Baudrillard’s claims about the hyperreal economy are rooted in robust analysis: signs and signifiers plague the economy by simulating value, stocks and investments prove.
Macintosh et al 00 [Norman, Teri Shearer, Daniel Thornton, Michael Welker, Professor Emeritus at Queen's University Canada, PHD, Accounting as simulacrum and hyperreality: perspectives on income and capital, https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0361368299000100#aep-section-id26] cent
The informational perspective (Beaver, 1996) does not explain why people care about formally recognizing the effects of events and transactions like the granting of stock options in the income statement. The information conveyed by data disclosed in financial statement notes, proxy statements or elsewhere should be the same as that of data reported in the income statement since readers could readily adjust income to reflect the disclosures if they wanted to. But if, in this hyperreal financial economy, accounting signs have indeed lost their association with “real” referents, then the informational perspective's presupposition that investors can “see through” accounting numbers to discern true market value is no longer sustainable. There is nothing to see through to. From Baudrillard's perspective, however, “official earnings” do matter. Fox (1997, p. 77) captured the idea: “[T]he simplest, most visible, most merciless measure of corporate success in the 1990s has become this one: Did you make your earnings last quarter?” The presence of this yardstick [a simulacrum] demands the practice of “managing earnings” in order to report official earnings [another simulacrum] that pretty much match analysts' forecasts, presumably in the hopes of simulating value in the eyes of investors and so bolstering the company's stock price. While the practice of earnings management is certainly not new, the extent and nature of the practice appears to be evolving. As SEC chair Arthur Levitt recently observed “this process [earnings management] has evolved into what can best be characterized as a game among market participants” (Levitt, 1998). He describes the self-referential process surrounding the production and consumption of earnings numbers as follows: This is the pattern earnings management creates: companies try to meet or beat Wall Street earnings projections in order to grow market capitalization and increase the value of stock options. Their ability to do this depends on achieving the earnings expectations of analysts. And analysts seek constant guidance from companies to frame those expectations. Auditors, who want to retain their clients, are under pressure not to stand in the way (Levitt, 1998). Microsoft, for example, recently reported an income figure that met or slightly exceeded analysts' expectations for the 41st time in the 42 quarters since the company went public. One analyst said, “Microsoft does a better job of leveraging accounting—I would say it's almost a competitive weapon—than anybody else in the industry” (Fox, 1997, p. 79). For some time, Boston Chicken's record of meeting or beating forecasts was perfect: Not only is Boston Chicken able to report earnings every quarter, but those earnings have so far never failed to meet or surpass analysts' expectations—even though those analysts all know that the earnings in no significant way reflect how the company is doing [emphasis added]... “It's a very smart strategy,” says Michael Moe, a growth strategist at Montgomerey securities. “It has made enormous amounts of capital available to them at an attractive price that most companies can only dream of” (Fox, 1997, p. 79). Though the company's reported earnings mirrored analysts' forecasts perfectly, the latter were well aware that these signs did not refer to “real” earnings. 4.3.1. The map begets the territory
The case of General Electric Company (GE) is even more striking. Due to its large size, wide spectrum of technologies and its global diversity, GE enjoys “a very large amount of flexibility to... deliver strong, consistent earnings growth in a myriad of global economic conditions” and is thus recognized as one of the world's leading, “aggressive practitioners of earnings management” (Managing Profits, 1994). Indeed, GE often develops a model of how an acquisition, a divestment or the restructuring of a division would affect official earnings before going ahead. So, in effect, unlike the traditional thinking where strategy is implemented and accounting later reports the results, in GE's case the accounting model (the map) precedes the implementation of the strategy (the territory). As Baudrillard describes the hyperreality of the simulation era, “The territory no longer precedes the map...[rather] the map engenders the territory” (Baudrillard, 1983a, p. 167). So instead of accounting reflecting the real outcomes of GE's strategic decisions, the ex-ante accounting model (itself a simulation of analysts' expectations as explained above) precedes and engenders the strategy which in turn recirculates into reported earnings. Similarly, motion picture companies like Walt Disney forecast reported earnings when deciding when to release videocassettes of hits like Snow White. By carefully timing videocassette releases, they can maintain the smooth trend in earnings that analysts can easily forecast. Analysts' earnings forecasts, in turn, sustain value. Fig. 2 depicts the potential simultaneity introduced by the earnings management “game”. Download : Download full-size image Fig. 2. Why earnings matter. In sum, as Fig. 2 and the quotes from SEC chair Levitt suggest, analysts look for clues about a company's future earnings in its current financial statements and investment decisions. But management simultaneously takes analysts' earnings forecasts as yearly targets and selects investments that are likely to produce reported income equal to or exceeding those forecasts. In turn, the market capitalizes analysts' earnings forecasts into stock prices. The company's investment decision model, the analyst's forecasting model and the investor's valuation model circulate simultaneously (to use Baudrillard's syntax). They refer to each other but, for investors, they lack any relation to a real referent such as cash flow or “true” income. Granted, the company's investments would not generate any earnings if they didn't also generate cash flows. But neither analysts nor investors know how earnings relate to cash flows and hence to value. Rather, they produce and consume accounting earnings which, when coupled with a “price/earnings multiple,” can be used to simulate value. So Baudrillard might address Kinney's question, “Why do official earnings matter?” as follows. Extant accounting theories are poorly equipped to address the question since they are based on antiquated presuppositions about the relation between accounting signs and underlying referents. In the order of simulation, the surplus of non-referential signs such as earnings has exploded, especially in the financial economy that McGoun (1997) aptly describes as “hyperreal.” Amid ongoing discussions of “meltdowns” and “irrational exuberance” in financial markets, the SEC chair called accounting “a reality check—in many cases, the only reality check—before important economic and investment decisions are made” (Levitt, 1996). But this is surely not the kind of “reality” the ancient Sumerians knew. Instead, earnings create a simulated reality of their own because investors' valuation models still treat earnings as if they have the underlying referents of bygone eras. This decoupling of income from its underlying referents does not, however, suggest a diminished importance for earnings. Indeed, as the financial economy becomes increasingly volatile, it becomes more important to maintain the predictability of the income calculation.