The US is overcommitted to the Persian Gulf now. The plan frees resources to the Indo-Pacific while retaining influence in the Middle East.
Sweeney 21 – [Mike, Fellow at Defense Priorities and an incoming doctoral student at the Schar School of Policy and Government. “When It’s over: An American Withdrawal Plan for the Middle East.” Modern War Institute, https://mwi.usma.edu/when-its-over-an-american-withdrawal-plan-for-the-middle-east/, March 25, 2021] TDI
Is it too early to begin planning for the United States to leave the Middle East? There’s a strong argument to be made it’s not. Over the past few years discussion of the United States decamping from the region—or at least significantly downsizing its basing footprint—has finally entered mainstream foreign policy debates. Articles like by Mara Karlin and Tamara Cofman Wittes in Foreign Affairs and by Martin Indyk in The Wall Street Journal examined the ways in which the region has decreased in importance to US interests. As a result, there has been a renewed willingness to look at the necessity of the extensive US basing footprint developed over the past thirty years.
In truth, most intellectual energy is still being spent on whether the United States should leave the Middle East, not how. But, eighteen months ago, a plan will eventually be needed for a US departure for several reasons. Not least of these is that the United States has never attempted to withdraw from a major geographic region since the global expansion of its military footprint in the wake of the Second World War.
In this regard, there is a British precedent that offers some insights. When the United Kingdom quit its role as the region’s default balancer , it did so by publicly announcing a ten-year withdrawal plan (later shortened to five years.) The transparency with which London maneuvered out of the region helped limit instability in its wake. This example’s utility has its limits, of course, since the British were handing off to another power. When the United States departs the Middle East, it’ll leave the region without an external balancer for the first time in over a century.
All of that said, it is worth emphasizing that even without its military forces, the United States will retain significant influence in the region—as indeed when it only maintained two primary bases in the region, at Manama, Bahrain and Incirlik, Turkey. It will still have access to diplomatic and economic levers that have served it well in the past, to say nothing of maintaining security ties through maintenance and technical support to the various weapons systems sold in the region, particularly to the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Moreover, a US departure from the Middle East should not be seen as a wholesale withdrawal from its role in the world by any means. To the contrary, alleviating the requirement to garrison the Middle East will free up forces and funds that are likely as the United States tries to meet its other military commitments in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region. For example, it is worth noting the specific positive impact this could have on aircraft carrier maintenance and deployment schedules, which by the demands placed on these platforms by US Central Command.
What exactly would such a withdrawal look like? From a logistical standpoint, the United States could evacuate from the region in as little as a year (or less) if absolutely needed. But that type of mad dash to the door is likely to have precisely the type of deleterious impact the British sought to avoid and which the United States should seek to circumvent as well. Instead, a four-year timeline might be optimal for the first phase of a US departure, during which the bulk of forces would exit the region.
It is attractive to consider a longer timeline from the standpoint of strategic hedging. Taking a decade or even fifteen years to depart would give a clearer look at the impact of the US exit and, presumably, allow for a more gradual transition. Working against this, however, is that as more time passes the region is increasingly likely to experience major societal change. In truth, the mass demonstrations of the Arab Spring in 2011 brought about few lasting changes. The underlying social and economic factors that drove that discontent . And the region continues to be dangerously dependent on the , which essentially to authoritarian rule with the fruits of energy sales. There are ample reasons to think this situation cannot obtain indefinitely.
The United States might not have the luxury of a decade or two to decamp. The worst-case scenario would be a replay of the 2011 situation in Bahrain, where the United States against action to repress demonstrators then had to acquiesce as occurred. A replay on a broader scale could not only further damage US standing in the region but risk reprisal attacks against US deployments or even the unwanted entangling of US forces in new civil strife.
With four years as a baseline, the basic question then becomes which forces move where. The center of gravity of US regional posture lies on the western bank of the Persian Gulf in four small Arab states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. These “core four” account for and the most extensive physical infrastructure in the US regional network. Kuwait alone has six major facilities for US use and currently hosts more American military personnel () than any other country save Germany, Japan, and South Korea. In addition, as headquarters of the Fifth Fleet, Bahrain facilitates rotational naval deployments, including carrier battle groups, each of which adds approximately 7,500 personnel to US regional presence totals. If the United States is to withdraw from the Middle East, then, it is these four countries that will factor most prominently in any scheme.