Decarbonization leads to US-China great power competition – cobalt export restrictions follow.
Hammelehle ’21 [Hammelehle, Julia; Policy Advisor at the Munich Security Institute; 7-20-2021; "Power Shifts: On the Geopolitics of the Energy Transition"; Munich Security Report; https://securityconference.org/en/media/msc-blog/article/power-shifts-geopolitics-energy-transition/; Accessed 7-24-2023; ARy]
Besides the potential for increasing state fragility, the path towards decarbonization is accompanied by significant power shifts and changes in trade patterns between states. The energy transition has thus also profound implications for the relationship between states. One example is the rising competition for leadership in the green economy. Given that low carbon technology constitutes a key factor for countries’ future prosperity, it has been described by some analysts as the “geo-economic battleground of the future.” As the role of clean energy technologies for global power competition is rising, so are the West’s concerns about the leading position of China in this field. For instance, the current US climate envoy John Kerry warned in 2019 “that it would be folly to replace a world order too dependent on Middle Eastern oil with one that’s too dependent on Chinese technology.”It is not only the pole position of the Peoples’ Republic in the market supply shares of clean technologies like solar modules and electric vehicles that alarms Western countries, but in particular the Chinese global stronghold in the supply chains of minerals and materials needed for their production. For example, China accounts 50% to 70% of global lithium and cobalt refining and dominates the whole rare earths value chain. This strong market position of Beijing in the rare earths industry has been at the center of the attention of China’s competitors. In 2010, the Peoples’ Republic used export restrictions on rare earths as geopolitical levers amidst a territorial dispute with Japan. More recently, it threatened to do so in a case of a trade conflict with the West. As China “appears to recognize the strength of its critical minerals supply chains as geopolitical leverage,” access to them has become a key strategic issue. While China’s competitors have begun to diversify the mining of rare earths following the Japan incident, Beijing has cemented its strong position in their processing. According to current figures, it accounts for 85-90 percent of the world’s capacity to convert mined rare earths into metals and magnets. As China and the US are the world’s two largest emitters and major economic and technological powerhouses, their “full-throttle” engagement is needed to move towards net-zero. Concerning Sino-American cooperation, two developments seem promising: first, the recent signs that both countries are willing to work together on climate; second, the potential of the competition for clean energy and climate leadership to inspire a “race to the top,” spurring green investment and fostering bold climate action. Yet, in an environment of fierce geopolitical competition and a profound lack of trust, substantial climate cooperation between China and the US seems unlikely. As a first step, Washington and Beijing should thus seek to prevent adverse effects of their rivalry on climate policies, for instance by avoiding that economic tensions also affect the low-carbon technology sector and lead to higher costs and disruptions of clean energy supply chains. As global climate cooperation is set to remain difficult and as states are facing substantial obstacles in decarbonizing their economies, different multilateral coalitions and collaborative frameworks will be needed to foster climate action. Concerning climate cooperation between states, a strong joint transatlantic climate approach, as also envisaged in the EU-US Summit Statement, could play an important role in advancing the fight against climate change. Beyond bold domestic climate policies and comprehensive bilateral cooperation, for instance on clean hydrogen, Europe and the US should work towards deepening their climate and green energy relations with the Global South and should push for stronger international regulations, including on green trade and the responsible sourcing of critical minerals. Beyond states, subnational actors like cities, civil society, and businesses have become key actors for tackling climate change. On the global path to net zero, their contributions – and thus the move toward what the UN Secretary-General termed as “inclusive multilateralism” – will also play a crucial role.