The Neoliberal emancipatory ideal underpinning their basic income backfires into an “In-Group” and “Out- Group” based upon the organizational “exit” and “voice” dynamics
Herzog 16 [LIs Herzog, "Basic Income and the Ideal of Epistemic Equality", 6/4/16, Basic Income Studies, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bis-2016-0009/html?lang=en//JO]
If one acknowledges that epistemic equality is an important normative ideal for organizations, whether for moral, instrumental, or instrumentally moral reasons, it suggests itself to ask about institutional levers that would promote it. Hence, one might suggest that an unconditional basic income could be a suitable candidate. One central argument in its favor is, after all, that it might help counterbalance the fundamental asymmetry between those who have to sell their labor in order to earn an income, and those who have an independent source of income (See e. g. Berry 2005, 212). By facilitating exit, an unconditional minimum income might also support epistemic equality in organizations: employees who know that they have a safety net in case they get fired might be more willing to speak up. They know that they will not end up without an income during the time it takes to find a new job or to start a self-employed business or a democratically run company (cf. similarly Blanc 2014, 484). At second glance, however, one can raise a number of critical questions about whether an unconditional minimum income would really have these positive effects. Arguably, the dynamics of “exit” and “voice” can be more complex than this line of argument suggests. With regard to feasibility, supporters of an unconditional minimum income – and especially those who draw on the argument from epistemic equality – run into a dilemma: if an unconditional minimum income is low, it may be more feasible, but it may not have the desired effects. Individuals usually adapt their standard of living upwards to their current income, which is composed of the unconditional minimum income and their wage (and other forms of income or transfers they might receive). If, in the case of exit from their job, they fall back on the unconditional minimum income alone, they have to immediately cut back their spending, which can be so difficult that they do not perceive exit as an option they would take voluntarily. Thus, to serve the purpose of strengthening epistemic equality, an unconditional minimum income would probably have to be quite high. This, however, makes questions of feasibility more urgent, and it also raises questions about ways in which this strategy might backfire. For example, it might make exit too easy, so that individuals lose any incentive to stay and speak up if they disagree with what is going on in an organization – and organizations could tell them to leave, instead of listening to what they have to say. Organizational life might become a very fleeting affair, with people coming and going in unpredictable ways. This might have certain normative advantages from an individual perspective, but it is hard to tell whether this is more likely to have a positive effect on epistemic equality in organizations, or whether it would turn their epistemic practices in a kind of “commons” that no-one feels responsible for. Organizations might react to such tendencies by offering those employees whom they do not want to leave yet higher wages (cf. also Gintis & Bowles 1993, 85). This, however, could exacerbate inequalities within organizations, creating an “in group” whose members are allowed to speak whenever they like, and an “out group” who are told to leave whenever they try to raise their voice. Some developments, for example the outsourcing of “non-essential” jobs into service companies, already go into the direction of creating different classes of employees with unequal rights. These developments are problematic not only from the perspective of epistemic equality, but, obviously, also from many other perspectives. One of the motives for promoting an unconditional minimum income is in fact to create stronger safety nets for those in precarious working conditions, but it is not clear what effects it would have for life within organizations. The overall case for an unconditional minimum income may be a strong one, but it seems too far-fetched to make an argument from epistemic equality, at least not before we do not have more empirical evidence of how an unconditional minimum income would change labour market dynamics.