Corporate control prevents and disrupts any environmental action.
Povitkina, 18. (Marina Povitkina; Marina Povitkina is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo (Norway) and the Centre for Collective Action Research at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden). Marina obtained her PhD in Political Science from the University of Gothenburg in 2018. Her dissertation compared how democratic governments achieve environmental sustainability goals depending on their levels of corruption. Her current research is on how corruption hampers collaboration in social dilemmas.; March, 2018; “The Limits of Democracy in Tackling Climate Change”; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09644016.2018.1444723; Taylor and Francis Online; Accessed 7/23/2023; JB)
Some features of democracies, however, are argued to hamper environmental commitments. Due to constant political challenge through electoral cycles, political leaders in democracies are known to be shortsighted, which can prevent them from allocating budget to implement[ing]ation of such long-term policy projects as environmental protection (Congleton Citation1992). Additionally, despite the pluralistic nature of democracies, strong corporate interest groups can gain high influence over the political decision-making. Politicians become compelled to respond to these groups’ short-term interests, which can go against environmental protection and the long-term benefit of the public (e.g. Bättig and Bernauer Citation2009).
Empirical evidence almost uniformly points to the positive effects of democracy on environmental outcomes (e.g. Gleditsch and Sverdrup Citation2003, Li and Reuveny Citation2006, Bättig and Bernauer Citation2009, Bernauer and Koubi Citation2009, Arvin and Lew Citation2011), apart from few exceptions (Midlarsky Citation1998). Spilker (Citation2013) finds that democracy does not seem to matter for environmental outcomes in the developing world, arguing that citizens in low-income countries are unlikely to demand environmental commitments from politicians, as they have other policy preferences.
The important limitation of the majority of empirical studies explaining environmental outcomes, however, is that they fail to account for the effect of ‘state capacity’ or political institutions that shape the functioning of the state apparatus and therefore determine whether a state is able to reach its official goals (Skocpol Citation1985). The quality of public administration, which develops and implements action plans, and institutions that shape its performance, to a large extent determine whether the state is able to introduce and apply the appropriate policy instruments, ensure monitoring and enforcement to implement these decisions (Ringquist Citation1993). Such well-functioning apparatus, however, is not necessarily an attribute of democratic systems (Huntington Citation1991).
Corruption and climate change mitigation
The extent to which democracies can solve environmental problems is therefore also dependent on the quality of institutions, which shape the functioning of the state apparatus and therefore – the actual delivery of results. Institutions are ‘rules of the game’ or ‘humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction’ (North Citation1990). One of the most detrimental institutional constraints for reducing CO2 emissions, widely discussed in the environmental economics literature (but surprisingly omitted from the discussions in comparative environmental politics), is corruption.
Corruption can influence national levels of CO2 emissions through at least five driving forces. First, corruption disrupts coercive power of the state. In a corrupt state, laws are rarely followed and policies simply do not get implemented (López and Mitra Citation2000, Damania et al. Citation2003). Corrupt ‘rules of the game’ create incentives for emitters to avoid prescribed rules of behavior and offer bribes to government officials instead (O’Connor Citation1994, Desai Citation1998). Corrupt bureaucrats in turn have incentives to take bribes and underreport emission levels instead of enforcing compliance with the regulations and fine unlawful emitting behavior (Damania Citation2002). Corruption also interferes in the process of hiring government officials and thus affects competence and level of commitment to policy objectives, leading to inadequate inspections and poor enforcement (Ringquist Citation1993). If corruption is also present in courts and judges can be bribed, it is eas[y]ier for powerful interest groups impose their preferences in courts and avoid complying with environmental laws (McAllister Citation2008).