Military presence is costly and makes terror more likely.
Logan 20 – [Justin, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is an expert on U.S. grand strategy, international relations theory, and American foreign policy. His current research focuses on the shifting balance of power in Asia—specifically with regard to China—and the limited relevance of the Middle East to U.S. national security. “The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East” Defense Priorities, https://www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/the-case-for-withdrawing-from-the-middle-east, September 30, 2020] TDI
Finally, there is terrorism. Here the striking fact is that less than two decades after the 9/11 attacks, the Washington establishment has almost completely moved on from the subject, yet it retains a central place in U.S. foreign policy.38 One never hears reference to a Global War on Terrorism. There are no longer any discussions of whether terrorism represents an “existential” threat.
Moreover, since the basic contours of American policy in the region predate 9/11 by decades, it is strange to think that a concern that emerged after a policy began explains the policy. But there is no evidence that terrorism is a threat that warrants an effort to manage the Middle East militarily.39 The chance of an American being killed by terrorism outside a war zone from 1970 to 2012 was roughly one in 4,000,000.40 By any conventional risk analysis, this is an extraordinarily low risk. As early as 2002, smart analysts were asking questions about counterterrorism policy such as “How much should we be willing to pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?”41
To the extent American policy and politics still turn on fears about terrorism, Al-Qaeda’s twitching carcass has been displaced by fears of ISIS. Its brutality and initial run of success made it sensational, but the ease with which its vaunted caliphate was dispatched indicates that it is no colossus requiring thousands of American troops to fight. Its scattered remnants, already being chased by local actors, require far less.42
Terrorist groups with serious political ambitions discover that hit-and-run insurgencies are less satisfying than seizing power and governing. Then they discover that behaving like a state makes you supremely vulnerable to American—and regional—firepower.43
The amount Americans pay now to fight Islamist terrorism—conservatively, somewhere between $50–100 billion per year, depending on how one counts—is absurdly divorced from the risk it chases.44 If someone ran a hedge fund assessing risk the way the U.S. government has responded to terrorism, it would not be long for the world. Moreover, it is difficult to identify how U.S. policy across the region—with the possible exception of some drone strikes and special operations raids—has reduced the extremely low probability of another major terrorist attack in the U.S. If anything, our policies may have increased them.45