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A reduction in deployments and alliance commitments signals a return to offshore balancing that shifts foreign policy towards restraint and modesty.

Arafat 20 – [Alaa Al-Din, formerly taught in the National Security and Defence Studies programme at Oman National Defence College and Sultan Qaboos University, Oman. He was a professor of Middle East Studies at the French University in Egypt and an Associate Researcher at London University. “Regional and International Powers in the Gulf Security.” Middle East Today, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-030-43316-1, April 22, 2020] TDI

The offshore balancing was Washington’s security policy toward the region from the 1970s to 1990s. While the onshore balancing was Washington’s security policy toward the region from the 1990s to 2010s. In fact, the American onshore balancing proved failure. Since 2013, America simply cannot reshape the region through force. Neither US interventions nor substantial military deployments have increased the stability of the region or the security of the United States. Instead, far too often, American involvement in the Middle East has done exactly the opposite. Despite the deaths of over 6500 US service members (and an estimated 300,000 civilians) in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as costs of more than $3.4 trillion, the Middle East is no more stable, democratic, or prosperous than it was two decades ago.133 In fact, since 2003, the region has witnessed the inability Washington to ensure the regional security, considerable deterioration of the American relations with most regional powers, increasing terrorist threats, including ISIS and al-Qaeda which despite losing most of its original leaders, al-Qaeda has metastasized across the region.134 Furthermore, the current status of Iraq, nuclear technology of Iran, the role on non-state actors, the roles of other external actors, proved that US effort to establish a suitable approach in the region has failed. Similarly, Persian Gulf countries have also failed to establish a security framework for the region. Given these failures, it is time to try something different: a return to offshore balancing. Obama’s 2010 and 2012 NSSs have ushered Washington’s strategic thinking to return to its offshore balancing. In fact, a strategy of offshore balancing would define US interests much more narrowly. It would focus on key interests and on the potential for regional hegemons to arise.135 The return to the initial American strategy of offshore balancing could be an ideal par excellence. Offshore balancing envisions a dramatic reduction in America’s overseas military deployments and alliance commitments, and a shift toward greater restraint and modesty in US policy writ large. It is premised on the idea that this type of retrenchment will actually produce better security outcomes at a better price.136 The offshore balancing is not passive security approach, but it is strategy that depends on setting clear priorities, emphasizing reliance on regional allies, and reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary conflicts. Accordingly, Washington can enhance regional security and not get bogged down fighting the wars of its regional partners.137 The offshore balancing in the Persian Gulf means that the United States will use of air and naval capabilities to counter threats, while also enhancing its commitment to its GCC allies by bolstering their defense capabilities through arms sales and military training. These elements can help the United States develop a balanced strategy to limit the threat posed by Iran, but also show America’s capability to provide security to the Middle East.138 In this context, Washington would transfer to the states of the region the tasks of maintaining their regional security, including the costs and risks of their defense, and upholding the balance of power in their own neighborhood. In this context, the Gulf States would be the first defense line of the region. The regional states would be responsible for providing security for their region, rather than asking Washington to do this for them.139 In this approach, the United States would dramatically reduce its military footprint in the region, leaving only the bare minimum of the current arrangements in place.140 These include keeping the headquarters of the 5th Fleet would remain in Bahrain, Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, keeping some prepositioned equipment in Kuwait and Qatar and intelligence-gathering facilities. Generally, Washington should refrain from deploying large numbers of US forces in the Persian Gulf. Instead, Washington could simply rely on equipment stored on container ships stationed at Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean.141 In short, offshore balancing would allow for US military presence in the region to be reduced dramatically. With offshore balancing, Washington should not provide Gulf States with a “blank cheque” that might drag it too directly into many of the region’s conflicts in places such as Syria and Yemen.142 Furthermore, offshore balancing is a strategy of restraint that would allow the United States to minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers.143

The offshore balancing would also relieve the United States of its burden of managing the security affairs of turbulent Persian Gulf.144 Importantly, a shift to that strategy would result in defense-related savings of perhaps 16–29% relative to the relevant post-Cold War figures. Such savings are certainly not trivial.145 For instance, the January 2012 US Defense Strategy Review envisaged an 8% reduction in the defense budget over a ten-year period—a fairly gradual reduction expected to shave around $50 billion off the defense budget each year.146 Additionally, it becomes difficult for Washington to sustain the level of larger military deployment of forces overseas. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq cost between $4 trillion and $6 trillion and killed nearly 7000 US soldiers and wounded more than 50,000.147 Offshore balancing also helps reducing terrorist attacks against the US targets. The less the United States is involved in the Middle East, the less its people are likely to be attacked by terrorists from the region. It is no accident that Switzerland does not suffer from Middle Eastern terrorism.148 Osama bin Laden was among the earliest critics of America’s regional presence, justifying his barbaric terrorist attacks with a narrative of resistance to occupation. He accused the United States of “occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula” and called for every Muslim to kill Americans until US troops withdrew from Saudi Arabia.149 Furthermore, the American people are mostly against the US involvement in the region. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2013, 52% of Americans polled believed that the United States “should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own.”150 Likewise, an April 2016 Pew poll found that 57% of Americans agree that the United States should “deal with its own problems and let others deal with theirs the best they can.”151 On the other hand, the Arab people demonstrates fatigue with the American policy. A poll by the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS), covering 84% of the population of the Arab world in 2011, shows that 73% of the people in the region regard the United States and Israel as the two most threatening countries to their interests.152

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