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A job guarantee ensures limitless expansion of economies culminating in ecological collapse

Wray et al. ’18 [L. Randall, Flavia Dantas, Scott Fullwiler, Pavlina R. Tcherneva, and Stephanie A. Kelton; 2018; Professor of Economics at the Bard College; State University of New York at Cortland; University of Missouri-Kansas City; PhD Economics, associate professor of economics at Bard College, research associate at the Levy Economics Institute and expert at the Institute for New Economic Thinking; Stony Brook University, and Levy Economics Institute of Bard College; Levy Institute Research Project Report, “Public Service Employment: A Path to Full Employment,” Annandale-on-Hudson, NY: Levy Economics Institute of Bard College]

Some have emphasized other structural forces at play. John Williams, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, argues that a growing percentage of (relatively) younger Americans are leaving the labor force to care for children and older family members, obtain more education, or enjoy leisure (Williams 2016). The supply-side case would tell us that more generous social safety-net benefits, combined with an increase in the number of families with two working spouses, have reduced the costs associated with labor force withdrawal. Prime-age workers are more likely to drop out rather than take jobs that require lower skill levels or pay much lower wages.

The evidence suggests that depressed LFPRs for prime-age workers are more likely the result of a combination of insufficient aggregate demand, weak job creation, and stagnant wages — all of which have been persistent problems over the past three or four decades. While short-lived economic expansions have occasionally counteracted these trends, this temporary relief has been provided by unsustainable asset-price bubbles (dot-com stocks, commodities, housing prices) and excessive private indebtedness, which increases fragility and does little for those at the bottom of the income ladder. Further, once the bubbles burst, we return to secular stagnation.

In addition to demographics and "lifestyle" choices, some blame excessive government intervention in labor markets for discouraging job creation. A glance at international comparisons weakens that case. In 2015, the United States had one of the lowest LFPRs among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, as can be seen in Figure 1.5. It is hard to make the argument that excessive labor market regulation or generous social safety nets are the reason for the lower participation rates in the United States compared with other OECD countries, since those countries generally have labor markets that are more tightly regulated as well as social safety-net schemes that are more extensive and comprehensive. Further, since the US Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996 —which curtailed or imposed time limits on government assistance to those in need, in order to promote private sector work over government dependency of the able-bodied—US participation rates have actually declined in contrast with most other OECD countries (as seen in Figure 1.6). The United States is among only a handful of countries with a falling LFPR.

Furthermore, given that all of these are "aging" economies (in fact, most of them have an older workforce than the United States) and most of them face similar technological innovations that displace labor, it is not likely that these factors can explain the relatively poor performance of US labor markets. 

Indeed, while the social shifts explanation sounds plausible, it is unlikely that a large number of Americans are voluntarily leaving the labor force in accordance with personal preferences. In fact, as discussed above, the number of those not in the labor force who report not wanting a job now has declined for age groups 16-24 and 25-54. Further, the historical trend for married couples with children under the age of 18 shows a significant increase in the percentage of families in which both parents are employed: from 25 percent in the 1960s to almost 61 percent in May 2016. Neither of these trends is consistent with the "lifestyle changes" argument.

The number of males of prime working age who are neither employed nor looking for a job has more than doubled over the past 50 years, but the "personal choice" to spend more time with family while a spouse works seems to explain little of this decline, as fewer than 25 percent of prime-age people who are not participating in the labor force have a working spouse and nearly 36 percent of them were living in poverty (CEA 2016). Furthermore, the decline in participation among prime-age males is twice that of prime-age males with children.

While the effect of aging on participation is not denied, deficient aggregate demand in the aftermath of the GFC has created a discouraged worker effect. This is the tendency for the long-term unemployed to be classified as being outside the labor force because, in the face of scarce employment opportunities, they

cease to actively seek work. In other words, a proportion of the decline in the US participation rate since 2000 is due to a rise in such hidden unemployment.

Conclusion

Despite the widespread belief that supply-side factors impinge on the ability of the economy to grow faster over the long run, the evidence is that the United States has typically operated with substantial labor market slack. If anything, slack has risen in the aftermath of the GFC, in part due to the discouraged worker effect. This slack, and accompanying downward pressure on wages, reduces the incentive for firms to invest in labor-saving production techniques. That, in turn, reduces the incentive to innovate in order to raise labor productivity.

In other words, lack of sufficient demand for workers —in part due to insufficient demand for US output—produces a vicious cycle of perverse disincentives that together keep employment and aggregate demand, and hence economic growth, lower than they might have been. Unfortunately, policymakers misread this as the existence of supply- side constraints on growth, since they think that depressed labor market participation is largely a supply-side phenomenon.

Although we believe that insufficient aggregate demand is a big part of the problem, general "Keynesian" pump-priming is not the answer. Stimulus needs to take the form of targeted job creation to tighten labor markets for less-skilled workers. If we are serious about improving the conditions of working America, we should revisit Roosevelt's New Deal jobs programs and Hyman Minsky's employer of last resort proposal to create jobs where they are needed while improving public infrastructure and provision of public services (Minsky 2013).

The substantial pool of idle labor in the United States could be put to work to increase aggregate demand and economic growth, which would be beneficial for productivity growth. While part of the policy solution is to encourage private demand, there is also room for more government spending. Since the private sector will hire the most employable workers first (those with more education, training, and work experience), it is necessary for the government to take up the slack that remains even in a robust expansion.

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