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A substantial reduction in on-the-ground presence preserves resources and prevents instability and extremism in the Gulf.

Manning & Preble 21 – [Robert, fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as a senior strategist at the National Counterproliferation Center in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) from 2010 to 2012, and as the director of long-range energy and regional/global affairs at the US National Intelligence Council’s Strategic Futures Group from 2008 to 2010; Christopher, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute from 2011 to 2020, and director of foreign policy studies from 2003 to 2011. Preble graduated from George Washington University in 1989 and received a PhD in history from Temple University in 2002, “Reality Check #8: Rethinking US Military Policy in the Greater Middle East.” Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/reality-check/reality-check-8-rethinking-us-military-policy-in-the-greater-middle-east/, June 24, 2021] TDI

Given these realities, the United States should substantially reduce the number of US forces permanently stationed in the region and scale down or eliminate routine US Navy deployments to the Persian Gulf. Occasional joint exercises in and around the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea could include ships on Mediterranean or Indo-Pacific deployments, but the anachronistic requirement to maintain a US carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf poses an unnecessary burden on a US Navy that is already strained to the .

The United States should conduct a zero-based review, seeking to trade bases for places: instead of maintaining fixed assets and permanent air and naval facilities, Washington should renegotiate and extend access arrangements with local partners. Greater investments in intelligence and early warning, as well as continued close coordination with regional states—and other countries with an interest in preserving a regional balance of power—will be equally important. In exchange, the elimination of the permanent carrier presence would help the US Navy divert its scarce shipbuilding resources away from those legacy platforms to new technologies (e.g., unmanned aerial and subsurface vehicles, as well as enhanced missile defenses).

The biggest changes to US force posture and force requirements, however, pertain to vulnerable US Army and Air Force bases. This on-the-ground presence dates back to the first Gulf War, and terrorist groups have cited it as a key rationale for numerous attacks against the United States and US personnel. These include the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the bombing of the Khobar Towers in 1996 and US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000, and the al-pQaeda attacks on September 11, 2001. The George W. Bush administration noted the linkage between a US military presence and terrorism directed against the United States as a reason for wanting to remove troops from Saudi Arabia. As then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified before Congress in February 2003, resentment over the stationing of US forces there had “been Osama bin Laden’s principal recruiting device.” Wolfowitz explained that the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq would enable the United States to withdraw from the region. “I can’t imagine anyone here wanting to . . . be there for another 12 years to continue helping recruit .”

Although the al-Qaeda threat has greatly diminished, anger and resentment toward US forces in the region—and Washington’s continued support for unpopular governments—remains. Meanwhile, Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile capabilities are a new factor putting US forces at risk. It is therefore vitally important to US security interests to end or reduce the permanent deployment of forces to Kuwait—the legacy of a war that ended more than a decade before most of the US troops there were born—as well as in other major bases in Iraq, Bahrain, and Oman. These moves could allow for a permanent reduction in the size of the active-duty force. Similarly, the US Air Force should terminate routine overflights in the region, close many of the associated bases that support these operations, and redirect resources to reflect the elimination of this unnecessary mission.

These fundamental changes to US deployments and the composition of US forces might strike some as dramatic, but they are relatively modest given the changes that have occurred since the Carter Doctrine was handed down over forty years ago. US policymakers need to understand the limits of American power and align US resources to secure vital interests. In the Middle East, that means encouraging the emergence of a regional balance of power. It also means combining a reduced US military footprint in the region with robust diplomacy, particularly in facilitating a Sunni-Shia détente in the Gulf. This may be aided by an element of exhaustion, as suggested by recent  held in Baghdad.

Pursuing this strategy will require proactive and creative diplomacy on Washington’s part to fashion a sustainable, stable offshore-balancing role and a willingness to shift away from  that has defined US policy for decades. The pace and scope of the transformation suggested here will depend on diplomatic success with Iran.

Defenders of the status quo in the Middle East warn that pressure from Washington risks pushing Gulf states toward the United States’ foreign rivals. However, as Senator Murphy notes, “this argument is a red herring, one that plays on a misunderstanding of both the irreplaceability of military alignment with the United States and the willingness of China and Russia to get their hands dirty in Middle Eastern politics.” 

The Greater Middle East holds limited interests for US national security and certainly none that require a continued and de facto permanent military presence there. President Biden’s decision to remove the remaining US forces from Afghanistan reflects a decision to prioritize the Indo-Pacific region. Recalculating US strategic priorities to reflect geopolitical trends is a wise move that should be repeated elsewhere.

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