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A NFU commitment checks Chinese military aggression.

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 6-29-2020, "What Are the Aims of U.S. Missile Defense?," https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/29/what-are-aims-of-u.s.-missile-defense-pub-82123//PL

Chinese strategists must have considered more sophisticated options than all-out nuclear retaliation in response to any rival nuclear attack. Without knowing what role theater nuclear forces play in such options—and how Beijing understands external threats to those forces—it is impossible for China and the United States and its regional allies to have a meaningful discussion about how theater missile defense systems could affect Beijing’s nuclear deterrent and whether measures can be taken to mitigate their impact. China’s future defense white papers can consider shedding more light on this issue. In this respect, the 2018 U.S. NPR report could be something of a general model (although China does not necessarily agree with the U.S. observation and evidence in this particular case): the NPR report clearly explained why the U.S. government is concerned that its theater nuclear forces are inadequate given its beliefs that Russia might use nuclear weapons in a limited way early in a conflict and that Moscow is developing new types of tactical weapons to support this doctrine. By extension, China’s clarification could also help other countries better evaluate the credibility of its NFU policy, reduce their concerns about the nuclear threat Beijing poses (which, in turn, may reduce investments in missile defense), and mitigate the risks of inadvertent escalation in a crisis. What the United States Can Do Mitigate U.S.-China differences on countering North Korean nuclear weapons. U.S. concerns about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs remain key drivers of the development and deployment of U.S. strategic missile defense systems designed to thwart enemy missiles launched from East Asia. But U.S. decisionmakers should be aware that the ambiguity over whether U.S. strategic missile defense capabilities are aimed at North Korea or China itself contributes significantly to Beijing’s worst-case assumptions about U.S. intent. Moreover, ongoing improvements to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities will likely drive the United States to augment its strategic missile defense systems, further intensifying the security trilemma between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Washington.161 At the operational level, the United States may feel it needs a high degree of confidence that even if North Korea launched every one of its ICBMs in a surprise attack, U.S. missile defense systems could intercept all of them. But U.S. policymakers should recall that Chinese strategists worry that such U.S. missile defense systems could neutralize China’s surviving nuclear weapons after a U.S. first strike, a concern heightened by China’s geographic proximity to North Korea. Despite hopes that the United States and China would find a way to cooperate more to try to convince North Korea to denuclearize, Chinese and U.S. geostrategic interests are CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE 55 increasingly diverging amid their heightened strategic rivalry, making such coordination more difficult to achieve. As a first step to mitigate such challenges, the United States and China should jointly evaluate North Korea’s nuclear and missiles capabilities and the potential threats they pose to other countries and regional stability, so as to narrow or at least shed light on the gap between Chinese experts’ generally more sanguine and U.S. experts’ typically more pessimistic assessments.162 U.S. allies, such as South Korea, can help convene and moderate such joint evaluations, giving China a stronger incentive to participate. A U.S. NFU commitment could help. The United States could help mitigate this dilemma by adopting an NFU policy toward China, or, less formally, by forging a private understanding with China on NFU. This would effectively address China’s fear of a U.S. first strike, thus substantially reducing the potential impact of U.S. missile defense on China’s nuclear deterrent and making it much easier for Washington to assure Beijing that U.S. missile defense systems cannot undermine its nuclear deterrent. China’s own NFU policy and its long-standing call for other nuclear powers to adopt such a policy means that even a U.S. declaratory policy of NFU would help address Chinese concerns about the risks of a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike. Despite the long internal debate within the United States about NFU, the potentially huge benefit of bringing Beijing and Washington closer to resolving their missile defense dispute should give one important reason for the United States to seriously consider adopting this policy toward China

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