Allied confidence is down now---Ukraine.
Levite ’22 [Ariel; 6-29-22; senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Technology and International Affairs Program; “Why security assurances are losing their clout as a nuclear nonproliferation instrument”; https://thebulletin.org/2022/06/why-security-assurances-are-losing-their-clout-as-a-nuclear-nonproliferation-instrument/] brett TDI
Security guarantees have long served as powerful nonproliferation instruments, helping convince countries to cap and walk back their nuclear programs. It was the creation of NATO with Article 5 collective security guarantees at its core that made it possible to wean Germany off the nuclear weapons path. The same goes for the Warsaw Pact and Romania. Elsewhere, South Korea, Taiwan, and even Italy, Sweden, and Australia all had nuclear weapons ambitions at some point that were squelched by the offer of various US security commitments. It has been mostly vulnerable states, lacking such assurances, that have ventured to press ahead. The likes of South Africa, Pakistan, and Israel immediately come to mind.
Here the lessons of the most recent crisis with Ukraine come to mind. Ukraine was the only one (besides Russia, of course) of the four former Soviet republics that not only had Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil during the Cold War, but actually had physical possession of these devices. It lacked only the activation codes needed to use the weapons; had it wanted to, Ukraine could have mastered triggering systems for the weapons in a matter of months. But in 1994, after much external prodding and internal soul searching, Ukraine agreed to give up on its precious nuclear possession in return for formal “assurances” for its security and territorial integrity anchored in the so-called Budapest Memorandum, co-signed by the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.
The memorandum was a weak instrument, lacking both the status of a treaty and a firm collective security formula of the nature that undergird NATO’s Article 5 assurance of mutual defense. It de facto repackaged the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s pre-existing commitments to member states, codifying a commitment to respect the territorial integrity of its members and refrain from the use of force to change borders. But the personal signature of the leaders of the three external guarantors sufficed to convince the Ukrainian elite to go ahead and quickly hand over all the weapons to Russia. Remarkably, President Xi subsequently extended similar Chinese security guarantees to Ukraine in 2013. It is this very diplomatic triumph that had made it possible to salvage the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime—the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which envisages no more than five nuclear states—that has now come back to haunt the world.
After all, Russia first reneged on its Budapest obligations in 2014 by unilaterally annexing Crimea and setting up two rebel enclaves in Donetsk and Luhansk. It has recently gone much further, recognizing the two as independent states, invading Ukraine, and challenging its very existence as an independent state, falsely claiming that Ukraine might actually pose a proliferation challenge by seeking to develop nuclear weapons of its own. While it is not in the cards now, would it be inconceivable down the road if Ukraine was forced not only to renounce its desire to join NATO but also give up on its demand for new ironclad security guarantees (“similar to NATO Article 5”) it is now seeking in the negotiations to end the war? After all, Ukraine does possess extensive nuclear knowledge and the infrastructure needed to field a nuclear weapons program if only as a lever to obtain security guarantees.