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Psychoanalysis does not function like a scientific method, recent evidence proves that psychoanalysis does not give any coherent response to any criticism.

Paris 17 (Joel Paris obtained his psychiatric training at McGill. His current research interests include a project carrying out a controlled study of the outcome of stepped care treatment for BPD. HE is a Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University. He is also a Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital, and an Associate Psychiatrist at the McGill University Health Center. “Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?” 1/31/17 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0706743717692306) //Sajad

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities. This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism. One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power. Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history. Conclusions In 2009, the British Journal of Psychiatry published a debate about whether the journal should accept psychoanalytic case reports.54 The debate pitted a biologist, Lewis Wolpert, against a psychoanalyst-researcher, Peter Fonagy. Wolpert argued that psychoanalytic case reports should be excluded because they are in no way scientific. Fonagy, while conceding some of his opponent’s points, defended analysis by pointing out that research is possible and is now beginning to be conducted. But while Fonagy himself is committed to empiricism, he represents a very small minority in a field that lacks that commitment. Unfortunately, the modern revisions of psychoanalysis do not offer a coherent response to critics. It is difficult to see how any of the current responses to criticism can save psychoanalysis from a continued and lingering decline. Analysis has separated itself from psychiatry and psychology by teaching its method in stand-alone institutes. The field may only survive if it is prepared to dismantle its structure as a separate discipline and rejoin academia and clinical science. Whatever its limitations, psychoanalysis left an important legacy to psychiatry. It taught a generation of psychiatrists how to understand life histories and to listen attentively to what patients say. In an era dominated by neuroscience, diagnostic checklists, and psychopharmacology, we need to find a way to retain psychotherapy, whose basic concepts can be traced back to the work of Freud, as part of psychiatry.55

The “Lack” is a lie—critics are silenced and threatened

Robinson 5’ [Andrew Robinson is a associate professor at University of Guelph. Runs an L&D consulting company in Charlottesville, VA. “The Political Theory of Constitutive Lack: A Critique.” 2005 https://philpapers.org/rec/ROBTPT-3]!VAR*

More precisely, I would maintain that “constitutive lack” is an instance of a Barthesian myth. It is, after all, the function of myth to do exactly what this concept does: to assert the empty facticity of a particular ideological schema while rejecting any need to argue for its assumptions. ‘Myth does not deny things; on the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it is a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact’ (2000, 143, my emphasis). This is precisely the status of “constitutive lack”: a supposed fact which is supposed to operate above and beyond explanation, on an ontological level instantly accessible to those with the courage to accept it. Myths operate to construct euphoric enjoyment for those who use them, but their operation is in conflict with the social context with which they interact. This is because their operation is connotative: they are “received” rather than “read” (1984, 232), and open only to a “readerly” and not a “writerly” interpretation. A myth is a second-order signification attached to an already-constructed denotative sign, and the ideological message projected into this sign is constructed outside the context of the signified. A myth is therefore, in Alfred Korzybski’s sense, intensional: its meaning derives from a prior linguistic schema, not from interaction with the world in its complexity. Furthermore, myths have a repressive social function, carrying in Barthes’s words an ‘order not to think’ (1997, 59). They are necessarily projected onto or imposed on actual people and events, under the cover of this order. The “triumph of literature” in the Dominici trial (2000, 43-6) consists precisely in this projection of an externally-constructed mythical schema as a way of avoiding engagement with something one does not understand.Lacanian theory, like Barthesian myths, involves a prior idea of a structural matrix which is not open to change in the light of the instances to which it is applied. (This is one of the reasons why the strong ontology founding Lacanian theory is rarely accompanied by a systematic epistemology). Žižek’s writes of a ‘pre-ontological dimension which precedes and eludes the construction of reality’ (1997a, 208), while Laclau suggests there is a formal structure of any chain of equivalences which necessitates the logic of hegemony (1996, 57). Specific analyses are referred back to this underlying structure as its necessary expressions, without apparently being able to alter it; for instance, ‘those who triggered the process of democratization [in eastern Europe]… are not those who today enjoy its fruits, not because of a simple usurpation… but because of a deeper structural logic’ (Žižek, 1992a, 27). In most instances, the mythical operation of the idea of “constitutive lack” is implicit, revealed only by a rhetoric of denunciation. For instance, Mouffe accuses liberalism of an ‘incapacity… to grasp… the irreducible character of antagonism’ (1993, 1-2), while Žižek claims that a ‘dimension’ is ‘lost’ in Butler’s work because of her failure to conceive of “trouble” as constitutive of “gender” (1994, 71). This language of “denial” which is invoked to silence critics is a clear example of Barthes’s “order not to think”: one is not to think about the idea of “constitutive lack”, one is simply to “accept” it, under pain of invalidation. If someone else disagrees, s/he can simply be told that there is something crucial missing from her/his theory. Indeed, critics are as likely to be accused of being “dangerous” as to be accused of being wrong.

Psychoanalysis is a pseudo-science

Popper 63’ [Karl Raimund Popper CH FRS FBA was an Austrian-British philosopher, academic and social commentator. Popper is known for his rejection of the classical inductivist views on the scientific method in favor of empirical falsification.  “Science: Conjectures and refutations” 1963 http://www.dpi.inpe.br/gilberto/cursos/cst-311/popper_conjectures_refutations.pdf]!VAR*

The two psycho-analytic theories were in a different class. They were simply non-testable, irrefutable. There was no conceivable human behaviour which could contradict them. This does not mean that Freud and Adler were not seeing certain things correctly: I personally do not doubt that much of what they say is of considerable importance, and may well play its part one day in a psychological science which is testable. But it does mean that those 'clinical observations' which analysts naïvely believe confirm their theory cannot do this any more than the daily confirmations which astrologers find in their practice. 3 3And as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Super-ego, and the Id, no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected stories from Olympus. These theories describe some facts, but in the manner of myths. They contain most interesting psychological suggestions, but not in a testable form. At the same time I realized that such myths may be developed, and become testable; that historically speaking all--or very nearly all--scientific theories originate from myths, and that a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories. Examples are Empedocles' theory of evolution by trial and error, or Parmenides' myth of the unchanging block universe in which nothing ever happens and which, if we add another dimension, becomes Einstein's block universe (in which, too, nothing ever happens, since everything is, four-dimensionally speaking, determined and laid down from the beginning). I thus felt that if a theory is found to be non-scientific, or 'metaphysical' (as we might say), it is not thereby found to be unimportant, or insignificant, or 'meaningless', or 'nonsensical'. 44 But it cannot claim to be backed by empirical evidence in the scientific sense-- although it may easily be, in some genetic sense, the 'result of observation'. (There were a great many other theories of this pre-scientific or pseudo-scientific character, some of them, unfortunately, as influential as the Marxist interpretation of history; for example, the racialist interpretation of history-another of those impressive and all-explanatory theories which act upon weak minds like revelations.) Thus the problem which I tried to solve by proposing the criterion of falsifiability was neither a problem of meaningfulness or significance, nor a problem of truth or acceptability. It was the problem of drawing a line (as well as this can be done) between the statements, or systems of statements, of the empirical sciences, and all other statements--whether they are of a religious or of a metaphysical character, or simply pseudo-scientific. Years later--it must have been in 1928 or 1929--I called this first problem of mine the 'problem of demarcation'. The criterion of falsifiability is a solution to this problem of demarcation, for it says that statements or systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scientific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or conceivable, observations.

Psychoanalysis not scientific, its not real

Wolpert 09’ [Lewis Wolpert CBE FRS FRSL FMedSci was a South African-born British developmental biologist, author, and broadcaster. “There is no place for the psychoanalytic case report in the British Journal of Psychiatry ” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/959F61577A05256FA6D5F72207EA5E61/S0007125000251180a.pdf/there-is-no-place-for-the-psychoanalytic-case-report-in-the-british-journal-of-psychiatry.pdf The British Journal of Psychiatry (2009)195, 483–487.]!VAR*

The main problem with psychoanalysis is that it makes no attempt to be based on science and so there are no general principles which a case history could use to help other patients. An analytic case history is essentially subjective and anecdotal, and it also ignores other approaches to mental illnesses. No analyst is likely to consider the possibility that the patients’ condition may be due to a genetic defect or some other physical illness. For example, there is good evidence that depression has a strong genetic component and so does schizophrenia. It is unlikely that psycho- analysts would even recognise such diagnoses of the patient’s condition. In addition, there is the problem that there are almost as many ideas about psychoanalysis as there are analysts. There is no one accepted theory. For example, Melanie Klein’s hypotheses regarding internalisations during the first year of life leading to paranoid and depressive states is without evidence but is not generally accepted. One analyst has recently examined views of analysts in the 1USA and concluded that his study: . . . reveals a plethora of newer ideas, some areas of consensus, and broad areas of disagreement concerning the meaning and value of the ideas that dominate our current discourse. While we welcome the ‘‘pluralism’’ that has partially replaced the ‘‘rejectionist’’ policy of only a few decades ago, our contemporary pluralism is, to a surprising degree, a multiplicity of authoritarian orthodoxies, each derived from a particular thinker, rather than a scientific discourse. Modern psychoanalytic interventions are primarily intended to provide a special communication with the patient based on emotion, rather than to promote intellectual insight. Nevertheless, most psychoanalysts continue to stress the strong influence of unconscious elements affecting people’s mental lives. There are no accepted diagnoses as in DSM–IV. In psychoanalytic thinking the patient is not suffering from a defined illness and so there is no attempt to find a cure. The technique is not laid down and each analyst will pursue their own approach to interpreting the patient’s free associations. There is thus nothing useful to be learned from a case report on an individual that could help other patients. Each case is essentially the relationship between an analyst and a patient. The relationship between the patient and an analyst is different from that with a psychiatrist, is very personal and not easily expressed or explained. It is claimed that the analyst takes in much of what oozes out of the patient in different non-verbal forms. The patient and analyst enter into a complex relationship. Freud wanted the case histories he wrote to have the stamp of science. On that score he believed he had failed, as an analysis involves what cannot be replicated, like free association. It only happens once. By contrast, the development of an embryo also only happens once, but scientific theory explains how it happens. Evidence is not something which analysts have much respect for. Almost all ideas in psychoanalysis are not supported by reliable evidence. That we have in our minds an ego, superego and an id is without foundation. Then there are all the claims about dreams providing important information on the patient’s thoughts, particularly their unconscious thoughts, for which evidence is again just not there. There is excessive emphasis on the influence of childhood, although many adults with symptom neuroses and character pathology have no history of childhood sexual or physical abuse. And where is the evidence for the Oedipus complex? One of the problems with psychoanalysis is that it is difficult to be wrong as anything can be explained; there is no evidence with which it assesses any idea or claim. Every explanation seems possible, and this must make it very attractive to those who practise it – how nice to have virtually no constraints. Consider these typical views expressed by the analyst Adam Phillips:2 Psychoanalysis does not cure people but shows them what is incurable; the understanding of psychoanalysis involves a continual resistance to it; what happens in therapy has more to do with the therapist’s past than the patients; brief therapy is no worse or better; what could be more mine and not mine than my own desire. So how does one evaluate the technique and its ideas? Case histories would be of no value. In an analytic case study by Marco Chiesa3 we merely have a long history of the patient over several years. The analyst was very weary at times and the report does not even reach a conclusion. By contrast, a good example of a case history published in this journal involved an unusual combination of three problems – depression, mild cognitive impairment and sleep disorder.4 It was only after detailed questioning that the sleep laboratory con- firmed rapid eye movement sleep behaviour disorder, which re- sponded positively to a combination of drugs with nasal continuous positive airways pressure. Drugs do not enter into analytic-based treatments. Another example is the case of an intel- lectual disability due to a genetic defect on the X-chromosome.5 Genes rarely enter into analytic thinking. It is the insistence of analysts to live in a world of their own that makes it totally unsatisfactory for them to present a clinical case in this journal.

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