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International trade key to preventing war. Data proves.

Jackson and Nei ‘15[Mathew, Stephen, Department of Economics, Stanford University; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), December 14; “Networks of military alliances, wars, and international trade”; https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1520970112 ; acc 7/24/2023 EB]

To gain insight into the relationship between networks of alliances and the incidence of wars, we model the incentives of countries to attack each other, to form alliances, and to trade with each other. We first define a concept of networks that are stable against wars from a military point of view, when trade is ignored. We show that there are no (nonempty) networks of alliances that are stable, where stability requires that no country be vulnerable to defeat accounting for offensive and defensive alliances, and no country wants to add or drop alliances. This instability is suggestive of the shifting alliances and recurring wars of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries. Wars, however, have greatly subsided in parallel with the huge increase of trade, trends that we discuss in detail below. We thus enrich the base model to include international trade, introducing a concept of a network of alliances being war-and-trade-stable, which allows countries to form alliances for either economic or military considerations. This enables the existence of networks of alliances that are stable against conflict and the addition or deletion of alliances. Trade helps in two ways: First, it provides economic motivations to maintain alliances, and the resulting denser network has a deterrent effect; second, it reduces the incentives of a country to attack trading partners. This reduces the potential set of conflicts and allows for a rich family of stable networks that can exhibit structures similar to modern trade and alliance networks. In examining the data, we find that an increase in the number of a country’s allies correlates with a lower frequency with which it is attacked, and increasing trade between two countries correlates with a lower frequency of conflict between them. We discuss below how the model fits with, and sheds light on, other data and theories, such as the advent of nuclear weapons, the Cold War, and the increase in the number of democracies. Our analysis fits firmly into the “rationalist” tradition based on cost and benefit analyses, with roots in ref. . To our knowledge, there are no previous models of conflict that game-theoretically model networks of alliances between multiple agents/countries based on costs and benefits of wars. There are previous models of coalitions in conflict settings (e.g., see ref.  for a survey). Here, network structures add several things to the picture. Our model examines group conflict (e.g., ref. ) but enriches it to admit network structures of alliances and of international trade. This allows us to admit patterns that are consistent with the networks of alliances that are actually observed, which are far from being partitions, moving the models toward matching observed patterns of wars, trade, and alliances. Moreover, as we see below both empirically and theoretically, the patterns and number of partners of a given country matter beyond group membership or overall levels of interaction. Finally, our model illuminates the relationships between international trade, stable network structures, and peace, something not appearing in the previous literature—because the previous literature that involves international trade and conflict generally revolves around bilateral reasoning or focuses on instability and armament (e.g., ref. ) and does not address the questions that we address here. The complex relationship between trade and conflict is also the subject of an active empirical literature (e.g., refs. –). The complex correlations between conflict and trade are illuminated by a model that provides structure with which to interpret some of the observations.

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