Solves the advantages
Alexander 22 (Dr. Samuel Alexander 22, lecturer at the University of Melbourne, Australia, co-director of the Simplicity Institute and a research fellow with the Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute; and Brendan Gleeson, Emeritus Professor at the School of Regulation and Global Governance, The Australian National University; “Collective Sufficiency: Degrowth as a Political Project;” Chapter 5, Post-Capitalist Futures: Paradigms, Politics, and Prospects, Palgrave MacMillan, 2022, DOI 10.1007/978-981-16-6530-1)
If capitalism is coming to an end in coming years or decades as it collides with various ecological and financial limits, how can we actively design the end of this mode of political economy rather than wait for its collapse? Or even, if necessary, how can we design for the collapse of capitalism in ways that make the best of a destabilised situation? Capitalism certainly isn’t going to lie down like a lamb at the polite request of Left-leaning environmentalists. What this means is that sustainability and justice advocates with radical visions of post-capitalist futures need to think very carefully about the question of strategy and transition. More specifically, we must confront the question of where and how to invest time, energy, and resources, if we genuinely seek a fundamentally different type of economic system ‘beyond capitalism’.1
In the prehistory of the COVID-19 pandemic, we explored in our book Degrowth in the Suburbs (Alexander and Gleeson 2019) the prospects for a systemic transition away from capitalism via degrowth— planned, managed, or imposed. We argued degrowth is the most coherent paradigm for transcending the machinic economics of growth inherent to the existing capitalist system.
Building on that post-capitalist vision, in this chapter we explore the transitional question of how that imaginary could be driven into existence as a grounded form of political economy. In doing so we also highlight the role grassroots social movements and alternative economic experiments might need to play in prefiguring degrowth economies and creating the cultural conditions for a politics and macroeconomics of degrowth to emerge. We begin with a brief definitional statement.
What is Degrowth?
Degrowth is a movement that sees the goal of limitless economic growth as being incompatible with a finite planet. From this perspective, the notion of ‘green growth’—where economies are envisioned to grow but in sustainable ways—is a dangerous but enduring myth (Hickel and Kallis 2019). Despite decades of extraordinary technological advance and deep faith in market mechanisms to bring environmental salvation, the so-called greening of capitalism has only produced ever-greater devastation. What is needed is a degrowth process of planned economic contraction that downshifts global material and energy demands to sustainable levels. The growth imperatives of capitalism, however, will not accept this, which is why sustainability implies a post-capitalist world.
Environmental sustainability, of course, cannot be isolated from social justice concerns. The growthists maintain that the only path to poverty alleviation is via the strategy of GDP growth, on the assumption that ‘a rising tide will lift all boats’. Given that a degrowth economy deliberately seeks a non-growing economy—on the assumption that a rising tide will sink all boats—poverty alleviation must be achieved more directly, via distribution of wealth and power, both nationally and internationally. In other words (and to change the metaphor) a degrowth economy would seek to eliminate poverty and achieve distributive equity not by baking an ever-larger pie but by slicing it differently. From a global perspective, the post-development literature is an indispensable guide to what degrowth scholar Serge Latouche calls the ‘decolonisation of the imaginary’.
Prerequisites for a Degrowth Transition
Recently the Danish political economist Hubert Buch-Hansen (2018) published a paper which outlined a conceptual framework that is useful for thinking about how paradigm shifts in political economy occur. He argued that there are four main prerequisites:
• First, there must be a crisis or series of crises that cannot be resolved within the existing mode of political economy;
• Second, there must be a coherent alternative political project;
• Third, there must be a comprehensive coalition of social forces attempting to produce the alternative paradigm through political struggle and social activism; and
• Finally, there must be broad-based cultural consent, even passive consent, for the new paradigm.
We’re going to adopt this framework, add our own analytical flesh to its theoretical bones, and use it to discuss the question of a degrowth transition to a post-capitalist society.
Capitalism Is Not in Crisis: Capitalism Is the Crisis
The first prerequisite, then, for a paradigm shift in the existing mode of political economy is crisis—but not just any crisis. It must be a crisis or series of crises in the system that the system itself cannot resolve. There are many reasons to think this prerequisite is met. Growth economics is sometimes called the ‘ideology of the cancer cell’ and this provocative metaphor neatly summarises the fatal anomaly in capitalism, namely, that on the one hand, it must keep growing for stability, and, on the other hand, for various ecological and financial reasons, it simply cannot keep growing. Like a chorus of others, we don’t believe capitalism can resolve this fundamental contradiction, which is creating conditions for a new, post-capitalist paradigm to replace it (Hickel and Kallis 2019). Accordingly, for the purpose of this forward-looking chapter, we will assume that the capitalist mode of political economy is ridden with irresolvable ecological and social crises such that, one way or another, the future will be post-capitalist.
An Alternative Political Project
The second prerequisite for a paradigm shift in political economy—for a degrowth transition, in particular—is the existence of an alternative political project. This isn’t the forum to comprehensively articulate and defend this alternative political project, so we’re just going to state it, or one version of it, in order to show that an alternative post-capitalist political project is beginning to take form.
The following political agenda is, in our view, both coherent and attractive, but it will soon become clear how disconnected it is from political realism in developed nations (or anywhere) today. Of course, we would argue that this is an indictment of mainstream politics, not the theory of degrowth. However, the political and social unpalatability of degrowth is a point to which we will return, because it has implications on the question of strategy. In a time of rising authoritarianism and political reaction in general, it is likely to be fiercely opposed by those clinging to the wreckage of the sinking ship. Nonetheless, nothing good will come from ill preparation for change that might come suddenly and unexpectedly. Therefore, we offer the following policy programme as an exercise in radical political imagination; a set of pivots and plot points for transition to a degrowth society:
• Alternatives to GDP: First, any political transition beyond capitalism requires transcending the GDP fetish and establishing better and more nuanced ways to measure societal progress, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator. Post-growth measures of progress like this open up space for political parties to implement policy and institutional changes—including those which we are about to review—which would genuinely improve social wellbeing and enhance ecological conditions, even if these would not increase, and would probably even decrease, GDP.
• Diminishing Resource Caps: If the rich, overgrown economies are serious about moving toward a just and sustainable human inhabitation of Earth, then first, we must acknowledge that we are hugely over-consuming our fair share of global resources, and second, we must institute diminishing resource caps which put strict limits on national resource flows. Fortunately, this would incentivise the efficient use of resources and dis-incentivise waste, and lead to degrowth in ecological impacts. Eco-socialists would argue that reducing societal material and energy flows will require significant nationalisation of key industries for stability during the planned contraction (Smith 2016), whereas eco-anarchists would argue that a confederation of small self-governing communities would be the better path (Trainer 2010). This debate is likely to continue and it may be that this controversy can only be resolved through practical experimentation, not theory.
• Reduced Working Hours (in Formal Economy): One obvious implication of diminishing resource caps is that a lot less resource-intensive production and consumption would take place in a degrowth economy. This would almost certainly lead to reduced GDP. To avoid the unemployment that typically flows from declining GDP, a degrowth economy would reduce work in the formal economy and share available work amongst the working population, while also placing increased value on the ‘care economy’. Financial security in a contracting economy could also be maintained through policies like a Participation Income, Universal Basic Services, or a job guarantee, as noted in the final bullet point. (We will return to the question of informal or household economies in the next section.)
• Rethink Government Spending: Currently, as a general statement, governments shape their policies and spend their money in order to promote economic growth. Under a degrowth paradigm, it follows that government spending would need to be fundamentally reconsidered. For example, fewer airports, roads, and tanks; more bike lanes and public transport. How governments spend money is one way to vote for what exists in the world. Rethinking government spending would also need to go hand in hand with transformations in the systemic provision of basic services. For example, Cubans have better health on average than US citizens and yet spend an estimated 90 per cent less on healthcare per capita (Hamblin 2016). This suggests that there is ample room to provide for basic services in an affordable way while also making more public money available to fund other social projects (like public housing or renewable energy systems).
• Renewable Energy Transition: In anticipation of the foreseeable stagnation and eventual decline of fossil fuel supplies, and recognising the grave dangers presented by climate change, a degrowth economy would divest from fossil fuels and invest in a renewable energy transition with the urgency of ‘war time’ mobilisation. This will be much more affordable and technically feasible if energy demand across society is greatly reduced, and that is a key feature of a degrowth society (Alexander and Floyd 2018). The energy transition needed cannot just involve ‘greening’ the supply of energy, it must also involve greatly reduced demand. This means anticipating and managing what Australian activist-analyst David Holmgren calls ‘the energy descent future’.
• Banking and Finance: Our systems of banking and finance currently have a growth imperative built into their structures. Any degrowth society would have to create systems that did not require growth for stability. Debt jubilees would probably be required, especially with respect to the poorest nations. These are particularly complex issues and the forces of opposition will be fierce. But the point is that any post-growth transition is going to require deep changes to the most fundamental banking, monetary, and financial institutions of capitalism.
• Population Policies: This is always controversial territory, especially in an age of rising social polarisation, but the environmental logic is compel- ling. As a population grows, more resources are required to provide for the material conditions of human wellbeing. As Paul Ehrlich once said: ‘Whatever problem you’re interested in, you’re not going to solve it unless you also solve the population problem.’ We won’t pose specific policies. The point is that this topic needs to be discussed openly and with wisdom and compassion. Equitable population policies must be part of any coherent politics of sustainability in recognition that we live on a ‘full Earth’. Nevertheless, population must not be used as a scapegoat to deflect attention away from the more fundamental problem of unsustainable affluence and the political economies of growth that both drive and require unsustainable consumption (see Harvey 1974).
• Distributive Justice: As noted earlier, environmental concerns cannot be isolated from social justice concerns, both nationally and globally. Prominent policies in this space include the notion of a Universal Basic Income, while others argue for a job guarantee or Universal Basic Services. These types of policies would go a long way to directly eliminating poverty, with funding supported by a maximum wage, wealth taxes, and land taxes that sought to reduce inequality. Again, ecosocialists would argue that a just distribution of wealth and power would have to involve significant socialisation of property and curtailment of ‘the market’. How far socialisation would need to go, and the nature of such a transformation, is obviously open to debate.
These policy platforms—all in need of elaboration and discussion— are sound guiding goals if a transition to degrowth society were recognised as necessary. Each of these policies could take various forms, and there is, and should be, debate within the degrowth movement and beyond about various ways to structure a post-capitalist society. But our present point is simply that a coherent alternative politico-economic project is emerging to replace the capitalist paradigm. So, the second prerequisite for a paradigm shift is also arguably present, which is to say: viable and desirable alternative structures exist. Capitalist realism—the belief that there is no alternative to the existing political economy—is a dangerous illusion.