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State officials will be captured by corporate interests and transfer welfare funds to the private sphere.

Bulfone et al. 5-17-2022, (PhD, Assistant Professor at Leiden University) "No strings attached: Corporate welfare, state intervention, and the issue of conditionality," Sage Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10245294221101145

The work of Alice Amsden on performance standards provides particularly important insights in this regard (; ). Amsden argues that the successful industrial upgrading in countries like South Korea, Malaysia, or China depends on the capacity by domestic state elites to create control mechanisms to discipline corporate behavior. These control mechanisms revolve around the idea that subsidies or other forms of monetary advantages to corporate recipients need to be subject to monitorable, redistributive, and results-oriented performance standards (, 8). If corporate recipients failed to meet these performance standards, state actors would withdraw their financial support, and eventually take more radical measures like ownership repossessions. Performance standards could relate to a wide variety of goals including firm-level managerial practices, sectoral industrial policy goals, or broader national policy goals. Concretely, corporate recipients could be asked to meet “export targets, local content requirements, debt-equity ratio ceilings, national ownership floors, operating scale minima, investment time-table obligations, regional location criteria, and eventually product quality specifications and environmental rules” (, 25).

When performance standards were not established, or enforced, state officials ended up being captured by corporate interests. This in turn led to a massive transfer of financial resources from the public to the private sphere with negligible developmental and industrial outcomes (). We urge the CPE literature to share this concern for conditionality, as there is no reason to believe that it is only state actors in developing countries that face the risk of a socialization of losses and a privatization of risks when engaging in industrial or innovation policies (; ; ).

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