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The 1ACs project of demilitarization as a strategy splits between the peaceful and wartime efforts that makes the violence mystified under debasing practices meant to transform into a martial form of politics

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

While the terms “militarism” and “militarization” emerged to explain Cold War military build-up and its social, ideological and international consequences (Shaw 1991), there has been a significant resurgence of the concept recently (Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). “Militarization” is now deployed in numerous disciplines to describe an array of phenomena. The International Feminist Journal of Politics has been a hub for the publication of feminist “militarization” research, including on topics such as militarized masculinities (Enloe 2003; Masters 2005; Eichler 2006; Duncanson 2009; Welland 2015; Tidy 2015); the militarization of political leadership (Cannen 2014; Athanassiou 2014); women’s lives (Shigematsu 2009); spaces such as memorials (Szitanyi 2015), heritage sites (Demetriou 2012) and border zones (de Lacy 2014); gender relations (Cockburn 2010); and feminism itself (Wright 2015). Yet with remarkably few exceptions (Enloe 2000, 3; Lutz 2002, 723; Stavrianakis and Selby 2013) the concept of “militarization” is infrequently defined or analyzed. Perhaps it seems self-evident, but “militarization” is a concept. Like any concept it guides our attention in certain directions, but it also limits our scope. Arguably the most influential text on “militarization” in feminist thought is Cynthia Enloe’s classic book, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (2000). The book opens with a now-famous question: how do they militarize a can of soup? Enloe describes a can of soup containing pasta cut into the shape of Star Wars weapons, illustrating her central argument that “militarization” is a broad social and gendered process: In the Star Wars soup scenario a lot of people have become militarized – corporate marketers, dieticians, mothers, and children. They may not run out to enlist in the army as soon as they have finished their lunch, but militarization is progressing nonetheless. Militarization is never simply about joining a military. It is a far more subtle process. And it sprawls over far more of the gendered social landscape. (Enloe 2000, 2) In this account, all sorts of things can become “militarized”: people, values, cultures and products. Further, “militarization” is a gendered process best understood by examining women’s experiences of it (Enloe 2000, 3). This analysis enabled the study of hitherto-unexamined connections, shedding light on the labor performed by laundresses, sex workers, military wives, nurses, mothers and other women across the globe. Building on previous work (Enloe 1983; Enloe [1989] 2014), it highlighted that investment in the military and military values is not necessary or natural: they can be disinvested from and resisted. However, the “militarization” concept underestimates the extent to which we live with war: how marginalized people, those who are racialized, disabled or poor, are subject to war-like (martial) forms of politics. Returning to Enloe’s can of soup, in a blog post critiquing the concept of militarism, Cowen makes this intervention: “If, in one of the most incisive critiques of militarism, Enloe asks ‘how do they militarize a can of soup?’ and questions how the pasta within assumes the shape of “star wars satellites,” then we are also interested in the central fact of the can” (n.d.). Napoleon commissioned the design of canning to support the supply of far-flung battlefields; “thus, the can of soup was always already ‘militarized’, and bypassing the can for the noodles hides perhaps more than it reveals” (Cowen n.d.). Drawing on other scholarship that has dispensed with the concept of “militarization” (Amoore 2009), Cowen’s (2014) later work on logistics illustrates that global supply chains have not been “militarized” or “securitized”: rather the science of logistics emerged from war. Picking up from such interventions, we can say that the can of soup, as a material object, was always already “of war” and therefore cannot accurately be said to have been “militarized.” “Militarization” frameworks cannot adequately account for this imbrication of “war” and “society” (Kienscherf 2016). This may seem like a counterintuitive statement. Isn’t the concept of “militarization” precisely about drawing out how social (gendered) relations are permeated by military values and cultures? However, by holding the categories of the military and of the social (or, war and peace) as separate until “militarization” happens, the concept implicitly presumes a status prior to militarization. It underestimates war-like forms of politics because it blithely assumes that war is “naturally” separate from the “social landscape.” In this sense, the concept is much like that of securitization (Wæver 1995; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998), which holds that security forms the exception to politics. “Politics” (or social relations) is implicitly treated as un-security or un-military until securitizing or militarizing processes occur, even if they occur pervasively. From this perspective, a reverse process can take place: desecuritization (Wæver 1995; Aradau 2004) or demilitarization. What “militarization” holds out is the hope that military encroachment on an otherwise unmilitarized past can be reversed; this drastically underestimates the extent to which warfare and military strategy are intrinsic to “political” or “social” relations. As with the can of soup, when we dig, we usually find that those “civilian” things that are claimed to be in danger of “militarization” have much deeper roots in warfare, and that the peaceful “domestic” political order for which we yearn has been fundamentally shaped from the outset by warfare and colonial violence. The concept of militarization ironically elides the fundamentally warlike history of liberal politics precisely through its critique of (supposedly exceptional) military encroachment or trespass on them. Relatedly, research conducted through the lens of “militarization” has tended to foreground gender analysis, for example, through the concept of “militarized masculinities,” or emulation of Enloe’s focus on women’s lives. Even if we are attentive to how this may play out differently for racialized or poor women, the analytical foregrounding of “women’s lives” positions systems of gender as primary in understanding “militarization.” Gathering considerations of race, disability, poverty and Indigeneity under gender by pursuing a methodology focused in the first instance on the lives of women (or on masculinities) risks subsuming varied systems of power, leaving us unable to capture how they might work differently than gender. When we also center race, Indigeneity and disability it immediately becomes clear that there is no natural peaceful order, and that the concept of “militarization” is pallid and half-hearted in its ignorance of the war-like relations that permeate “peaceful” domestic civil order (James 1996; Davis 2002, 2003). In IR, the work of |Richter-Montpetit (2007, 2014) is central to understanding race and the production of liberal violence. She argues that torture is not an aberration from liberal order but forms part of a lineage of anti-Black violence, from the institution of chattel slavery through contemporary law and criminal justice, demonstrating that violence against racialized bodies and the law have existed in mutual relation throughout US history. Thus, “racialized taxonomies and the larger racial formation they gave rise to were not simply manufactured by law. Rather, law was shaped by, and simultaneously enabled a wider set of processes and technologies of race-making” (RichterMontpetit 2014, 52). The concept of “militarization” cannot take stock of these histories because it assumes a peaceful order that has been breached by militarism. Only by eschewing forms of analysis that assume a (breached) separation between military and civilian spheres can we avoid this kind of dangerous oversight. For this reason I propose an alternate concept: “martial politics.” “Martial” denotes that a thing is war-like, or that it derives from battle, war, or the military – that it is “of war.” It describes the process by which war and peace are imbricated. Assessing “martial politics” involves evaluating the historical roots and present expressions of this imbrication. “Martial politics” dispenses with the before/after temporality of “militarization” and the assumed separation between military and civilian, war and peace. It denies any innocent domain of “normal” politics by pointing to the martial nature of contemporary and historical political formations. “Martial politics” is the liberal norm, not the exception. Illustrating the potential value of this concept, the following sections of this article apply it to two key empirical sites of supposed “militarization”: the police and the university. The empirical material in this article focuses primarily on the US as an avowedly liberal state, and on matters that traditional IR scholars would relegate to “domestic politics” (i.e., the study of race, disability, policing, education and universities). Contrary to such traditions, the article views the US as a site of ongoing settler colonialism, founded in and continually produced through the legacy of chattel slavery, and thus very much a “global” space. From this perspective, I argue that neither the police nor the university have been “militarized” and instead illustrate how contemporary forms of policing and knowledge production are vested in longer trajectories of martial politics.

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