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The job guarantee forces state and local governments to replace their workforces.

Sturgess ’16 [Hugh, honors thesis for Bachelor’s degree in Political, Economic, and Social sciences; University of Sydney, October 12, “Would a Job Guarantee Guarantee Jobs?” https://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/handle/2123/16650/Hugh%20Sturgess%20Honours%20Thesis.pdf?sequence=2 ; acc 7/24/23 EB]

Forstater (2005: 252) enjoins critics of the JG to remember “the zoos, theatres, public buildings, parks, drainage systems, schools, and bridges built or repaired […] and the art, drama, oral histories, music, day care, school lunches, archeological and historical preservation” provided by the New Deal work programs. A JG, he argues, could provide the same services. There are two clear problems with this argument. Firstly, all these projects require planning and preparation that could not depend on the fluctuations of the broader labour market, and so could not be JG jobs. One cannot leave a school half-built because the workers have been offered higher paying jobs at (say) a fast food outlet. Secondly, the public sector already does all of these things, and much else besides. Many of our social needs are not currently neglected entirely but rather in degree. Public works, environmental schemes, infrastructure, the arts, education, health care, social care, and so on are provided by the government or the market, however inadequately. It seems perverse to respond to an under-provision of physical, social and cultural infrastructure by establishing an entirely different form of public-sector labour - the JG - that would use under-skilled, under-paid workers instead of well-paid and -trained workers. 50 If there is no clear distinction between the work done by the JG and that done by the mainline public sector, JG workers pose a significant threat to the employment, wages and conditions of better-paid, secure public-sector workers. As Seccareccia (2004: 33) notes, in periods of state retrenchment, there would be an enormous incentive for state and local governments to substitute low-wage JG workers for (relatively) high-wage and often organised permanent public servants. This is not a hypothetical concern. As noted in Chapter 2, anecdotal evidence suggests that some local governments substituted Jefas and WPA workers for regular public employees. During the Global Financial Crisis, states such as New South Wales and Victoria responded to the federal government’s social housing construction program by cutting their own funding for social housing, effectively shifting the cost of construction to the Commonwealth (ABS, 2012). The fact that JG workers would be paid for by the federal government but employed by third parties would be a powerful incentive for those third parties (such as state and local governments) to replace their workforces.

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