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NFU solves---it causes Chinese arsenal transparency.

Susan Turner Haynes 18. (Susan Turner Haynes joined Lipscomb University as an assistant professor in 2015. Prior to her doctorate) Assistant professor of political science at Lipscomb University in Nashville, Tennessee. Spring 2018. “Dragon in the Room: Nuclear Disarmament’s Missing Player.” Strategic Studies Quarterly. pp. 25-47. //PL

The most direct solution to stopping Chinese nuclear proliferation is to have a treaty that effectively places a ceiling on Chinese strategic nuclear weapons in exchange for further reductions in US and Russian strategic (and likely nonstrategic) forces. A treaty of this sort would seemingly benefit all involved by advancing the purported disarmament goal of all three countries, lessening the security “trilemma” between the three countries, and legitimizing China’s commitment to a “lean and effective” deterrent. This is the kind of solution that most scholars recommend, and while it flows logically from the framework of US-Russian disarmament, such a posteriori reasoning is unsuitable to the Chinese context for several reasons. The first reason is that we do not know for certain the number of Chinese nuclear forces. Any disarmament proposal having to do with hard capabilities will require a certain degree of a priori knowledge. In the case of a treaty dealing with Chinese nuclear force levels, effective implementation would require the Chinese to disclose (and other signatories to verify) the number and nature of its nuclear capabilities. To date, China has been very protective of such information. According to many in China, this is because minimum deterrence requires relative opacity when it comes to the state’s nuclear capabilities—increasing transparency increases China’s vulnerability. An additional obstacle to Sino-US disarmament is the increasing irrelevance with which the Chinese view quantitative limits. From the Chinese perspective, the ongoing modernization programs of the nuclear superpowers have allowed both states to maintain the artifice of meeting disarmament obligations while retaining relative nuclear superiority. Some even argue that the focus on numbers is meant to divert international attention and provide the international community with a false sense of security.17 This has caused many in China to claim that a strict quantitative approach to nuclear disarmament is no longer sufficient.18 After all, what does it matter if there are fewer nuclear weapons if these weapons are upgraded to increase the likelihood of their use? Can one claim, as some have in China, that “the nuclear arms race has changed from one based on quantity to one based on quality?”19 If this is the case, then quantitative disarmament agreements are not enough. The proceeding analysis examines each of these obstacles, in turn, beginning with the problem of transparency. The argument here is that future disarmament negotiations between China and the United States are unlikely to resemble those between the US and Russia. We cannot begin with START, nor can we use previous negotiations as a template for a new situation. Instead, we must work diligently to uncover new conditions for cooperation. While the US may appease China by continuing to decrease its strategic weapons through bilateral agreements with Russia, other areas of concessions are likely to make more of an impact in the Sino-US nuclear dynamic, including written clarification of US intent regarding nuclear use and the use of its prompt long-range conventional weapons and restrictions on certain qualitative advancements in its nuclear force. Seeing Opportunities for Cooperation US officials are usually the first to argue that China’s opacity vis-à-vis its hard capabilities impedes disarmament cooperation. Chinese officials often counter that the US is equally opaque when it comes to intent. Even if China reveals the structure and scope of its strategic nuclear arsenal, they argue, China needs reassurance that the United States will not use its knowledge of China’s nuclear force to employ its strategic nuclear weapons or its advanced conventional weapons in a preemptive strike. Chinese leaders would thus want to have knowledge of and confidence in US nuclear intent before disclosing specific information relating to its nuclear capabilities. This is why China wants the US to sign a formal no first use (NFU) agreement, in which the US commits only to use nuclear weapons in response to nuclear attacks and not in response to large-scale conventional, chemical, biological, or cyberattacks. It would also foreclose the possibility of America providing extended deterrence to its nonnuclear allies.20 This is a move the US has never been willing to make. The closest step it took in this regard was the considerable debate that ensued around the topic under the Obama administration prior to the 2010 nuclear posture review. Ultimately, however, the US decided against adopting an NFU policy. It also rejected a more limited no first strike (NFS) policy, which would have prevented the US from carrying out a preemptive nuclear attack (usually aimed to eliminate an adversary’s nuclear capabilities or arsenal).21

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