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A job guarantee would kill labor markets and kill business confidence.

Tymoigne 2014

[Eric Tymoigne; Assistant Professor of Economics at Lewis and Clark College, Research Associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College; “Job Guarantee and Its Critiques: Insights from the New Deal Experience”; International Journal of Political Economy; 12/08/14; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.2753/IJP0891-1916420203?casa_token=UurlBikEl2UAAAAA:NUseLcF9EwBlsB19xY8EBX8j-ktEJeN3j_M-wBGLtGkAAyDuz-T5QEZFZSrtY_Kpao-FkOILd06-; accessed 7/23/23] CK

Abstract: Unemployment brings economic, psychological, and social hardship to individuals and their community. Common policies to combat unemployment include the promotion of economic growth and training, but a less common policy focuses on the right to work. This policy proposal decouples the goals of economic growth and full employment, and allows willing individuals to work in order to maintain their morale and employability while participating in socially beneficial activities. Since the 1990s, debates regarding the right to work have been revived. Critics have been wide ranging and the paper evaluates some of them by going back to the New Deal work programs. The paper shows that some of these critics are warranted while others are not. The paper concludes that Job Guarantee can provide significant benefits as long as it is organized around a vision of labor as a fulfilling and rewarding activity. However, this vision is almost certain to clash with existing labor market structures and dominant political interests. As a consequence, if put in place, Job Guarantee may be organized as a minimalist, make-work, low-wage program and that would be a mistake.

The idea of establishing a government program that guarantees the right to work almost became a reality in the United States with the 1945 full employment bill (Santoni 1986). This idea was reconsidered by Minsky (1965) and further developed by Wray (1998), Muysken and Mitchell (2008) and Harvey (1989, 2000). These authors have argued that a Job Guarantee program (JG) would not only help to solve socio-economic problems caused by unemployment, but also promote output-price stability and social equity.

According to its most recent proponents, the JG would be mostly federally funded but decentralized in its implementation by letting sponsors (states, localities, non-profit organizations, and others) propose projects to employ people from the JG pool. JG would pay a wage that would be adjusted upward from time to time. Proponents want this wage to be a living wage. JG would complement existing strategies that deal with unemployment through retraining and economic growth.

By hiring anybody willing to work at a given wage, the government is implementing a buffer stock policy for labor in the same way it does for bank reserves or agricultural commodities. This will help to stabilize the price of labor because the JG wage would set the base wage in the same way the fed funds rate is the base rate for all other interest rates. In addition, as long as the buffer employment ratio (JG enrollees divided by total employment) is large enough, the demand for labor should find what it needs in the JG pool, which would reinforce the stabilizing impact of the JG wage on other wages. By stabilizing the price of labor, the JG would help to dampen cost-push inflation and deflation. By moving automatically government spending in a countercyclical manner, the JG would dampen demand-led inflation and deflation.

Since the JG has been studied more carefully, a number of mostly skeptical evaluations have been done by Sawyer (2003), Kadmos and O’Hara (2000), and Aspromougors (2000), King (2000), and Seccarecia (2004). In relation to the New Deal work programs, Jensen (1989) and Margo (2001) made similar critiques that broadly range from the limited capacity to deal with structural unemployment and labor market distortions, to high cost and inflationary tendencies.

Probably the most common critique is that JG is not able to deal with structural unemployment. Solving structural unemployment requires retraining but the JG either does not provide training, or there are limited learning opportunities on the job because most JG occupations would involve low or common skills. Worse, the JG may worsen skills by assigning individuals to tasks that do not fit their skills.

In terms of market distortions, the JG likely would compete with existing public and private sector activities unless it is involved in a very narrow set of activities with limited relevance. In addition, JG may decrease the supply of work to the private sector because JG workers may have fewer incentives to look for private jobs if the JG provides better working conditions. Finally, like the New Deal work programs, the JG is likely to have a bad reputation and so to send a negative signal to potential employers.

JG critics are skeptical of the cost estimates provided by JG proponents and argue that the benefits produced would not match the cost. The administrative cost of the JG would be substantial and would require a massive reorganization of the current government administration in charge of helping the unemployed. Not only would the cost of the JG be higher than estimated, but also the benefits would be limited because of the limited usefulness of the JG activities. The private or public sectors already cover most of the useful activities.

Finally, JG critics think that the claims about the stabilizing effects of the JG are overstated or not accurate. Some authors argue that the JG would create additional demand while putting the economy at full employment, thereby leading to the same demand-pull inflation as in the typical Keynesian fiscal policy. Others have doubted the capacity of the buffer program to stabilize wages significantly because, contrary to agricultural commodities or bank reserves, labor is not a homogenous commodity. In addition, the level at which the JG wage is set is important to determine the cost, benefits, and potential inflationary dynamics, and JG proponents have not spent enough time looking at this issue carefully.

Mitchell and Wray (2005), Forstater (2005), Tcherneva and Wray (2005), Muysken and Mitchell (2008), and Harvey (1989, 2000) provide a counter-critique to some these different points. This paper aims at evaluating some of the critiques by putting them in the context of the 1930s work program. While not being a JG in the way envisaged by its proponents, the work programs of the 1930s are the closest policy experiment in the United States. The challenges and successes of the programs show that some of the critiques of the JG are relevant while others are not, and they provide some insights into the proper ways of implementing a JG. The first part presents briefly the New Deal work programs. The second part focuses on the achievements of the program. The third part discusses some of the main challenges. The fourth part concludes by drawing some lessons from the New Deal work programs.

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