The plan decks allied confidence. Unilateral withdrawal sparks fear of general decline, AND undermines regional diplomacy.
Wechsler 21 [William F.; 5-24-21; director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council; “No, the US shouldn’t withdraw from the Middle East”; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/no-the-us-shouldnt-withdraw-from-the-middle-east/] brett TDI
Rather than argue for a return to pre-2003 policies, which often involved restraint but also typically required consistent US presence and leadership, the authors advocate instead for a radical military withdrawal that would inevitably have much wider implications. They state that their proposals “might strike some as dramatic.” In this case, it can be argued, “some” would include all long-standing US regional partners and the vast majority of US national security professionals, both Democratic and Republican, who have worked on the region for decades.
My colleagues’ specific recommendations include the following (I have bolded some parts for emphasis):
“substantially reduce the number of US forces permanently stationed in the region,” including a call to “end or reduce the permanent deployment of forces to Kuwait . . . as well as in other major bases in Iraq, Bahrain, and Oman”
“scale down or eliminate routine US Navy deployments” including the “anachronistic requirement to maintain a US carrier battle group”
“terminate routine overflights in the region” and “close many of the associated bases that support these operations”
Make no mistake: this is a call to repeal the Carter Doctrine, shut down the US Fifth Fleet (headquartered in Bahrain), and eliminate much of the infrastructure, built over more than half a century, that allows the United States the placement and access required to protect US national security interests. This would be no mere redeployment or retrenchment. It’s an argument for ending the routine projection of US power into the region through the air and over the seas, and removing all US military personnel stationed within key partner nations, regardless of the preferences of their leaders. No matter how artfully described, such a policy would be immediately and correctly recognized by all regional leaders as a general US withdrawal.
At that point, the biggest flaw in this plan would become immediately evident. The authors assert that, in order to protect US interests, the United States should then make “greater investments in intelligence and early warning,” seek “close coordination with regional states,” and engage in “robust diplomacy.” While these are worthy goals, in the context of a general withdrawal they are entirely unrealistic.
My colleagues assume that our relationships with host country policymakers and security-sector officials would freeze in place and remain after departure. They assign zero value to the day-to-day interactions between US forces and intelligence professionals, the influence this allows the United States to wield, and the atmospherics that can be gathered as a result. They ignore the criticality of military relationship building and how the strength of those relationships transfers into improved interoperability and common strategic perspectives. They ascribe limited agency to US partners, assuming that these partners will not feel abandoned by the United States and seek out alternative arrangements to meet their security needs. You can surge a lot of things, but as Admiral William McRaven has said, “you can’t surge trust.”
Furthermore, the calls for greater reliance on diplomacy in the region would come as a surprise to almost every modern US president—with Trump, perhaps, the sole exception—and their secretaries of state, each of whom dedicated disproportionate time to exactly that. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton became the personal action officers for diplomacy at Camp David between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and the Palestinians, respectively. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger first made an art of “shuttle diplomacy” in the region, and Secretaries James Baker and John Kerry proudly boasted of the number of trips they had taken there. President George H. W. Bush spent countless hours on the personal diplomacy necessary to build a coalition to liberate Kuwait, and thus restore the status quo, while his son, who upended that status quo, had regular personal calls with the leaders of Iraq and Afghanistan.
This diplomacy was possible only in the wider context of American military strength, a self-evident linkage of hard power and diplomatic prowess. Now that Russia has reentered the region militarily, it too has successfully leveraged its newfound position for its diplomatic ends. At the same time, former regional powers that have long since withdrawn militarily do not tend to find themselves at the center of regional diplomacy. A simple trade-off seeking to replace military power with diplomatic power is wishful thinking, at best.
This approach is particularly infeasible when applied to US counterterrorism objectives. The authors argue that “adequate counterterrorism capacity can be maintained primarily with more robust access agreements and cooperation from local partners,” without explaining how access agreements are supposed to improve in the context of US withdrawal—or how the United States is supposed to maintain cooperation with people who feel it is in the process of deserting them. The approach assumes, as my colleagues write, that the “threat is mostly local and manageable with only a small, residual US military presence, if that” (emphasis added). In reality, Salafi jihadists have a near-perfect record of shifting to external attacks once they have attained a local sanctuary, and successful indirect action requires the United States to take on more risk, not less.
Similarly, as recent events clearly demonstrate, a requirement for “over the horizon” counterterrorism and “offshore balancing” requires more regional naval presence rather than less. With no shortage of irony, the US departure from Afghanistan has recently necessitated the deployment of the only aircraft carrier based in Asia toward the Middle East. Moreover, since the new policy is to support Afghan national security forces from afar—exactly as my colleagues prefer—it will require the United States to keep more ships and aircraft in the Gulf region, operating out of many of the same bases that the authors want to close.
In the end, there is no win-win scenario when it comes to withdrawal: no way to protect US interests without taking on the necessary costs or risks, and certainly no way to do so and still maintain (or improve!) regional partnerships and US diplomacy.
Which brings us to the last of my colleagues’ recommendations. When the United Kingdom announced its general withdrawal from the area by 1971, it could do so with confidence that the United States would be willing and able to protect freedom of navigation and other common interests. Looking ahead, only China is likely to be in a similar position in the coming decades. Unfortunately, recent Chinese actions strongly suggest that rather than signaling continuity in strategic approach—as the shift from the United Kingdom to the United States did—a reliance on China would represent a more fundamental discontinuity: from free trade to mercantilism.
My colleagues discount this concern, either by dismissing the possibility altogether (by quoting others who refer to this as a “red herring”) or by implying that Asian countries that are otherwise circling each other warily in their own region will decide to work together harmoniously in this theater, since they all have “a strategic interest in the security of the sea lanes through which oil supplies flow.” One of the authors was more explicit back in 2014 (again, cited in the more recent publication), when he wrote that “the administration should explore burden-sharing with… China on sea-lane security.”
Perhaps China would not seek a unilateral capacity to secure its energy resources as it continues to build a modern blue-water navy. Perhaps China would not apply to the Gulf any lessons from its aggressive and norm-breaking approach to the South China Sea. At best, acting on such assumptions would be a tremendous risk to take, but my colleagues unfortunately do not explore the potential downsides. Moreover, if the United States were to withdraw, as the authors propose, we would be left with few options should China later prove to be less benevolent than they seem to anticipate.