Solar panels also require nickel and zinc, as well as silicon, copper and others. China and Russia are the world’s leading silicon mining countries. Russia is the world’s third biggest nickel exporter, with its Siberian Norilsk Nickel company the world’s largest producer of high-grade nickel. Germany, for one, imports almost 40% of its nickel from Russia. Russia also sells palladium and is a key exporter of copper. Lithium, the key element in the lithium ion batteries that propel electric vehicles, is one of the few energy transition minerals for which Russia is not a big market force. Rosatom, Russia’s State Nuclear Energy Corporation, is working to fix that. Unlike with nuclear, the western world has sanctioned much of Russia’s commodities trade, or imposed high tariffs. But this has only served to make the metals and minerals necessary for the energy transition harder to get and much more expensive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent commodities prices soaring, up well over 50% since February 2022. Zinc, nickel, and other metals hit record prices thereafter. These price surges served to prolong some of the energy transition hardships and delays caused by China’s supply chain crunches from its COVID-19 lockdown, which caused global shortages in wind turbines, solar panels, and their component parts. The conundrum this creates for policymakers is twisted. To take action against Russia’s nuclear industry or minerals exports will set back the very diversification of energy sources necessary to minimize Putin’s energy leverage. It will also hurt the momentum towards a nuclear and carbon-free power sector, and slow the energy transition. If Rosatom brings its planned large lithium mine into production, for example, it will support the electrification of transport and further reduce Russian oil and gas revenues. But if Putin is left the ability to hold nuclear power hostage all over the world, as he did Europe with natural gas, odds are that he will use that advantage to the western world’s disadvantage. We can easily imagine countries plunged into darkness by Russia as it demands concessions in exchange for nuclear fuel. It’s not like this hasn’t happened before with other energy sources. If Putin somehow ekes out a win in Ukraine or otherwise holds onto power, the West can expect retribution for supporting Kyiv. This may well include nuclear and commodities manipulation. But if Putin loses power, the prospects of energy sector chaos or even a failed Russian state are just as dangerous. Perhaps the Wagner militia group, which owns extensive mines in Africa, will end up running Russia’s lithium and uranium mines and the enrichment facilities. With Russia already providing nuclear support to Iran, it is not far fetched to imagine weapons-grade uranium enrichment and fabrication cooperation between a future Wagner uranium monopoly in post-Putin Russia and anti-West Islamic fundamentalists or even terrorist groups. This would be a nightmare scenario. Despite best efforts, exactly how the West will wake from the nightmare of Putin, avoid the nightmare of a post-Putin collapse, and also protect the energy transition remains unclear. Hopefully the best minds in governments around the world are looking for a path forward.