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Even the possibility of a US first strike can lead to nuclear escalation.

[Michael S. Gerson, Feburary 2011, "The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/future-us-nuclear-policy-case-no-first-use, js]

If a nuclear-armed opponent believes that the United States might use nuclear weapons first in a disarming strike, a severe crisis could be especially dangerous and unstable. A crisis is "stable" when neither side has an overriding incentive to use nuclear weapons first, and both sides are aware of this situation. Conversely, a crisis is "unstable" when one or both states have an overriding incentive to strike first. Given U.S. quantitative and qualitative advantages in nuclear forces and given that current and potential nuclear-armed adversaries are likely to have nuclear arsenals with varying degrees of size and survivability, in a future crisis an adversary may fear that the United States could attempt a disarming nuclear first strike. Even if the United States has no intention of striking first, the mere possibility of such a strike left open by a policy of not ruling one out could cause suboptimal decision-making in the heat of an intense crisis and increase the chances that nuclear weapons are used. The U.S. option to use nuclear weapons first could generate crisis instability in three ways. First, in a severe crisis, intense apprehensions about a U.S. first strike could prompt an opponent to take measures to increase the survivability of its forces and help ensure nuclear retaliation, such as adopting a launch-on-warning posture, rapidly dispersing forces, raising alert levels and mating warheads to missiles, or pre-delegating launch authority to field commanders. These actions increase the possibility of an accidental launch or other miscalculations that could lead to unauthorized use. Second, in the midst of an intense crisis, trepidations about a U.S. first strike could create incentives for signaling and brinksmanship that increase the chances of miscommunication and nuclear escalation. For example, concerns about a U.S. attack could prompt an adversary to take measures to decrease the vulnerability of its forces, such as mating warheads to delivery vehicles, fueling missiles, or dispersing forces. While the opponent might intend these measures to deter a U.S. counterforce strike by increasing the survivability of its forces, U.S. political and military leaders might misperceive these actions as a sign of the opponent's impending nuclear attack and decide to preempt. Third, a state could be enticed to preempt out of fear that if it does not launch first, it will not have a second chance. A "use-it-or-lose-it" mentality might give an opponent a strong incentive to preempt. In this context, the adversary’s motivation to use nuclear weapons first comes not from the possibility of gaining some advantage, but rather from the belief that waiting and receiving what it believes to be a likely U.S. first strike would only lead to an even worse outcome.

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