Asian allied prolif is necessary for deterrence, inevitable and no impact. San Antonio for Seoul makes nuclear war more likely.
Kelly ’22 — [Robert, professor of political science at Pusan National University. “The U.S. Should Get Out of the Way in East Asia’s Nuclear Debates” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/07/15/us-south-korea-japan-east-asia-nuclear-debates-nonproliferation/, July 15, 2022] TDI
Alternatives to direct South Korean/Japanese nuclear deterrence of North Korean WMDs are soft. Extended nuclear deterrence is weakly credible if it means nuked U.S. cities to defend South Korea or Japan. Missile defense does not work well enough to provide a roof against as many weapons North Korea appears to be building. China will not take serious action to stop Pyongyang. A negotiated deal — the best solution and hence discussed at length below — might control Pyongyang’s programs somewhat via missile or warhead limits or inspector access. But North Korea seems unwilling to negotiate seriously, is an untrustworthy counterparty, is unlikely to cut enough to relieve the existential threat its WMDs now pose to South Korea and Japan, and would demand exorbitant counter-concessions as payment.
This poor option set is already forcing “thinking the unthinkable” discussions in the region. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has suggested preemptive strikes on North Korean missile sites in a crisis, and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the region. The sheer precarity of South Korean and Japanese exposure to a nuclearized/missile Orwellian tyranny — which will be evident yet again this year if Pyongyang tests another nuclear weapon as predicted — will make it increasingly awkward for the United States to hegemonically insist that Seoul, and Tokyo even, may not investigate all security options.
Worse, U.S. resistance to allied nuclearization assumes a traditional American internationalism that is no longer assured. One of the United States’ two parties increasingly disdains alliances and admires authoritarianism. If former U.S. President Donald Trump — or a similar Trumpist — retakes the U.S. presidency in 2024, American opposition to East Asian allies’ nuclearization will decline dramatically — if only because the United States will no longer care what they do. As president, Trump was more interested in personal relationships with regional autocrats like Chinese President Xi Jinping or North Korean leader Kim Jong Un than with traditional U.S. partners. He notoriously “fell in love” with Kim and signaled a desire to “blow up” the US-ROK alliance if re-elected. He also hinted at breaking the 1951 U.S.-Japan security treaty. So, there is a reasonable chance that South Korea will nuclearize after 2024 regardless of what the Americans think. U.S. abandonment of South Korea would also push the Japanese nuclearization discussion to the right.
This would not be the first time the United States has tacitly accepted another country’s nuclearization. Ostensibly, the United States has supported the NPT for decades. In practice though, Washington tolerates at least five other states — Britain, France, Israel, India, and Pakistan — being unwilling to build down their stockpiles. Using the vague standard implied by these examples — friendship with the United States; reasonable state capacity; and at least theoretically, democratic rule — South Korea and Japan more than clear the bar for what is effectively a U.S. NPT exemption.
Judged by U.S. behavior toward NPT contravention, the NPT is better understood as a U.S. effort to prevent unfriendly or hostile states from nuclearizing rather than as a blanket, “Global Zero” commitment to fewer nuclear weapons in the world. The United States does not pressure friendly nuclear weapons states, including itself, to meet NPT requirements. It gave up sanctioning India and Pakistan’s violation after just three years. Applying this more honest standard of U.S. interests to arms control, the NPT is of questionable utility in East Asia.
China, Russia, and North Korea already possess nuclear weapons and show no signs of building down. So there is no regional nuclearization cascade for South Korea or Japan to provoke, because it has already happened. . And Taiwanese nuclearization is unlikely, as Taiwanese elites are quite aware that their nuclearization would provoke China.
Next, there is an under-discussed NPT downside: It provokes the alliance-debilitating, “New York for Paris” debates mentioned above. If U.S. allies do not nuclearize and must rely on U.S. nuclear weapons for nuclear deterrence, then they will inevitably question whether the United States will use those weapons in their defense if that might incur a retaliatory nuclear strike on the U.S. homeland. The answer to that question is almost certainly no, as then-French President Charles de Gaulle realized 61 years ago. The easiest way to reduce this bitter, alliance-undermining dissension is to let U.S. allies self-insure via indigenous nuclearization.
Finally, South Korean/Japanese nuclearization could serve shared regional interests by providing supplemental, local deterrence (as British and French nukes did during the Cold War) and by improving alliance burden-sharing. Further, the threat of South Korean/Japanese nuclearization might finally prompt Pyongyang and Beijing to take North Korean denuclearization negotiations seriously. Should South Korea and Japan respect the NPT and Global Zero plan while China, Russia, and North Korea do as they will, the effective outcome is unilateral disarmament. This is politically and strategically infeasible; we regrettably live in a world of persistent nuclear armament.
Global Zero advocates, such as political scientist Scott Sagan, worry about the transactional issues of WMD possession because they are uniquely dangerous weapons. Indeed, theft, loss, rogue scientists, and so on are legitimate fears. But they are no more resonant with South Korea or Japan than with any other nuclear weapons state. Indeed, as liberal democracies with robust state capacities and preexisting, well-managed nuclear energy programs, they will likely be quite responsible, as Britain and France have been.
No one seriously believes Seoul or Tokyo will launch an out-of-the-blue, nuclear-first strike on an opponent; set up something like the A.Q. Khan proliferation network; sell WMDs to terrorists or other rogues; put Homer Simpson in charge of nuclear safety; or be so sloppy as to require something like the Nunn-Lugar program. Even Pakistan and India have been better with their arsenals than the panic of the late 1990s suggested. Even dictatorships have been cautious about these issues. And as democracies with a history of foreign-policy restraint, democratic peace theory suggests they would be good stewards, certainly better than East Asia’s autocratic nuclear powers.
There is generalized anxiety about a regional arms race, which South Korean/Japanese nuclearization might exacerbate. Perhaps, but as noted above, there is no local cascade to be sparked because it has already occurred. China, Russia, and North Korea have all moved first. China and Russia have established nuclear arsenals and no intention of complying with the build-down imperative. Russia’s growing rhetorical invocation of its nuclear weapons is a disturbing evolution. North Korea repeatedly agreed, non-bindingly since 1992, to avoid nuclear weapons — only to exit the NPT and keep building. It now has intercontinental ballistic missiles and several dozen nuclear warheads.
Ostensibly, South Korea and Japan are not competing in this race — but only because they outsource their nuclear deterrence to the United States. Extended deterrence does not remove the U.S.-Japan-South Korea alliance on WMDs from the East Asian security discussion. It only means they are not located in-theater. That may have value in keeping China from building more WMDs (although it is already doing so) or Russia from playing the nuclear card in the region as it does in Europe. But it is not stopping North Korea. And that is the core issue—always and again.