Counter Interpretation: evaluate competing rhetorical narratives. Their attempt to model the material world extracts meaning from objective reality which doesn’t measure the world but creates it. Epistemic refusal exposes the rhetorical vacuity of hegemonic systems that marginalize non-normative groups while restructuring knowledge of the world.
Schwartz 21 Scott W. Schwartz, Ph.D. candidate in the Anthropology Department at the CUNY Graduate Center, as well as an adjunct lecturer at the Borough of Manhattan Community College. His research focuses on the methodologies and materials employed in the collection of environmental data, examining the epistemological history of climate modeling and algorithmic governance more broadly. He served as a Quantitative Reasoning Fellow at Baruch College from 2014 to 2016. He has conducted archaeological fieldwork centered on historical ecology and conservation in Scotland, Iceland, and Italy. He has had various projects featured in art galleries in New York and Los Angeles over the past decade, including a recent collaboration appearing at the Queens Museum as part of their Chance Ecologies exhibit. In the summer of 2017 he was awarded an Art-Science residency grant from the National Science Foundation and Pratt Institute. “The Material Culture of Temperature Measurement, Capital, and Semiotics” 2021 | City of University of New York Academic Works, 1.2.5 Theoretical Overview Page 27-31 | https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5226&context=gc_etds |JDiang
This dissertation largely follows the conception of the discipline of archaeology laid out by Gavin Lucas in his 2004 article, “Modern Disturbances: On the Ambiguities of Archaeology.” This conception posits that the purview of archaeology is the material aspect of a reciprocal relationship between material and discursive culture. Lucas suggests that the “pre” in “prehistory” need not be considered in sequential or chronological terms, but rather that the “pre” implies that materiality is a necessary pre-condition for discursive information (meaning). That is, semantic information cannot be conveyed in a material-less void. Discursive concepts, such as love or justice, demand at least the materiality of the vocal chords or the vibrating hairs in our ears. The “origins” implied by the etymology of “archaeology” then, refer to the material origins of any discursive information. While, in agreement with this notion of reciprocity between the material and the discursive, following the work of Karen Barad, I contest the idea that the material is somehow ontologically “before” the discursive. Rather, along with Barad, Graham Harman, and other contemporary scholars (sometimes lumped together as speculative realists, object-oriented ontologists, new materialists, or post-humanists), I pursue a flat ontology in which no phenomenon (be it discursive or material) has hierarchal or sequential eminence. That is, the material is not “ontologically before the discursive” as Lucas suggests (2004, 113). Rather, neither can exist without the other. If something has materiality, it signals discursively. If something signals discursively, it has materiality. The very act of parsing this into a binary is a problematic endeavor that I seek to reconcile within the framework of semiotic stratigraphy. Barad’s work posits that meaning (discursivity) and matter cannot be bifurcated, epitomizing an anti-Cartesian trend among many scholars over the past few decades (Barad 2007; Brassier 2007; Harman 2010). Every thing, object, or phenomenon has a material stratum and sends or receives signals (means something to something else). This holds true for stones, tables, or vampires. Barad asserts that every thing is simultaneously and perpetually both sending and receiving signals, that is, being interpreted. A stone is interpreted by wind in that it encounters the electromagnetic resistance of the stone and must move around its contours (Morton 2012). The Material Culture of Temperature // Schwartz 15 To these ends, Barad’s insights into observation and measurement, along with those of Mary Poovey (1998), Isabelle Stengers (2010), Patricia Clough (2012), and Sally Merry (2016) are critical to this dissertation. These critiques of measurement suggest that measurements (such as those a thermometer makes) do not necessarily observe ontologically pre-existing attributes that exist outside of the measurement process, but rather that the action of observation, interpretation, or measurement carves out (or brings forth) properties. As I will expand within, in a very tangible sense, thermometers do not measure temperature, they create temperature. Or, perhaps more palatably, measurement is a generative act of co-creation. As Sally Merry writes, “Those who create indicators aspire to measure the world but, in practice, create the world they are measuring” (2016, 21). In conjunction with Barad’s work on interpretation, observation, and the conveyance of meaning, I build on the insights of Charles Peirce’s semiosis framework. While Barad and Peirce’s ideas do not perfectly align, I wish to play with what I perceive as a great deal of overlap between the two systems. Specifically, I toy with Pierce’s triadic relationship between Sign > Object > Interpretant to articulate a semiotic stratigraphy that will provide the backbone of my data analysis. Anthropologists have increasingly been drawn to Peirce’s model of semiosis as a productive framework for moving beyond the untethered subjectivity of phenomenological and postmodern scholarship, while at the same time acknowledging the malleability of objective reality. Within archaeology the work of Zoe Crossland and Alexander Bauer (2017) has been highly visible in this endeavor. It is also important to note that this dissertation is not a deconstructionist exercise of the type narrowly associated with Derrida (Ziarek 1996). The point here is not to tear down an existing whole into its constituent elements revealing its rhetorical vacuity. Rather, the aim is to relate precisely how coherent discursive systems, such as temperature or law, are built out of very tangibly designed material interactions. It should also be noted that while the following “archaeology of knowledge production” shares titular affinities with Foucault (1969), my aims are quite apart from his. Rather than using the term “archaeology” (somewhat) metaphorically as an act of revealing the stratigraphy (layers) of concepts, I am more interested in the actual materials used to build concepts, drawing on Deleuze more than Foucault for my notion of “concepts”—“Whenever a new concept is created it cuts up our knowledge of the world in a novel way requiring other concepts to be likewise ‘reactivated or recut’” (Ruthrof 2009, 209), suggesting that concepts are not composed of accreted layers. As his later shift in terminology evinces, “genealogy” may better to describe Foucault’s scholarship than archaeology. This is not to say that the ideas of Derrida and Foucault do not have substantial bearing on this dissertation, just perhaps not in the fashion that may seem most readily accessible. While all of the above theoretical positions and justifications are employed in the interpretive frameworks within, on a larger level this work is inspired by strains of thought developed in queer theory. Specifically, I contest dominant and hegemonic narratives and attempt to expose asymmetrical power relations that marginalize and diminish non-normative groups. As a counter-normative method, queer theory is a useful tool for undermining a status quo that beckons irreversible ecological devastation and continued social stratification. This dissertation is indebted to the work of Judith Butler (1993), Mel Chen (2012), Lee Edelman (2007), Jack Halberstam (2005), Paul Preciado (2013), and Jasbir Puar (2017), among others. In this register, this dissertation could happily be categorized as a work of what Nicole Seymour (2012) calls “irreverent ecocriticism.” That is, some could interpret my argument that temperatures are artifacts comprised of dense semiotic events interwoven with high fashion, luxury real estate, gentrification, or El Chapo as “irreverence not as a refusal of political ideals, but rather as a unique means of committing to a political ideal” (68-69). Seymour further defends irreverent ecocriticism: At a time in which a significant portion of U.S. citizens do not share…environmentalists’ opinions on issues such as global warming and the need for continued environmental regulation…it would seem that a different dispositional and epistemological stance is certainly in order. If we can laugh at ourselves, be less sure of ourselves, we might be able to approach our object differently, and invite others to approach our object differently. We might be able to understand why we can’t make others understand (62). To such ends, this dissertation is somewhat binocular in scope. On one hand it is capable of being read as an interventional critique of the naturalized epistemology of capital. Simultaneously, the excessive analyses (over one-hundred pages) of “temperature artifacts” could be read as an absurdist echo of the irreconcilable premise underlying the performance of capitalism—that wealth can grow forever