Increasing US security order regenerates the Liberal International Order
Global Agenda Council, 16, 7-2016, "Strengthening the Liberal World Order: A World Economic Forum White Paper", [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/strengthening_liberal_world_order_wef-1.pdf]//PL
The liberal world order that arose after World War II rested on three pillars: a liberal economic order that could bring a greater degree of prosperity to all who participated in it; a liberal political order that favored democratic governance; and a strategic order that suppressed the great power conflicts that had produced so much destruction in the first half of the 20th century. The first two involved extensive mutual cooperation among nations and peoples. The latter depended almost entirely on the power and commitment of a single power: the United States. It was the US military presence in both Europe and Asia that effectively put an end to the cycle of warfare that had plagued both regions. American military power acted as a guarantor of mutual security that allowed former enemies – such as Germany and France – to join in economic and political union without fear of another conflict. In East Asia, the American presence allowed Japan, and later China, to focus on economic growth and modernization without fear of another round of conflict that had caused such damage to both countries between the 1890s and the 1940s. In the Middle East, too, albeit with less consistent success, the United States served as a mediator and guarantor of the security of the leading nations, even those that were engaged in conflict with one another. The fact that the world has gone seven decades without a great power war is, in historical terms, a remarkable achievement. Even the “long peace” that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars was not without costly great power wars (the Crimean War of the 1850s and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871). This long and broad era of strategic peace has, in turn, made possible the other successes of the liberal world order: the unprecedented prosperity of the post-war era and equally unprecedented spread of democratic governance. Today, however, this strategic order is being challenged on several fronts. In Europe, Russia has committed the first cross-border aggression by a major power since World War II, raised the specter of renewed nuclear competition and caused tensions with NATO allies from the Baltics in the North to Turkey in the South. In East Asia, China’s greater military power and expanding strategic reach have raised questions about the reliability of America’s security guarantees to its allies and to America’s ability to play its traditional role of keep international trade routes and sea lanes open. These challenges promise to be especially pressing in the South and East China Seas, where Chinese territorial claims conflict with those of other nations, including close allies of the United States, and in some cases conflict with international law. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Iran has deployed forces in Syria and supported guerrilla forces in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in a bid for growing hegemony in the region. The forces of ISIS have gained control of territory spanning the border between Iraq and Syria and threaten to grow stronger, feeding off sectarian strife in both countries. The crises in the Middle East have also spilled over into Europe, putting immense pressure of European political institutions and on security ties among European countries and between Europe and the United States. The chaos and destruction in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East have produced the largest mass movement of people since World War II. This has tested institutional ability and strained the capacity of frontline states. It has also fuelled populist and xenophobic rhetoric intended for domestic political audiences in the United States and particularly Europe that has sought to blur the lines between those owed international protection and economic migrants. While the security concerns are real, and vetting and vigilance are necessary, it is crucial that the US and its partners live up to their commitment to protect internationally endangered persons under the Refugee Convention. This is not only a question of doing the moral or legally obligated thing, it is smart policy. Denying entry to refugees based on a fear of radicalization at home does not resolve security concerns, it merely pushes greater numbers of at-risk communities towards the conditions that foster violence, hopelessness and alienation. At the same time, the United States and its partners must lead an effort to update the current legal and instituti Global Agenda Council on the United States - Strengthening the Liberal World Order framework established after World War II and ill-suited for the modern world. These challenges will not go away but must be addressed, intelligently and firmly. The US must provide leadership, including military leadership, to help provide a solution to the Syrian political crisis while also reducing and eliminating the threat posed by ISIS. Overall, to sustain the liberal world order requires that the United States continue to play the role it has played since World War II in providing security and deterring aggression. At a time when much of the world has come to doubt America’s will to continue its global engagement, steps need to be taken to provide reassurance. Reassuring Allies and Friends of American Reliability The first task is to reassure friends and allies of the dependability of US security guarantees. Nations that begin to question America’s reliability will seek other means of protecting their security, and while we would like to believe that they do so in ways that serve both their interests and ours, it is more often the case that the courses they choose are destructive and disruptive to the liberal order and to general security. Gulf States supporting radical forces in the sectarian struggles of the Middle East, for instance, have lessened everyone’s security, including their own. A close ally such as Japan should not be left on its own to meet the challenges of a region where the exercise of Japanese military power, unmoored from close ties with America, raises historical concerns. In Asia as well as in Europe, allies facing a China growing in power and ambition or a Russia with great power and expansionist ambitions need to be reassured that the US has both the will and the capacity to provide defense against aggression. That has been and remains the cornerstone of the security system that has undergirded the liberal world order. To this end, we must first work to strengthen the political, military and economic capacity of allies. The stronger they are, the more effective is the deterrence provided by the alliance. While dependence on the US for ultimate security is unavoidable in this international system, to the degree allies can do more on their own and can partner with the United States to provide overall security, the alliances will be healthier and American public support for a globally engaged foreign policy will be greater. At the same time, it is important to demonstrate to friends and allies that the US can provide diplomatic solutions to problems, has a unique capacity to bring parties together to find common solutions to problems and does not pursue aims by strictly unilateral or military means. Although effective leadership often requires moving out ahead of other powers, the United States needs to avoid creating the perception of being a rogue superpower. Establishing a Modus Operandi with Independent Powers We also need to find ways to incorporate rising democratic powers and organizations that are not traditional American allies into the overall security framework. This means finding a modus operandi with nations like India and Brazil, or the Arab League, which do not want to join an American alliance system but share some common interests. Whether this requires new institutions or simply a supple diplomacy remains to be seen. But an effective American policy will find a way to work with independent powers that nevertheless share a common world view. Having reassured allies and friends of America’s reliability as a provider of security and a facilitator of diplomatic solutions, it becomes possible to deal more effectively with real and potential adversaries. There is no more effective deterrent to opponents of the liberal world order, and to a stable security order, than the reality and perception of a strong, unified alliance and cooperation among friendly states that share common goals. Behind that must be the evident willingness and capability of the United States to act to deter aggression; but the perception of effective US leadership, and the welcoming of an American role by friends and allies, adds significantly to deterrence. In dealing with actual or potential adversaries, the first step must be effective deterrence and containment. It is essential that the United States make clear that the costs of aggression outweigh the benefits and that success is impossible. This requires, above all, maintaining sufficient military strength, and the will to use it, so that potential challengers have a clear sense of the risks. Nothing invites aggression like ambiguity, in terms of both means and will, on the part of the deterring power. With effective deterrence established, however, it is possible and desirable to offer would-be challengers an alternative Global Agenda Council on the United States - Strengthening the Liberal World Order path. While making it clear that military action will not succeed and will be costly, the United States can also make clear, through diplomatic and economic “carrots and sticks”, that a peaceful rise through integration into the existing economic and political system is a much more fruitful course. Wherever possible, coalitions that espouse these views should be assembled with the US operating as an indispensable partner. Ending Sequestration and Increasing US Defense Capabilities The United States spends more on defense than any other nation in the world, and indeed more than the next 10 nations combined. This fact is often noted to suggest that the US defense budget is either high enough or too high. What many fail to take into account, however, is that the United States plays a unique role in the world. No other nation has the global responsibilities that the United States has shouldered. The fact is, the US has been the main provider of security throughout the world for the past 70 years. Its navy keeps the sea lanes open to international trade. Its land, air and naval forces help maintain the peace in East Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Therefore, American forces must have far greater capacity and reach than those of other nations. Today, as a result of budget cuts, including those mandated by the so-called sequester, America’s ability to continue playing this vital role in all these theatres is increasingly in question. Every recent secretary of defense, every chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and every head of every service has warned that, unless spending on defense increases, US forces will lose their capacity to provide security, will “hollow” out, will be inadequately trained and equipped to carry out their global missions. Given the role that the US plays in providing the underlying security that allows the liberal world order to function and flourish, continuing down this path not only threatens US security, but also the order itself. To carry out any of the goals in this report, therefore, will require taking on the political challenge of fighting to lift the sequester caps. As a political matter, this may require compromises on both taxes and non-defense domestic spending. If so, those compromises should be made