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The LSGA reduces deficit spending through caps on discretionary funding.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 23, federal agency that provides budget and economic information to Congress, 4-26-2023, "The Economic and Budgetary Effects of Discretionary Funding Caps as Specified in the Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023," Congressional Budget Office, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59390

The Congressional Budget Office has analyzed the economic and budgetary effects of imposing caps on discretionary budget authority.1 Specifically, the agency has estimated what the effects would be if the funding caps enacted in June 2023 had been those required under H.R. 2811, the Limit, Save, Grow Act of 2023 (LSGA), which was passed by the House of Representatives on April 26, 2023. CBO has previously published estimates indicating that, relative to the agency’s February 2023 baseline budget projections, caps under the LSGA would reduce the primary deficit—that is, the total deficit minus net interest outlays—by $3.2 trillion from 2024 to 2033.2 In comparison, the caps that became law under the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (FRA, Public Law 118-5) would reduce CBO’s projections of discretionary spending, and therefore the projected primary deficit, by $1.3 trillion over that period.3

Those estimates were prepared according to long-standing practice, reflecting the assumption that the total output of the economy, measured in current-year dollars (that is, in terms of nominal gross domestic product, or GDP), would not change. As a result, total income would be unchanged. The dynamic analysis described in this report considers a broader set of effects. It takes into account the ways that reductions in discretionary spending would affect the total output of the economy and how the resulting macroeconomic changes would in turn affect federal revenues and spending.

Two Scenarios Under Discretionary Funding Caps

CBO examined two illustrative policy scenarios that are based on the caps that would have been imposed by the LSGA. In both scenarios, the caps would take effect in the first quarter of fiscal year 2024—that is, starting in October 2023—as specified in the legislation, and discretionary funding would be reduced by the same total amount.

For the first scenario, CBO assumed that all discretionary funding—both defense and nondefense—that would be constrained by the caps would be reduced by amounts that were proportional to their levels under current law. For the second scenario, CBO assumed that defense funding would not be affected and that all nondefense discretionary funding that would be constrained by the caps would be reduced by a greater proportion than in the first scenario. CBO distributed the reduction in nondefense funding across noninvestment government purchases, physical infrastructure and research and development (R&D), transfers and subsidies, and education in proportions equal to the shares of such funding in fiscal year 2022.4

The two scenarios are illustrative because actual allocations of discretionary funding would be determined by future legislation. Further, the economic and budgetary effects would depend on the mix of reductions in various funding categories that CBO analyzed. A different mix of funding would lead to different results.

Macroeconomic Effects

In the short term, the reductions in discretionary spending under both scenarios would result in lower levels of real GDP (that is, GDP adjusted to remove the effects of inflation), employment, interest rates, and inflation relative to CBO’s baseline projections. In the long term, real GDP would be higher because smaller deficits would increase the amount of resources available for private investment and thus boost the stock of capital assets. That effect would be partially offset by reductions in funding for physical infrastructure, R&D, and education, which would reduce private-sector productivity growth and real GDP. That offset would be larger under the second scenario, in which defense funding would be unaffected by the caps.

In general, CBO’s estimates of the macroeconomic effects of a fiscal policy are sensitive to the economic conditions that exist when the policy is implemented. For example, CBO estimates that fiscal policy has a larger impact on inflation when supply disruptions are greater and the labor market is tight (that is, when unemployment is low and job vacancies are plentiful). If funding caps had taken effect before October 2023, when supply chains were disrupted to a greater degree and labor market conditions were tight for a longer period of time, the effects of decreased government spending in reducing inflation would have been substantially larger.

This analysis is based on the economic forecast that CBO finalized in early December 2022; that forecast underlies the agency’s February 2023 baseline budget projections, which were used in this analysis. In CBO’s forecast, the economy slowed in the first half of 2023, signaled by a modest decline in GDP, an increase in the unemployment rate, and a gradual decline in inflation. If the analysis described in this report had accounted for the faster economic growth and lower unemployment in the last quarter of 2022 and the first quarter of 2023 than CBO forecast, the effects of the reduction in government spending in reducing inflation would also have been larger. (Unless this report indicates otherwise, all years referred to in describing economic projections are calendar years. Years referred to in describing budget projections are federal fiscal years, which run from October 1 to September 30 and are designated by the calendar year in which they end.)

Budgetary Effects

In both of CBO’s illustrative scenarios, the macroeconomic changes would primarily affect the budget through reductions in interest rates. Those macro­economic changes would reduce the deficit from 2024 to 2033 by $242 billion in the first scenario and by $222 billion in the second scenario.

In terms of total budgetary effects, including those stemming from macroeconomic changes, debt as a percentage of GDP in both scenarios would be 10 percentage points lower in 2033 than in CBO’s February 2023 baseline. All told, deficits as a percentage of GDP would be an average of 0.9 percentage points below their values in CBO’s February 2023 baseline, with a difference of 1.2 percentage points by 2033. About a tenth of the reductions in deficits and debt would stem from macroeconomic changes.

Caps on Discretionary Funding as Specified in the Limit, Save, Grow Act

The caps on discretionary budget authority that CBO analyzed, as specified in the LSGA, would have taken effect in October 2023.5 According to CBO’s analysis, discretionary funding under those caps would be $1.7 trillion in 2024, compared with $1.8 trillion in 2022 and 2023, and would grow by about 1 percent per year thereafter.6

CBO estimates that, relative to its baseline projections in February 2023, the LSGA’s discretionary funding caps—if they had been enacted instead of the FRA’s caps—would have reduced total deficits over the 2024–2033 period by $3.6 trillion, before accounting for the budgetary effects that would arise from changes in the economy. That deficit reduction reflects a decrease of $3.2 trillion in primary deficits and $0.4 trillion in net interest costs—amounting to 18 percent of the projected deficit over that period. CBO used that estimate to underpin its analyses of the macroeconomic effects of the caps.

In the two scenarios that CBO analyzed, discretionary funding that would be constrained by the caps would be reduced by an amount that was proportional to the levels projected in CBO’s baseline. In the first scenario, funding for defense, which accounted for approximately 45 percent of discretionary funding in 2022, would be reduced along with nondefense funding. In the second scenario, funding for defense would remain at baseline levels, and all the reductions needed to meet the same total reduction in discretionary budget authority required in the first scenario would be made in nondefense funding. (Ultimately, the actual spending mix would be determined by future appropriation legislation.)

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