Chinese export restrictions escalate into war – AND worsen climate change.
Bader ’20 [Bader, Jeffrey; Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; 11-2020; "Future U.S. policy toward China"; China Center at the Brookings Institution; https://www.academia.edu/49134577/Future_U_S_policy_toward_China; Accessed 7-24-2023; ARy]
There is no evidence suggesting that China seriously aspires to threaten the United States homeland or seek a global confrontation with the United States replicating the pattern of the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War. Rather, we can expect to face a China that strives for economic preeminence in East and Central Asia, military security against the United States in the western Pacific, and rising but not predominant influence outside of Asia based largely on economic connections. We should not expect China to build up a network of like-minded or satellite states that pose a security threat to the United States, or to adopt the U.S. role in recent decades as the world’s policeman. China is not an existential threat to the United States, but there is no avoiding the fact that we will be competitors and, in some respects, rivals — economically, politically, militarily, and technologically. That will require the United States to get its house in order in numerous ways that go beyond the scope of this paper, as domestic rejuvenation is the basis for successful competition. Such competition also will compel limitations on cooperation in some areas where the United States and China interacted relatively freely in the past. The U.S. will have to secure its fundamental foreign policy interests against Chinese attacks or erosion, through defense of our allies in the Asia Pacific, deterring use of force against Taiwan, and protection of the key values and institutions of the international rules-based order. We also will have to formulate an economic strategy that not only rebuilds competitiveness at home, but brings together a coalition of like-minded aggrieved countries, eliminates Chinese trade and investment privileges unsuitable for an advanced economy, fights for maintenance of an open internet, and preserves the dollar’s special role in international trade and finance. The compilation of papers in this project offer specific recommendations for how the United States can most effectively compete with China across the full range of political, economic, military, security, and ideological domains. The most important battleground for U.S.-China rivalry is likely to be in the field of technology. U.S. creation and domination of the chief technology platforms provided the springboard for the American century. With the astonishing advances in technology that mark the 21st century, whoever is the chief innovator will be strongly positioned to be the dominant military and economic power for years to come. The reality that the United States and China will be technology rivals does not mean that there can or should be radical decoupling. American companies will want access to the Chinese market for profits and to Chinese immigrants and researchers who contribute so extraordinarily to their advances. We need to recognize the trade-off between restricting Chinese access to advanced U.S. technology and the encouragement we inadvertently provide to Chinese competitors when we force them to develop the products we refuse to provide. We should aspire to a world that is not completely fractured between American and Chinese technology forcing the world’s 190 countries to choose between mutually incompatible systems. We will need to protect technologies critical to U.S. national security and economic competitiveness without making export of every product with a chip an obstacle course. And we will need to redouble vigilance against Chinese theft of technology and impose enforceable penalties on Chinese entities that engage in such actions.The central challenge for the United States, however, will be how to project and protect our interests in the face of this emerging competitor but without losing our way by exaggerating or misunderstanding the nature and magnitude of that challenge. We cannot compete with China by outbidding China in an unwinnable race to the bottom through technology and social media prohibitions, expansive definitions of national security in trade and investment, managed trade, cancellation of scholarly and research exchanges, visa and immigration bans, and imposition of diplomatic restrictions. When we feel the need to use such tools in order to gain greater reciprocity, our goal should be for both sides to eliminate restrictions whenever possible, not impose them permanently. Our strength lies in our traditional openness, which cannot be casually tossed aside in every skirmish that comes along. The United States also cannot neglect one of its great assets: the alliances and partnerships we have built up over the last 70 years in Asia and Europe. Our allies and partners will not follow us in radical decoupling from China or a new Cold War, but they share many of the same grievances and can be a powerful force multiplier on all manner of issues if we treat them and their interests with respect. Many of the trends in Chinese development can become serious threats, but in some cases, they could be opportunities for cooperation, depending on China’s behavior but also on our intentions. China’s economic growth and presence, for example, can close overseas markets to American companies or expand American opportunities as wealth is created abroad. It is worth recalling that the great recession of 2008 would have become a depression without U.S.-China joint efforts to cushion the fall and provide massive stimulus. Continued Chinese construction of coal-fired power plants will contribute to global warming, but if the United States doesn’t work with China to combat global warming, the results will be catastrophic for the world. As two deadly epidemics (SARS and COVID-19) emerged from China in the last two decades, it is clear that isolation and sanctions alone cannot keep China-born viruses outside our borders. Rather, both countries must also engage in intensive scientific and public health cooperation. China does not agree with U.S. sanctions-based policies to deal with North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs, but it does wish to roll back both, and it is naïve to believe that the United States will have success in containing either program without Chinese cooperation. The costs of radical decoupling have received little attention in the rush to announce the arrival of an ominous new strategic rival. The inevitable ensuing enmity would exacerbate an arms race that would crowd out pressing domestic priorities. It would divide scientists, researchers, and scholars working on common problems. Ethnic hatred and stereotypes would find fertile soil. Above all, it would increase the risk of military conflict between two nuclear powers. The temptation to see China as an enemy rather than a competitor is reinforced by its internal policies of repression. But there is much more to China’s impact on the world than its appalling imprisonment of political dissidents and repression of ethnic minorities; U.S. policy cannot ignore this behavior, but it cannot be the singular focus. Americans should not expect that the Chinese will yield to U.S. blandishments or pressure on human rights or governance issues. We should speak out on human rights and democracy because they have defined our character as a nation and our international standing. More importantly, we should live up to our ideals to inspire admirers abroad, including in China. Along with interaction with Chinese civil society when possible in the face of current restrictions, American soft power provides the best opportunity for modest progress. The United States and China have areas of overlapping interest and issues on which they must work together. Additionally, the overall character of the relationship will affect Chinese decisions, for better or for worse. If the Chinese see the value of at least a non-hostile relationship with the United States, it will restrain them from taking actions that they think might damage that relationship. There are still strong voices in China favoring marketbased reform, and their voices are amplified when they are met with encouragement and incentives by the United States. On the other hand, if relations with the United States deteriorate, the voices of recklessness and protectionism on the Chinese side will be strengthened. The Xi Jinping years have seen a change in Chinese behavior that has elicited a sharp American reaction and brought us to our current state. Modern Chinese political history, however, rarely validates those who project a straight line forward from the present. The changes from Mao to Deng, from Tiananmen to double-digit growth, from the marketdriven reforms and low-profile foreign policies of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji to the retrenchment and risk tolerance of Xi Jinping should make us cautious about assuming that today’s policies will persist. The United States has to plan on the basis of current unhappy realities and trends, but not pursue an approach that makes the worst-case evolution more likely.