US-China war goes nuclear – extinction.
O’Hanlon ’22 [O’Hanlon, Michael; Senior Fellow and Director of Research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution ; 9-22; ""; Brookings Institution; https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/FP_20220926_nds_china.pdf; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
The United States has spent the last three decades planning for and fighting conventional wars of choice against adversaries lacking nuclear weapons. It now faces in China the challenge of designing a conventional defense strategy under the nuclear shadow cast by a peer competitor. For this reason alone, a war with China over Taiwan will almost inevitably raise risks of both inadvertent and deliberate nuclear escalation, to a degree that the United States has not directly experienced since the Cold War. Yet the relationship between integrated deterrence, as spelled out in the NDS, and nuclear deterrence, as discussed in the accompanying Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is not entirely clear. China has had nuclear weapons since 1964, but recent qualitative improvements in its forces as well as the apparent pace of its quantitative expansion are pushing it toward a position of deep nuclear stalemate with the United States. If the two countries are not already there, they will be soon. Nuclear stalemate, also often called mutual vulnerability or mutually assured destruction, is a situation in which two countries’ nuclear forces are each able to inflict devastating retaliation against the other’s cities, no matter who strikes first. This is what people mean when they say that no one can win a nuclear war. Credible nuclear threats on behalf of allies and partners, or extended deterrence, will be hard to achieve in a world where China’s nuclear weapons pose an increasingly robust threat to the U.S. homeland. This means that it will become especially difficult for the United States to rely on its nuclear weapons to defend allies against conventional attacks, as it has done for many years. The world got a taste of this last summer with China’s test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle mounted atop a fractional orbital bombardment system. The deployment of that system, along with other Chinese capabilities designed to evade missile defenses, is a reminder to the United States that if a conventional conflict escalates, the U.S. homeland will be vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons. Indeed, even today China could simply exhaust U.S. missile defense capabilities with a sufficiently large saturation attack. In fact, China may believe that its more robust nuclear arsenal endows it with greater freedom to engage in aggression as its conventional capabilities also continue to grow, knowing that the United States’ long-standing nuclear trump card is likely off the table. In other words, Beijing could believe that conventional war is less risky, and more promising, since the United States would have a harder time using its nuclear supremacy to force China into some form of capitulation. Something akin to nuclear parity would make it even harder than it is today for either side to believe it could wield nuclear threats in a convincing way. Paradoxically, the “strategic stability” sought in the NPR could actually facilitate instability at the conventional level, which the NDS is most concerned with addressing. This would be a return to the “stability-instability paradox” that strategists wrote about in the U.S.-Soviet context during the Cold War