Wholesale withdrawal erodes our competitive advantage against China.
Wechsler 21 – [William, senior director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council. Wechsler is a graduate of Cornell University and received a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. He has been an adjunct lecturer at SIPA and is currently an executive committee member of the SIPA alumni association, “No, the US Shouldn’t Withdraw from the Middle East.” Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/no-the-us-shouldnt-withdraw-from-the-middle-east/, June 24, 2021] TDI
Dealing first with the contention that American military forces in the Middle East are wastefully ineffective, it is true that military-led nation-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have been . Unfortunately, these massive (and ) failures of military-led nation-building efforts in the Middle East (and beyond) conflate and mask the highly successful counterterrorism (CT) operations that have consistently , smashed , and limited the ability of terrorist groups to conduct on U.S. soil. Bluntly, the failures of the American military’s nation-building efforts in the Middle East are exceeded only by the successes of its CT efforts. Recognizing the stark and monumental outcome differences between military-led nation-building operations and CT operations allows for a more balanced and accurate assessment of the American footprint (and its true costs) in the Middle East. While American military forces may be susceptible to enemy attacks from their forward positions in the Middle East, they also prosecute operations that disrupt terrorism in tangible ways that continue to keep Americans safe. In short, in the conduct of its CT mission, forward-deployed troops are more often the predator (on America’s behalf) than the prey. Arguments advocating for the wholesale withdrawal of American forces from the Middle East jeopardize American lives to exactly the extent that they fail to distinguish the difference between successful (and still required) CT operations and failed nation-building efforts.
If a failure to recognize the security imperatives of a persistent American military presence in the Middle East represents the strongest myth perpetuating calls for American disengagement, a dogmatic belief in the “zero-sum” resource ledger for GPC efforts represents the loudest. According to this position, military commitments in the Middle East automatically decrease military readiness for GPC threats in a “zero-sum” relationship and thus threats from great power competitors require the American military to . Given the stakes of GPC, certainly a reprioritization of resources is prudent and necessary. But how much and from what elements of national power?
For those who take the increasingly old-fashioned view that the job of the U.S. military is to fight and win the nation’s wars in armed conflict, there are plenty of reasons to doubt the logic of removing American forces from the Middle East in exchange for GPC contributions. The obtuse belief that the military exists to fight and win in armed conflict establishes that the further away the military gets from conducting tasks associated with combat, the less useful and effective such military operations become (this is why military-led nation-building fails). But in GPC, operations short of armed conflict will, by design, be the norm. In fact, given the established role of that has prevented “hot war” between great powers since World War II, it is reasonable to conclude that “hot war” (featuring the kinds of activities that the U.S. military is best suited for) will not occur until/unless a great power nation solves the of nuclear deterrence. Notice, at issue here is not whether or not GPC nations pose critical threats to the United States—they do—but what instruments of national power are best suited to deal with them in the current and projected environment. Thus, empowering the diplomatic, information, and economic elements of national power (i.e., those elements explicitly designed to compete in alternate arenas apart from armed conflict) to assume a leading role in addressing GPC threats makes more sense than ““ American foreign policy in areas where it need not be militarized and at the expense of areas where it must remain ““ (i.e., the Middle East). Plainly, if GPC requires competitive actions short of war, and if credible security threats to the American people persist in the Middle East requiring war-like combat capabilities, then it makes little sense to shift the military from tasks that it is best suited for and align it against tasks for which it is less suited (compared to other elements of national power).
Not only does “zero-sum” thinking misalign military resources away from its core and essential purpose, but it discounts and undermines the enduring advantages of the American military vis-à-vis GPC nations. One of the most striking attributes of the modern Chinese military is its outside of the Chinese mainland. What, for instance, does China know about deploying, sustaining, and fighting with large combat forces far from home, in different environments, and for long periods of time? The answer is not nearly as much as the American military that has been doing precisely that for over twenty continuous years. To be sure, this is not to suggest unending commitments to American “forever wars” or that the American military should keep its forces in the Middle East simply to outpace the Chinese military in combat experience. Rather, it is to highlight that as the U.S. military performs its critical and still-required CT mission in the Middle East, it simultaneously and naturally (out-) competes with China in significant ways that help preserve military advantages in GPC. Re-framed this way, any hasty “realignment” of forces away from the Middle East to support GPC efforts elsewhere (for activities short of war) automatically represents an erosion of the American military competitive advantage against China.