Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Middle east instability spirals — global war.

Klare 18 – [Michael, Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College in Amherst, Massachusetts. “Gearing Up for the Third Gulf War.” Common Dreams. https://www.commondreams.org/views/2018/05/14/gearing-third-gulf-war, May 14, 2018] TDI

A Third Gulf War would distinguish itself from recent Middle Eastern conflicts by the geographic span of the fighting and the number of major actors that might become involved. In all likelihood, the field of battle would stretch from the shores of the Mediterranean, where Lebanon abuts Israel, to the Strait of Hormuz, where the Persian Gulf empties into the Indian Ocean. Participants could include, on one side, Iran, the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and assorted Shia militias in Iraq and Yemen; and, on the other, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). If the fighting in Syria were to get out of hand, Russian forces could even become involved. All of these forces have been equipping themselves with massive arrays of modern weaponry in recent years, ensuring that any fighting will be intense, bloody, and horrifically destructive. Iran has been acquiring an assortment of modern weapons from Russia and possesses its own substantial arms industry. It, in turn, has been supplying the Assad regime with modern arms and is suspected of shipping an array of missiles and other munitions to Hezbollah. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have long been major recipients of tens of billions of dollars of sophisticated American weaponry and President Trump has promised to supply them with so much more. This means that, once ignited, a Third Gulf War could quickly escalate and would undoubtedly generate large numbers of civilian and military casualties, and new flows of refugees. The United States and its allies would try to quickly cripple Iran’s war-making capabilities, a task that would require multiple waves of air and missile strikes, some surely directed at facilities in densely populated areas. Iran and its allies would seek to respond by attacking high-value targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, including cities and oil facilities. Iran’s Shia allies in Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere could be expected to launch attacks of their own on the U.S.-led alliance. Where all this would lead, once such fighting began, is of course impossible to predict, but the history of the twenty-first century suggests that, whatever happens, it won’t follow the carefully laid plans of commanding generals (or their civilian overseers) and won’t end either expectably or well. Precisely what kind of incident or series of events would ignite a war of this sort is similarly unpredictable. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the world is moving ever closer to a moment when the right (or perhaps the better word is wrong) spark could set off a chain of events leading to full-scale hostilities in the Middle East in the wake of President Trump’s recent rejection of the nuclear deal. It’s possible, for instance, to imagine a clash between Israeli and Iranian military contingents in Syria sparking such a conflict. The Iranians, it is claimed, have set up bases there both to support the Assad regime and to funnel arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. On May 10th, Israeli jets struck several such sites, following a missile barrage on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights said to have been launched by Iranian soldiers in Syria. More Israeli strikes certainly lie in our future as Iran presses its drive to establish and control a so-called land bridge through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. Another possible spark could involve collisions or other incidents between American and Iranian naval vessels in the Persian Gulf, where the two navies frequently approach each other in an aggressive manner. Whatever the nature of the initial clash, rapid escalation to full-scale hostilities could occur with very little warning. All of this begs a question: Why are the United States and its allies in the region moving ever closer to another major war in the Persian Gulf? Why now? The Geopolitical Impulse The first two Gulf Wars were driven, to a large extent, by the geopolitics of oil. After World War II, as the United States became increasingly dependent on imported sources of petroleum, it drew ever closer to Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading oil producer. Under the Carter Doctrine of January 1980, the U.S. pledged for the first time to use force, if necessary, to prevent any interruption in the flow of oil from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to this country and its allies. Ronald Reagan, the first president to implement that doctrine, authorized the "reflagging" of Saudi and Kuwaiti oil tankers with the stars and stripes during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War that began in 1980 and their protection by the U.S. Navy. When Iranian gunboats menaced such tankers, American vessels drove them off in incidents that represented the first actual military clashes between the U.S. and Iran. At the time, President Reagan put the matter in no uncertain terms: “The use of the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians.” Oil geopolitics also figured prominently in the U.S. decision to intervene in the First Gulf War. When Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait in August 1990 and appeared poised to invade Saudi Arabia, President George H.W. Bush announced that the U.S. would send forces to defend the kingdom and so played out the Carter Doctrine in real time. “Our country now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence,” he declared, adding that “the sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the United States.” Although the oil dimension of U.S. strategy was less obvious in President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in March 2003, it was still there. Members of his inner circle, especially Vice President Dick Cheney, argued that Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the safety of Persian Gulf oil lanes and needed to be eliminated. Others in the administration were eager to pursue the prospect of privatizing Iraq’s state-owned oil fields and turning them over to American oil companies (a notion that evidently stuck in Donald Trump’s mind, as he repeatedly asserted during the 2016 election campaign that “we should have kept the oil”). Today, oil has receded, if not entirely disappeared, as a major factor in Persian Gulf geopolitics, while other issues have moved to the fore. Of greatest significance in animating the current military standoff is an escalating struggle for regional dominance between Iran and Saudi Arabia (with a nuclear-armed Israel lurking in the wings). Both countries view themselves as the hub of a network of like-minded states and societies -- Iran as the leader of the region’s Shia populations, Saudi Arabia of its Sunnis -- and both resent any gains by the other. To complicate matters, President Trump, clearly harboring deep antipathy toward the Iranians, has chosen to side with the Saudis big league (as he might say), while Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, fearing Iranian advances in the region, has opted to weigh in on the Saudi side of the equation in a major way as well. The result, as suggested by military historian Andrew Bacevich, is the “inauguration of a Saudi-American-Israeli axis” and a “major realignment of U.S. strategic relationships.” Several key factors explain this transition from an oil-centric strategy emphasizing military power to a more conventional struggle among regional rivals that has already deeply embroiled the planet’s last superpower. To begin with, America’s reliance on imported oil has diminished rapidly in recent years, thanks to an oil drilling revolution in the U.S. that has allowed the massive exploitation of domestic shale reserves through the process of fracking. As a result, access to Persian Gulf supplies matters far less in Washington than it did in previous decades. In 2001, according to oil giant BP, the United States relied on imports for 61% of its net oil consumption; by 2016, that share had dropped to 37% and was still falling -- and yet the U.S. remains deeply involved in the region as a decade and a half of unending war, counterinsurgency, drone strikes, and other kinds of strife sadly indicate. By invading and occupying Iraq in 2003, Washington also eliminated a major bulwark of Sunni power, a country led by Saddam Hussein who, two decades earlier, had been siding with the U.S. in opposing Iran. That invasion, ironically enough, had the effect of expanding Shiite influence and making Iran the major -- possibly the only -- winner in the years of war that followed. Some Western analysts believe that the greatest tragedy of the invasion, from a geopolitical point of view, was the ascension of Shiite politicians with close ties to Tehran in post-Hussein Iraq. Although that country’s current leaders appear intent on pursuing a path of their own in the post-ISIS moment, many powerful Iraqi Shiite militias -- including some that played key roles in driving Islamic State militants out of Mosul and other major cities -- retain close ties to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. While disasters in themselves, the wars in Syria and Yemen have only added additional complexity to the geopolitical chessboard on which Washington found itself after that invasion and from which it has never extricated itself. In Syria, Iran has chosen to ally with Vladimir Putin’s Russia to preserve the brutal Assad regime, providing it with arms, funds, and an unknown number of advisers from the Revolutionary Guards. Hezbollah, a Shiite political group in Lebanon with a significant military wing, has sent large numbers of its own fighters to Syria to help Assad’s forces. In Yemen, the Iranians are believed to be providing arms and missile technology to the Houthis, a homegrown Shiite rebel group that now controls the northern half of the country, including the capital, Sana’a. The Saudis, in turn, have been playing an ever more active role in bolstering their military power and protecting embattled Sunni communities throughout the region. Seeking to resist and reverse what they view as Iranian advances, they have helped armmilitias of an extreme sort and evidently even al-Qaeda-associated groups under attack from Iranian-backed Shiite forces in Iraq and Syria. In 2015, in the case of Yemen, they organized a coalition of Sunni Arab states to crush the Houthi rebels in a brutal war that has included a blockade of the country, helping to produce mass famine and a relentless American-backed air campaign, which often hits civilian targets including markets, schools, and weddings. This combination has helped produce an estimated 10,000 civilian deaths and a singular humanitarian crisis in that already impoverished country. In response to these developments, the Obama administration sought to calm the situation by negotiating a nuclear deal with the Iranians and by holding out the promise of increased economic ties with the West in return for reduced assertiveness outside its borders. Such a strategy never, however, won the support of Israel or Saudi Arabia. And in the Obamayears, Washington continued to support both of those countries in a major way, including supplying massive amounts of military equipment, refueling Saudi planes in midair so they could strike deeper into Yemen, and providing the Saudis with targeting intelligence for their disastrous war. The Anti-Iranian Triumvirate All of these regional developments, in play before Donald Trump was elected, have only gained added momentum since then, thanks in no small degree to the pivotal personalities involved. The first of them, of course, is President Trump. Throughout his election campaign, he regularly denounced the nuclear deal that Iran, the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union all signed onto in July 2015. Officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement forced Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program in return for the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions. It was a plan that Iran scrupulously adhered to. Although President Obama, many senior American policymakers, and most European leaders had argued that the JCPOA -- whatever its flaws -- provided a valuable constraint on Iran’s nuclear (and so other) ambitions, Trump consistently denounced it as a “terrible deal” because it failed to eliminate every last vestige of the Iranian nuclear infrastructure or ban that country’s missile program. “This deal was a disaster,” he told David Sanger of the New York Times in March 2016. While Trump, who has filled his administration with Iranophobes, including his new secretary of state and new national security adviser, seems to harbor a primeval animosity toward the Iranians, perhaps because they don’t treat him with the adoration he feels he deserves, he has a soft spot for the Saudi royals, who do. In May 2017, on his first trip abroad as president, he traveled to Riyadh, where he performed a sword dance with Saudi princes and immersed himself in the sort of ostentatious displays of wealth only oil potentates can provide. While in Riyadh, he conferred at length with then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the 31-year-old son of King Salman and a key architect of Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical contest with the Iranians. Prince Mohammed, who serves as the Saudi defense minister and was named crown prince in June 2017, is the prime mover behind the kingdom’s (so far unsuccessful) drive to crush the Houthi rebels in Yemen and is known to harbor fierce anti-Iranian views. At an earlier White House luncheon in March 2017, bin Salman, or MBS as he’s sometimes known, and President Trump seemed to reach an implicit agreement on a common strategy for branding Iran a regional threat, tearing up the nuclear agreement, and so setting the stage for an eventual war to vanquish that country or at least to fell the regime that runs it. While in Riyadh, President Trump told a conference of Sunni Arab leaders that, “from Lebanon to Iraq to Yemen, Iran funds, arms, and trains terrorists, militias, and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos across the region. It is a government that speaks openly of mass murder, vowing the destruction of Israel, death of America, and ruin for many leaders and nations in this very room.” While no doubt gratifying to the Saudis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, and other Sunni rulers listening, those words echoed the views of the third key player in the strategic triumvirate that may soon drive the region into all-out war, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, also known as “Bibi.” For years, he has railed against Iranian ambitions in the region and threatened military action against any Iranian move that would, as he saw it, impinge on Israeli security. Now, in Trump and the Saudi Crown Prince, he has the allies of his dreams. In the Obama years, Netanyahu was a fierce opponent of the Iranian nuclear deal and used a rare appearance before a joint session of Congress in March 2015 to denounce it in no uncertain terms. He has never -- right up to the days before Trump withdrew from the accord -- stopped working to persuade the president that the agreement should be junked and Iran targeted. In that 2015 speech to Congress, Netanyahu laid out a vision of Iran as a systemic danger that would later be appropriated by Trump and his Saudi confederates in Riyadh. “Iran's regime poses a grave threat, not only to Israel, but also the peace of the entire world,” he asserted in a typically hyperbolic statement. “Backed by Iran, Assad is slaughtering Syrians. Backed by Iran, Shiite militias are rampaging through Iraq. Backed by Iran, Houthis are seizing control of Yemen, threatening the strategic strait at the mouth of the Red Sea. Along with the Straits of Hormuz, that would give Iran a second choke-point on the world’s oil supply.” Now, Netanyahu is playing a major role in driving the already crippled region into a war that could further destroy it, produce yet more terror groups (and terrorized civilians), and create havoc on a potentially global scale, given that both Russia and China back the Iranians. Girding for War Pay attention to the words of Netanyahu in Washington and Donald Trump in Riyadh. Think of them not as political rhetoric, but as prophesies of a grim kind. You’re going to be hearing a lot more such prophesies in the months ahead as the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia move closer to war with Iran and its allies. While ideology and religion will play a part in what follows, the underlying impetus is a geopolitical struggle for control of the greater Persian Gulf region, with all its riches, between two sets of countries, each determined to prevail. No one can say with certainty when, or even if, these powerful forces will produce a devastating new war or set of wars in the Middle East. Other considerations -- an unexpected flare-up on the Korean Peninsula if President Trump’s talks with North Korea’s Kim Jong-un end in failure, a fresh crisis with Russia, a global economic meltdown -- could turn attention elsewhere, lessening the importance of the geopolitical contest in the Persian Gulf. New leadership in any of the key countries could similarly lead to a change of course. Netanyahu, for example, is now at risk of losing power because of an ongoing Israeli police investigation into allegedly corrupt acts of his, and Trump, well, who can say? Without such a development or developments, however, the way to war, which will surely prove to be the road to hell, seems open with a Third Gulf War looming on humanity’s horizon.

Independently, military conflict encourages Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz. Deterrence fails.

CPA 23 – [Center for Preventative Action, “Confrontation with Iran | Global Conflict Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations, , January 6, 2023] TDI

Concerns

A worsening conflict with Iran would have significant economic, political, and security implications for the United States. Should the United States and Iran engage in military conflict, Iran could attempt to block the , through which , which would raise oil prices globally. Moreover, the United States risks isolating itself from already  allies: in June 2019, NATO  to working with the United States to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. A U.S.-Iran confrontation could trigger an escalation of proxy warfare in countries like Syria and Yemen, or an increase in Iranian missile strikes targeting the  U.S. troops in the Middle East.

Recent Developments

Since the United States withdrew from the  (JCPOA) in May 2018, tensions have risen between the United States and Iran. While the Donald J. Trump administration pursues a strategy of maximum pressure to bring Iran to the , Iran has begun to contravene the JCPOA’s restrictions on its nuclear program.

In April 2019, the United States  Iran’s  (IRGC) a terrorist organization—the first time the United States classified part of another government as such. In May 2019, after intelligence suggested Iran and its militias were preparing to attack U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria, the United States  B-52 nuclear-capable bombers, an aircraft carrier strike group, and additional Patriot  to the Middle East to deter Iran. The same week, Iran announced a  for sanctions relief before exceeding the JCPOA’s cap on uranium enrichment levels and later  to exceed uranium stockpile limits. Also in May 2019, following a rocket attack on Baghdad’s Green Zone in Iraq—which U.S.  on Iran—and the release of  on IRGC boats in the Persian Gulf that U.S. intelligence officials cited as signs of a growing Iranian threat, nonemergency U.S. government employees were  from Iraq. Over the next month,  in or near the Strait of Hormuz were attacked, which U.S. government officials have also , and the United States deployed an additional  troops to the Middle East. Escalating military tension has been matched by increasingly bellicose rhetoric from government officials. In June, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that the United States “cannot expect to stay safe,” and President Trump  that there’s “always a chance” of war with Iran.

That cuts off key chemical exports---causes global economic decline and exacerbates conflict in West Asia.

Beacham 19 – [Will, Deputy Editor for ICIS Chemical Business, “Strait of Hormuz Closure Would Cause Chemicals Supply Shock, Hurt Demand.” ICIS, , September 26, 2019] TDI

BARCELONA (ICIS)–Closure of the Strait of Hormuz between Iran and Saudi Arabia would cut off most Middle East chemical exports, causing a severe chemicals supply shock, as well as a knock-on effect on demand from a big spike in oil prices.

New analysis by ICIS suggests that 9.5m tonnes (21%) of global linear low density polyethylene (LLDPE) capacity could be disrupted, along with 6.7m tonnes (16%) of ethylene glycol (EG), 3.9m tonnes (15%) of low density poylethylene (LDPE) and 28.2m tonnes (14%) of world ethylene capacity.

The Strait is an important shipping route for chemicals produced in Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, as well as sites along the east coast of Saudi Arabia.

Closure of the Strait would cut off chemical exports by sea from these sites to the rest of the world. Most product is transported by sea rather than road or rail in this region.

As well as the direct local impact, exports of chemical feedstocks such as natural gas liquids to other parts of the world could be curtailed.

The disruption would potentially be much more severe than that caused by the 14 September attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Khurais oil field and Abqaiq oil processing plant.

These cut chemical feedstock supplies to Saudi facilities initially by between 16-50%, potentially disrupting 10% of global ethylene capacity. Feedstock supplies  since then.

Chemical prices spiked but then fell back for most products because poor demand and ample supply from other sources compensated for any Saudi capacity losses. Insurance premiums have also risen for ships using the Strait, raising costs for chemicals shippers.

Closure of the Strait of Hormuz could have a more profound impact, with a higher proportion of supply disrupted and subsequent tightening of markets.

DEMAND SHOCK The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important shipping lanes. Closure would likely cause an oil price spike. This could hurt the global economy at a time when growth is already slowing thanks to the US-China trade war, Brexit and other macro-economic factors. Higher oil prices suck money out of consumers’ pockets through increased fuel prices.

According to Sophie Udubasceanu,  ICIS Global Crude Oil Editor, the Strait of Hormuz is , at the moment, the “elephant in the room,” keeping investors on edge and triggering questions over security of the ships travelling through.

She said: “The strait is one of the world’s major chokepoints, because it sees almost 21m bbl/day of crude, condensate and petroleum products passing through. That’s over 20% of the global petroleum related liquids consumption. There aren’t many ways to avoid it, only via pipelines in Saudi Arabia and UAE.”

A prolonged period of higher oil prices could even tip some economies into recession, hurting demand for chemicals further. Lower demand might reduce the impact of curtailed Middle East chemical supply to some extent.

John Richardson, ICIS senior consultant for Asia, said: “There would be an economic effect from oil prices potentially spiking to $100/bbl at a time of a trade war and potential recession in Europe. Clearly there would be a supply effect – less feedstock supplies for crackers outside the Middle East and less chemicals directly from the Middle East. But the impact on demand would also be very, very bad.”

ESCALATION So far there has been no military response to the 14 September attacks. This could be because Saudi Arabia and the US would have a lot to lose from an escalation.

With the rise of shale gas and oil, the US is less reliant on Middle East oil than it once was. Being drawn into a conflict there could be expensive for the US financially. There would also be the risk of military response leading to another wider Middle East conflict.

Saudi Arabia is trying to diversify its economy beyond oil and needs foreign capital, expertise and partnerships to do so.  These efforts would be thwarted by more instability in the region.

Huntsman CEO Peter Huntsman  that the 14 September attacks could make US chemical companies think twice about investing billions in Saudi Arabian projects.

Richardson believes there is a less than 50% chance of this conflict escalating. He said: “[US president Donald] Trump doesn’t want a war ahead of an election. But by pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal – which wasn’t perfect – he has pushed Iran into a corner and Iran feels it has less to lose by ramping up military action.”

A US study, supported by the UK, France and Germany, claims the attacks were orchestrated by Iran. Houthi rebels in Yemen said they were responsible for the bombings whilst Iran has denied all responsibility.

Saudi Arabia’s minister of state for foreign affairs, Adel al-Jubeir, this week  that all options are being considered, including military action against Iran.

Speaking at the United Nations meeting in New York on 25 September, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told reporters the country wanted “a peaceful resolution with the Islamic Republic of Iran”.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.