the aff’s attempts at [social justice reform/climate reform/corporate reform] are a futile example of anti-consumption which conversely entrenches consumers into a state of reflexive impotence and futurelessness, rendering any genuine radical reform impossible and exacerbating the endless insomniac drift in which addictions to technology render life meaningless – instead, affirm an experiential epistemic inquiry of semiocapitalism
Quynh et. Al. 23 (Huang Ngoc, James Cronin, Alexandros Skandalis, Huang Ngoc Quynh is an esteemed Lecturer in Marketing at the University of Leicester, “Futureless vicissitudes: Gestural anti-consumption and the reflexively impotent (anti-)consumer”, ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367660931_Futureless_vicissitudes_Gestural_anti-consumption_and_the_reflexively_impotent_anti-consumer) ShNapiro
In the case of ideological progressivism on the political left, anti-consumption practices often appear in demonstrations and protests related to addressing environmental issues, unethical corporate behaviours, and social injustice (Kozinets and Handelman, 2004). In the context of re-emerging social conservatism on the political right, anti-consumption activities such as brand rejection and corporate boycotts are a mainstay of new rightist groups’ efforts to challenge liberal business practices and influence civil debates (Cambefort and Pecot, 2020). Moreover, while anticonsumption has long been impelled by anti-imperialist movements to signal discontent with globalisation and the neoliberal model of global capitalism (Varman and Belk, 2009), socioeconomic populist groups have also made political use of reducing and rejecting consumption to protest unfair domestic market forces (Hershkovitz, 2017). Many of these cases underline that anticonsumption practices can reflect ideological attachments that are oppositional to the perceived structures of power that underpin today’s socio-economic life. However, despite the revitalisation of antagonistic politics across consumer culture, we should not lose sight of those forms of anticonsumption that function apolitically and, in doing so, potentially reproduce and perpetuate the status quo. In this paper, we set out to conceptualise how anti-consumption practices, when lacking discernible political alternatives at their core, are incessantly assimilated into the circuitry of semiocapitalism and its desiring forces (Hietanen et al., 2022). In the absence of any genuinely transformative politics, we identify what we call ‘gestural anti-consumption’, a performance that works to relieve individuals’ personal dissatisfactions with, rather than to collectively transform, the underpinning semiocapitalist hegemony and its futureless vicissitudes (Ahlberg et al., 2021; Fisher, 2014a). When undertaken in a ubiquitous market-society where market fundamentalism1 reigns supreme and all beliefs in some kind of post-capitalist future are slowly being ‘cancelled’, anticonsumption functions as a mere gesture of resistance rather than a genuinely antagonistic force. Consumers and anti-consumers, we argue, become conflated and integrated as the one ‘(anti-) consumer subject’. This singular and amalgamated (anti-)consumer subject position remains deadlocked in its actual effects while only appearing differentiated in superficially experiential and symbolic terms. Without unifying political alternatives underpinning them, this subject’s gestural anti-consumption practices remain tied to self-expression and self-fulfilment which are fully commensurate with market logics and can be safely commodified. By adapting and extending the late cultural theorist Mark Fisher’s (2009: 21) concept of ‘reflexive impotence’, we unpack how gestural anti-consumption unfolds via the intersection of the (anti-)consumer subject’s reflexive awareness of her political inertia, inability or unwillingness to bring about structural change, and perpetual attachment to the desiring forces of capitalism itself. This paper is underpinned by two interrelated research questions: What are the main features of gestural anti-consumption? How is the perceived impossibility of structural change prefigured into practices of gestural anti-consumption? To address these questions, we reflect on netnographic data and in-depth interviews with people who engage in ‘digital detoxing’, that is individuals who limit or temporarily abstain from the consumption of digital technologies. Digital detox, while classifiable as a form of anti-consumption, has become, as Syvertsen (2017: 96) emphasises, a mundane and routine act of consumption itself – a ‘part of everyone’s toolbox’ in coping with digital overload and dissatisfaction – rather than a collective action to address the root causes of consumption-related problems. For many individuals, digital detox practices are not motivated by political solidarity against a shared adversary, whether ‘Big Tech’ firms who ostensibly manipulate their consumption or the liberal capitalist structures of power that make such manipulation possible. Crucially, digital detox does not function according to the typical formula of collective ideological resistance – ‘a clear-cut case of “us” and “them”’ 2 Marketing Theory 0(0) (Syvertsen, 2017: 96) – rather it is often a case of disorganised individuals undertaking ephemeral and practical attempts to make their consumption better work for themselves. Our paper makes two important contributions to the emerging strand of ‘terminal’ (Ahlberg et al., 2022) or ‘de-romanticist’ (Fitchett and Cronin, 2022) writings within critical marketing scholarship. First, in line with this strand’s calls to revisit and de-romanticise the institutionalised concepts of our discipline, we offer an update to the subject position of ‘the reflexively defiant consumer’ (Ozanne and Murray, 1995). Under semiocapitalism, we suggest that resistant consumer subjectivity is better understood as the reflexively impotent (anti-)consumer’. In contrast to the celebratory view of an autonomous, self-determining postmodern rebel who, through critical reflection, ‘choose[s] to defy or resist traditional notions of consumption’ (Ozanne and Murray, 1995: 522), we offer an image of an increasingly helpless subject who, with reflexive awareness of his or her utter embeddedness in commodified desiring flows, is disinclined to genuinely defy dominant market forces. In this regard, we challenge the prevalent idea that ‘anti-consumption must be an act of ideological extravagance – wandering beyond the accepted limits of cultural acceptance’ (Kozinets et al., 2010: 226–227). Second, our analyses provide clarification for how any potentially energising relief from capitalism ultimately capitulates under what has been theorised as a cultural atmosphere of ‘no hope’ or futurelessness (Ahlberg et al., 2021; Fisher, 2014a; Hietanen et al., 2020). By tracing how the reflexively impotent (anti-)consumer is as much aware of the problems of technologicallymediated consumer capitalism as she is of her own powerlessness to confront them, we illustrate how living with the slow cancellation of the future impairs any efforts of resistance. The value of identifying the lived effects of this‘futurelessness’ is not simply in offering a pessimistic perspective on subjects’ potential for resistance, but is in the implication for fellow (anti-)consumer researchers to think more ‘futuristically’ about where our critiques could – or should – land. For the analystactivist to genuinely challenge the futureless vicissitudes of consumer culture, it becomes necessary to locate ongoing epistemic enquiry not just at the level of the structural but also at the level of the experiential. This means taking into account capitalist subjects’ own justifications for pursuing personal interests and pleasures rather than any kind of political praxis when faced with systemic problems. Theoretical underpinnings Anti-consumption and political ideology: A brief background Anti-consumption can be defined as ‘intentionally and meaningfully excluding or cutting goods from one’s consumption routine or reusing once-acquired goods with the goal of avoiding consumption’ (Makri et al., 2020: 178). Anti-consumption practices are expressed through three non-exclusive forms: rejecting (i.e. refusing or avoiding); restricting (i.e. reducing); and reclaiming (i.e. changing or co-opting the meanings of) goods, services or experiences (Lee et al., 2011). Although the drivers and manifestations of rejecting, restricting, or reclaiming consumption are manifold, the motivating role of political ideology has been underwritten by a significant stream of research (Izberk-Bilgin, 2012; Kozinets and Handelman, 2004; Ulver and Laurell, 2020). Political ideology denotes a fantasy framework of beliefs, aspirations and aversions concerning the proper functioning of society and how it might be achieved. At an elementary level, political ideology can be mapped out on a continuum with liberal progressivism on the left and conservativism on the right (Cambefort and Pecot, 2020). Although many cases of anti-consumption detected in consumer research are motivated by leftist ideology – for example, liberals’ ‘anti-unethical’ and ‘anti-colonialist’ Hoang et al. 3 rejection of global brands that offend their moral shibboleths – antagonisms have also been detected between social conservatism and the market. Examples of rightist anti-consumption include boycotts of supermarkets that sell Halal products by nationalist groups in England (Lekakis, 2019) and Christian-conservative groups’ rejection of Disney products following the brand’s corporate decision to better represent gay employees and consumers (MacDonald and McDonald, 2014). Recognising that anti-consumption is neither an exclusively left- nor right-wing activity, Pecot et al. (2021) suggest that political extremism in general should be understood as an important predictor for anti-consumption. Individuals positioned at either extreme of the left-right political spectrum are more likely to be suspicious of consumerism and to engage in anti-consumption compared to those in the centre ground. It is the political centre – or ‘mainstream’ – that is understood to function as ‘a constant adversary’ for politically extreme individuals to fight against (Ulver and Laurell, 2020: 490). Whether extremely leftist or rightist, those who undertake anticonsumption in opposition to this real or imagined mainstream adversary are assumed to have committed to a form of lifestyle activism within a movement of like-minded political subjects ‘pos [ing] a viable alternative’ to the existing system (Izberk-Bilgin, 2012: 678; Kozinets and Handelman, 2004). Nevertheless, a ‘viable alternative’ that can truly supplant the existing system is rarely, if ever, taken seriously or considered achievable by lifestyle activists whose practices are typically undertaken in the individualist pursuits of self-expression, social distinction, therapy or hedonism (Kozinets, 2002). Although lifestyle activists may share political beliefs that deviate from the mainstream, it is rare that these beliefs are mobilised in ways that lead to authentic and durable change. For example, Moraes et al. (2010: 293) argue that individuals and groups who ‘share their own notions of the good life’ engage in oppositional practices that, while potentially aligned with extremist views, are undertaken ‘not with a view to change society at large […] but with the aim to restructure the meanings of their own lived experiences as seductive alternatives’. High-profile antimarket or anti-marketing events such as Burning Man have long provided us with illustrations of an anti-consumption that is largely deskinned of any revolutionary potential; serving to provide weekend-trippers with a short-lived, experiential sense of respite from (rather than reformation of) dominant market structures (Kozinets, 2002). For Kozinets, consumption might fall under scope for extreme criticism at such events and alternative modes of exchange are encouraged, but they are ‘not about major social change’ (Kozinets, 2002: 36); instead, they are more about personal growth and expression, and thus denuded of the political narratives that might motivate enduring and genuinely transformative solidarity in wider cultural life. Similarly, Mikkonen et al. (2011: 99) illustrate how online cadres of lifestyle activists who reject the hyper-consumerised ways of celebrating Christmas engage in mischievous anti-consumption discourses as a way of pursuing a cynical and playfully self-aware identity project, ‘the Scrooge’, rather than to genuinely educate and rescue seasonal shoppers from marketers’ manipulation. Even commercial brands sometimes seek to incite consumers’ rejection of – and resistance against – dominant market institutions, not in the pursuit of any kind of post-market politics but simply to achieve legitimacy for their own offerings (Koch and Ulver, 2022). Central to the above anti-consumption projects is the absence of earnest political demands and the subordination of meaningful critique to individual conceits and self-interest, what has been referred to as ‘the hollowing-out of political subjectivity’, resulting in a subject positioning founded on ‘base pragmatism and instrumentalism work[ing] in the service of the dominant ideology’ (Treadwell et al., 2013: 4–8). Moreover, the pluralisation of politically hollow anti-consumption projects works to ossify the status quo by aligning resistant energies with individual-expressive 4 Marketing Theory 0(0) rather than collective-transformative logics, ensuring that no single anti-consumption position is consolidated enough to become a genuine threat. No matter how cynical or dissatisfied anticonsumers are, without social solidarity and popular political dissensus, their behaviour is better understood as an alignment to the unrelenting individualism and diversification of consumptive capitalism, rather than as ‘reflexive defiance’ (Ozanne and Murray, 1995: 516) to it. The result is, we argue, a form of anti-consumption that remains gestural and, for the most part, objectless. However, while it might be devoid of collective political objectives, gestural anti-consumption is not without objects, as it constitutes a series of ‘alternative’ consumption choices rather than the refusal of consumption altogether (Chatzidakis et al., 2012; Cronin and Fitchett, 2021). To help us to better understand the political objectlessness of gestural anti-consumers and what underpins their inability or unwillingness to pursue genuine transformation, we now turn to Fisher’s (2009) onto-affective concept of ‘reflexive impotence’. Reflexive impotence and semiocapitalist horizons A common theme of critical marketing scholarship is that consumption today functions within a culture of disavowal whereby consumers are fully aware of their own complicity in systems of power and domination yet maintain an ironic distance to their actions (Bradshaw and Zwick, 2016; Cronin and Fitchett, 2021). Under these circumstances where consumers can disavow yet nonetheless participate in and reproduce the problematic aspects of dominant systems, an incontestable status quo is maintained through what Fisher (2009: 21) refers to as ‘reflexive impotence’, that is, ‘They know things are bad, but more than that, they know they can’t do anything about it’. Reflexive impotence denotes a state of being fully aware of one’s dissatisfaction with today’s increasingly technologically-saturated consumer-capitalist zeitgeist but acquiescing to it under the belief that it is unrealistic and near impossible to change the system. Even when undertaken on mindless autopilot or without significant meaning, day-to-day consumerist preoccupations such as routinely logging calories on digital self-tracking devices (Kristensen and Ruckenstein, 2018), keeping smartphones charged for idle scrolling on public transport (Robinson and Arnould, 2020), posting photos to social media (Kozinets et al., 2017) or binge-watching the latest ‘trending’ TV series via streaming services (Jones et al., 2018), all remain deeply entrenched regimes that many of us cannot imagine no longer doing. Collectively these vortices of digital artefacts and signs (‘semios’) – and the resigned acceptance that perpetuates their consumption – can be located within the parameters of ‘semiocapitalism’, a technologically-mediated global capitalist formation reliant on identifying, influencing and automatising consumers’ informational and semiotic flows, techno-cultural activities and modes of personal stimulation, expression, and meaning-making for its regime of accumulation (Hietanen et al., 2022; Hoang et al., 2022). Under semiocapitalism, consumers remain plugged into what Fisher calls ‘the drip-feed of digital stimulus’ because of: (1) the pervasive lures of an always-on digital culture that is seductively (and competitively) desirous, indulgent and egotistic; and (2) the naturalisation of ritualistic compliance that works to obviate any opposition to it (Dean and Fisher, 2014: 30). Importantly, semiocapitalism reproduces itself through the mixture of ‘perpetual pleasure’ and ‘an endless insomniac drift’ which always happen simultaneously (ibid.). Although its subjects almost never feel wholly present when consuming under semiocapitalism, its endlessly rotating carousel of pleasures keeps the majority committed. The result is reflexive impotence, a deep sense of inertia that is ontological–affective: what is felt becomes what is lived, and what is felt is that there is no popular impetus for change. Hoang et al. 5 There are three critical aspects to reflexive impotence’s onto-affectivity. First, Fisher’s (2009: 21) concept has an intellectual dimension centred on ‘marketplace metacognition’ – a subject’s social intelligence about his or her positioning as a consumer and marketers’ operations upon them (Wright, 2002: 677). Within a networked, gadget-driven, and computer-literate consumer culture, subjects are often not ignorant to market actors’ attempts to surveil and influence them but are also appreciative of the many indulgences and conveniences on offer (Hietanen et al., 2022). Consumers are painfully aware of the benefits that their digital consumption provides, resulting in a state of ambiguity that is conceived of as vaguely manageable rather than resolvable. This is seen in what Fisher (2009: 25) calls an ‘ahistorical, anti-mnemonic blip culture’ wherein time becomes fragmented into ‘digital slices’ that allow consumers to treat their relationships with technology as discrete encounters with benefits, which compensate for the cumulative costs of semiocapitalist subjugation (e.g. addiction, targeted advertising, algorithmic manipulation, etc.) (Hoang et al., 2022). Second, reflexive impotence has an attitudinal dimension best described in terms of ‘postpessimism’, ‘the understanding that neither an optimistic nor pessimistic attitude is justified due to the lack of alternatives’ (Gonnermann, 2019: 27). Gonnermann describes post-pessimism as an attitude ‘meandering between resignation and stoic acceptance’ (p. 37). Reflexive impotence, for both Fisher and Gonnermann, is not the same as apathy. Instead, it mirrors closely the idea of ‘disaffected consent’ (Gilbert, 2013: 18) whereby subjects feel that they have no choice but to accept that the existing socio-economic world they live in, while deeply problematic, constitutes the only viable form available to them. Experienced as ‘a penumbral burden of suppressed meanings and closed-off social possibilities that cannot be completely eliminated or denied’ (Gibson-Graham, 1995: 25), the post-pessimistic attitude is characterised by recognition that today’s capitalist zeitgeist is here to stay for better or worse; all other possibilities are cancelled (Ahlberg et al., 2022). The result is a cultural atmosphere of futurelessness (Fisher, 2014a) where any conceivable futures that are radically different to the semiocapitalist present have evaporated.