Doubts about future intentions cascade, independently triggering revisionist probing and arms races.
Mitchell ’17 [Wess; 2017; President of the Center for European Policy Analysis; “The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and The Crisis of American Power,” p. 157-162]
First, recent evidence suggests that a policy of U.S. military retrenchment would make major regions less rather than more stable. For decades advocates of offshore balancing have asserted as an unproven dogma that a reduction in American alliance commitments would lead regional states to automatically balance against threatening powers, replacing the function of containment normally provided by U.S. extended deterrence, and that this would make regions more stable— all at lower expense to the United States. Recent experience provides a laboratory for testing the validity of these claims. As discussed in chapter 4, the behavior of U.S. allies over the past few years has shown that small states do not only balance against threats as offshore balancing advocates would predict; some also acquiesce in revisionist behavior through various forms of accommodation. More over, while many U.S. allies are investing in greater local military capabilities, it is not just taking the form of defensive postures; many are considering offensive or even nuclear capabilities that could contribute to regional destabilization unless accompanied by a U.S. security presence. The deterrent value of defensive alliances and the benefits of combined U.S. and allied balancing against rivals, once lost, may not be so easy to replace.
Second, it is not clear that jettisoning alliances would result in the financial windfall to the United States that many offshore balancing advocates expect. Losing the advantage of forward positions provided by allies would impose two new kinds of cost on the United States. One is the need to increase air and naval power: to achieve a level of power projection capability similar to what it possesses through overseas basing, much of which is on the territory of allied states, the United States would have to develop a significantly larger air force cap able of conducting offensive and lift operations mainly from North America and U.S. territories. It would also have to design and build large numbers of airplanes capable of crossing large distances into hostile air zones, a technological feat that is costly and unlikely to be achieved anytime soon. Similarly, relying on the oceanic moat would call for a much larger navy capable of maintaining a continuous presence across multiple oceans. Developing such a force would cost the United States a lot of money— perhaps as much if not more than it currently spends on overseas installations.5 A second, longer-term problem would be strategic in nature: the high costs of achieving reentry into the global rimlands once the United States has lost a forward presence there. The wars of the twentieth century are a reminder of the degree of national economic, military, and human exertion required of a power in America’s geographic position to achieve landfall in the Eurasian littorals and mainland once regional balances have been upset. Fortunately, in those eras, U.S. enemies did not develop the capability to deny the United States access to these regions. In the era of rapidly accelerating A2AD warfare technology, it cannot be assumed that America’s technological edge would allow it to do so again without enduring prohibitively high costs in U.S. blood and treasure— costs that are likely to be higher than any temporary savings from an ad hoc retrenchment.
A Strategy To Strengthen Alliances
Alliances remain the best-known instrument at America’s disposal for guaranteeing its national security and competing effectively against rivals in the new conditions of the twenty-first century. No other current or foreseeable strategic alternative is likely to provide cost-effective replacements to built-in advantages that alliances offer to the United States at as low a cost. And contrary to claims of many critics on both left and right, they are likely to continue to offer a strategic value to the United States under conditions of economic austerity and contested primacy; indeed, they may be even more important to the United States under such conditions than in the immediate post– Cold War period, when America’s power was less constrained and its rivals less numerous. In a more competitive landscape, alliances may represent the crucial margin of advantage when our edge in other traditional areas of strength is, at least for a time, less decisive. The costs of losing even a portion of these relationships, whether through defection or through continued slippage due to rival probes and U.S. devaluation, could be high. It could mean a weaker barrier against great-power war, a more permissive environment for the territorial growth of Eurasian competitors, and perhaps someday the need for a larger U.S. military to reproject power in and restabilize the system once its balance has been lost— all on the iffy proposition that the United States can achieve similar benefits by bargaining with large rivals or by withdrawing from the complicated affairs of the world’s regions entirely.
It is therefore in the strategic interests of the United States to strengthen its alliances. Doing so should be an urgent policy priority at a moment of intensifying probes by U.S. rivals and widespread doubts about American intentions and capabilities in the international system. Already these patterns represent a significant global challenge for the United States; allowed to persist unchecked, they could lead to a general and potentially militarized crisis in the U.S.-led international order, with multiple vulnerable allied frontiers in various stages of advanced geopolitical competition, alliance fragmentation, or even local war. Given the strategic similarities of probing efforts in such hotspots as eastern Ukraine and the South China Sea and the fungible nature of frontline allies’ concerns in these regions, the prospects for a multiregional crisis involving American power are higher today than at other any point in the modern era. However, such a crisis has not yet occurred, giving the United States an important and perishable window of opportunity to shore up its alliances as a preventive to further destabilization. A strategy to do so would focus on restoring American strategic credibility and raising the visible costs that aggressive powers would have to pay to revise the system to their favor. It would prioritize those alliances most in need of attention while working systematically to reinforce the central pillars of U.S. extended deterrence that are most in danger of collapse.