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The US debasing project in Africa is nothing new but is an integral part that justifies the United State’s drone program which creates a territoriality of violence in which the US can maintain its military posture without physical presence

Kindervater 2017 [Katharine Hall, postdoctoral fellow in the Society of Fellows and the Department of Geography at Dartmouth College. Drone strikes, ephemeral sovereignty, and changing conceptions of territory. Territory, Politics, Governance, 5(2), 207-221.] CSUF JmB TDI

As the FBI Director’s comments about shrinking the world made at a Minneapolis press conference indicate, space is an important figure in today’s discourse surrounding the US government’s use of drones and the ever-evolving war on terror. Proponents and critics alike stress that the drone allows for shrinking space or distance and overcoming territorial limits, enabling targeting at increasingly large distances and extending the spatial reach of the military with limited risk to US soldiers. Further, perhaps in part because of these characteristics, the drone has become a weapon and surveillance tool (Kindervater, 2016) that is increasingly deployed in territories outside of war zones and met with relatively little resistance – examples of which can be found in Libya, Somalia, Pakistan, and Yemen. If the contemporary global drone wars raise questions about the changing space of war, they also produce related questions about the meaning of territory, and more specifically the relationship between territory and the projection of force. For example, as drone strikes exceed the “traditional” limits of the battlefield, does the relevance or salience of the territory of the nation-state fall away, especially as it relates to sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction? Have new or different conceptions of territory emerged in the war on terror and contemporary drone wars? This article examines the role of territory in the United States’ deployment of lethal drones, and does so by looking at two publicly available documents that provide legal justifications for drone targeting operations. Focusing on these legal justifications throws into relief the malleable, dynamic, and multiplicitious character of territory, as well as how territory and authority are mobilized and constructed in relation to the law and the projection of force. I argue that territory is mobilized in these documents to legally justify the use of force and the reach of US sovereign power. By drawing on conceptions of territory that are dynamic and malleable, the Obama Administration attempts to place drone strikes squarely within the law, effecting a new landscape of mobile and ephemeral sovereignty that stands in contrast to conventions of state sovereignty that are fixed to static demarcations of territory. The first section of the article is devoted to a close reading of a Department of Justice memorandum and white paper, which outline the US government’s justification for drone strikes outside war zones as well as against US citizens. In these documents, how the space of war is characterized becomes important for determining the legality of a strike. Here, law/legal justification and territory work together to produce a shape-shifting field of state violence and the use of force. Territory and the space of the battlefield become important bolsters to the United States’ authority to strike, yet the concept of territory that underpins these documents is far from fixed and static. Thus, the second section turns to recent efforts by critical geographers to develop dynamic and networked concepts of territory and how this might help us to think through the significance of territory to the execution of drone strikes, leading to the emergence of a more ephemeral and fluid form of sovereignty. The article concludes by revisiting the concept of territorial design advanced in this special issue in light of this engagement with US drone strikes. As I discuss, looking at territory through the lens of the contemporary drone strike allows us to see the tensions and connections between the constitution and demarcation processes of territory as well as the multiplicity of state territory. Drone strikes, law, and territory Since September 11, 2001, two public government documents provide the most comprehensive account of the government’s justification of the use of drone strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, extending state power and the projection of force outside of delineated battle spaces. The 2010 Memorandum for the Attorney General from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (“Memorandum”) and the 2011 draft of a Department of Justice White Paper (“White Paper”) each outline a legal argument in support of drone strikes, with particular focus on the lawfulness of targeting American citizens abroad. Together, the documents reveal not so much the rationales for drone strikes, but the – sometimes contradictory and conflicting – frameworks of authority and power that the Obama administration places these strikes within. Territory is a central figure in these frameworks. In what follows, I introduce the arguments made in these documents and then look more closely at the roles of territory and the law in producing the spaces of contemporary drone wars. The 2010 Memorandum specifically focuses on affirming the legality of a drone strike targeting Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen, by assessing whether or not the strike would violate federal criminal laws or the Constitution of the United States. The conclusion of the document –that these strikes are legal –is supported by three main arguments, which the Memorandum moves through in order, yet also keeps fairly distinct from one another. This has the effect of making it difficult for the reader to distinguish exactly what the legality of the strikes hinges on – a difficulty compounded by redacted portions of the text. The first consideration of the Memorandum is whether, in the case of targeting al-Awlaki, the actions of the government would fall under a public authority justification for the criminal codes it would otherwise violate. If the targeting of Awlaki fell under the public authority justification, it would not be considered an “unlawful killing” or murder by the state. The Memorandum argues that this justification would apply for either DoD or CIA drone strikes because it would constitute a “lawful conduct of war” (Office of Legal Counsel, 2010, p. 20). To make this argument, which is the most detailed section in the Memorandum, the authors argue that al-Awlaki as an individual falls within the scope of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The Memorandum authors argue, “…the AUMF itself does not set forth an express geographic limitation…” (Office of Legal Counsel, 2010, p. 24). What is important, therefore, is the status of those involved in the conflict, not the location of the conflict, which is seen to extend globally and to move with the individuals involved. Following this, and in what begins to feel like circular reasoning to the reader, the Memorandum concludes that because the military would follow the rules of International Humanitarian Law in its targeting procedures, these actions would be under the conduct of war and thus fall under the public authority justification. The second and third major justifications put forward in the Memorandum rely on evidence that al-Awlaki is actively taking part (or planning to take part) in hostile actions directed against the United States. It first determines that the United States would not fall subject to the War Crimes Act because of al-Awlaki’s legitimate status as a target. Second, the Memorandum demonstrates that there are no constitutional limitations placed on killing Awlaki as a US citizen because the threat he poses is greater than the violation of his constitutional rights. The argument that the US government would prefer to capture him, but deems it infeasible, is used to bolster this claim. Any evidence presented that the United States had tried to capture him, if it exists, has been redacted. Focused also on the targeted killing of a US citizen more generally, and not directly referencing al-Awlaki, the 2011 Department of Justice White Paper parallels many of the arguments and conclusions outlined in the 2010 Memorandum, with sections focused on Constitutional limitations, the public authority justification, and war crimes. The 2011 White Paper, however, adds a more specific legal framework for when lethal force is justified. It states that: …where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an associated force would be lawful: (1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 1). These three stipulations represent the most concise guidelines across available government documents for the authority to strike, and they center on an official within the US government making the determination of a threat. Once this determination is made, and the individual target in question is associated with a terrorist group, killing this individual is deemed lawful as long as capturing him/her is seen as difficult and the “laws of war” are followed. Focusing on the first stipulation, a central component of the target determination is whether or not the individual poses an imminent threat. Much of the justification for this stipulation that follows in the White Paper deals with what constitutes an imminent threat and how norms of sovereignty and territory are taken into consideration. According to its authors, the possibility of an imminent threat authorizes the United States to target an individual under the justification of self-defense (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 1). This targeting practice also does not violate another state’s sovereignty, such as Yemen or Pakistan’s sovereignty; either the lethal action is undertaken with the consent of that state, or that state is unwilling to accept or take action on its own, rendering US action justified by the immediacy of the threat. In other words, imminent threat trumps other states’ control of their own territories. In addition to self-defense, the White Paper also draws on the AUMF for justification of targeted killing outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, arguing that under the AUMF the United States is involved in a “non-international conflict” with terrorist groups whose nature (as per the AUMF remit) has no geographical limitation. The categorization here of “non-international conflict” is a legal term found in the laws of armed conflict and refers to a conflict between a state and non-state organized armed groups. This is contrasted to an “international” conflict between two states. The White Paper thus essentially defines the drone strike as an act of war in two ways, or from two angles. The first is through the AUMF – that these strikes fit within the scope of this authorization of force. The second is through the definition of a non-international conflict – that the nature of the US engagement against terrorist groups puts it within this type of conflict, and therefore expands it globally. While this might be redundant (the 2011 White Paper is no more clear and no less circular than the 2010 Memorandum), the authors clearly seek to emphasize the lack of geographical limits and territorial boundaries to the potential scope of drone strikes and US projection of force and authority. The self-defense and AUMF/non-international conflict justifications come together in a peculiar way around the idea of a threat’s imminence. In the White Paper the authors are working with a general and fairly broader concept of imminence, one that is tied more to the longer temporality of the war on terror (Department of Justice, 2011, p. 7). An imminent threat is not a “ticking time bomb” scenario, but rather signaled by participation in a terrorist group that is continuously planning attacks. At first glance, it is unclear why the argument of imminent threat is necessary to the legal framework if, as the 2010 Memorandum (along with parts of the 2011 White Paper) makes clear, attacks against Al-Qaeda members and affiliates are justified globally under the AUMF and the existence of a “non-international conflict.” The broad concept of imminence seems unnecessary and redundant, perhaps even adding further confusion. Yet the emphasis on imminence reflects the importance of temporality to the justification of lethal force. This is not a long-standing or permanent justification, but rather one that is temporary, ephemeral, and must be repeatedly renewed for the individual/threat in question, wherever they are located. Connected to this particular understanding of imminent threat, in both the Memorandum and the White Paper the drone strike is also justified spatially. The interpretation of the AUMF as having no geographical limits and the definition of “non-international conflict” as not tied to states gives the legal framework of drone strikes global reach. Indeed, the landscape of force projection that emerges out of these documents renders “non-international conflict” sort of a misnomer: it might be better described as a hyper-international or global conflict. In this understanding of conflict, “traditional” or “fixed” international boundaries do not matter in the way they seem to have in the past (as containers or delimiters of violence, reach of power, etc), at least when it comes to determining where force can or cannot be used. In this legal view, drones strikes outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are not beyond the battlefield; they rather are incorporated in a redefined battlefield. Furthermore, this is a battlefield tied less to territorial space and more to the individual who produces that battlefield through his/her associations or actions. Recent critical scholarship in geography seeks to make sense of this redefined battlefield or battle space as it relates to the use of drones, and a common theme in this scholarship is the role that law plays in justifying and extending the use of force: it is through law that geographies of war are expanding and changing. This emphasis on law seems to fit with the US government’s selection of the law as the avenue through which to justify strikes, even if the legal arguments themselves are incomplete, fuzzy, or debatable. While there is a rich and growing set of literature on war and law, here I focus on three prominent examples from this scholarship in geography that address drone strikes and the space of contemporary war specifically and demonstrate how law and violence are intertwined in different ways: (1) Derek Gregory’s writings on the geography of drones strikes, particularly as it relates to his concept of the “everywhere war,” (2) Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter’s exploration of the relationship between law and technology, and (3) John Morrissey’s mobilization of the term “lawfare.” Taken together, these scholars help us to think about the role of law in producing contemporary geographies of war, but also point the way forward from the analysis of the Memorandum and White Paper above to understanding the role of territory as a political technology (Elden, 2010) in shaping the Obama administration’s legal justifications for drone strikes. In “Drone Geographies,” Derek Gregory argues that drones must be understood within a matrix of military violence that is connected to and producing new visualities and experiences of the battlefield (Gregory, 2014, p. 7). Running through his discussion of various components of this matrix (which includes the development of homeland security, techniques of viewing at a distancing, and the emergence of global threats) is a sense that a new spatiality of war is emerging. War is no longer “over there” or contained within a defined geographical area; rather the “there” of war is “everywhere.” The concept of everywhere war captures not only the endless nature of war today – its persistent temporality – but also its spatial scope, where it is increasingly difficult to delineate spaces of war from spaces of peace (Gregory, 2011, p. 238-239). In everywhere war, the global spatiality of war is tied to its temporality, which has become increasingly “event-ful.” Violence can now happen anywhere, at any time: Violence can erupt on a commuter train in Madrid, a house in Gaza City, a poppy field in Helmand or a street in Ciudad Juarez: such is the contrapuntal geography of the everywhere war. It is also to claim that, as cartographic reason falters and military violence is loosed from its frames, the conventional ties between war and geography have come undone… (Gregory, 2011, p. 239) Gregory explores three cases of the everywhere war: US drone attacks in Pakistan, the drug war between the United States and Mexico, and cyberwar. These examples show the blurring of the boundaries of war and violence more generally. Furthermore, Gregory finds that the question of legality features prominently in each case. It “runs like a red ribbon throughout the prosecution of late modern war” (Gregory, 2011, p. 247). For Gregory, the everywhere war spreads largely because war is framed in a seemingly neutral and objective legal language. For example, when drone strikes, even those carried out by the CIA, are justified through an urgent and legal language of “self-defense” – as we saw for example in the Memorandum and White Paper – little attention is given to civilian casualties or to the strikes’ ever-expanding nature. The legal framework thus serves to mask the effects of its violence, at least from a Western point of view. For Gregory, framing this violence within a legal apparatus is key to enabling the everywhere war, and involves an intensifying relationship between legality, security, and war. As Gregory concludes: The invocation of legality works to marginalize ethics and politics by making available a seemingly neutral, objective language: disagreement and debate then become purely technical issues that involve matters of opinion, certainly, but not values. The appeal to legality – and to the quasi-judicial process it invokes – thus helps to authorize a widespread and widening militarism of our world. (Gregory, 2011, p. 247) Ian Shaw and Majed Akhter take up how this legal apparatus works more explicitly in their investigation of the relationship between law and technology in drone strikes in the FATA region of Pakistan. Looking at the increase of drone strikes in FATA as well as the history of the region, Shaw and Akhter argue that FATA is produced as an exceptional place – justifying continuing violence and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty – through the region’s legal status and through the object of the drone itself. FATA has been an exception within Pakistani law (here they draw on Agamben’s concept of the space of exception) since at least the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation, which rendered the area outside of the reach of the law. The Pakistani government has continued this designation in one form or another up to the present. While FATA long has been a frontier region where law is suspended, what is significant about contemporary drone strikes in FATA is how law (as the suspension of law) works along with the object of the drone to create FATA also as a space of exception for the United States (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1497). They suggest that the drone itself acts as an exception of sorts, making certain actions inside FATA acceptable. As Shaw and Akhter argue, the drone is an object that has been fetishized by the military so that its human element or relations are rendered invisible (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1492). It is, in other words, the drone that can be used in FATA, not other military technologies: …the legal-historical geography of the terrain acts in concert with the object itself to produce drone warfare in FATA: it is not simply a matter of drones operating over an undifferentiated enemy landscape. Rather, uneven geo-legalities of war, state, and exception make drone warfare a reality in certain spaces and not others. (Shaw and Akhter, 2012, p. 1500) In examining the intersections of law, geography, and technology in FATA, Shaw and Akhter provide insight into the specificities of the FATA region, yet it is not clear how their argument holds up when other kinds of incursions into Pakistan are considered, such as the Navy Seal raid that killed Osama bin Laden, or when the lens is turned to other drone strikes around the globe, such as those in Yemen or Somalia. Something more fundamental seems to be happening in the relationship between law, territory, and expanding spaces of killing. Trying to understand the more general relationship between war, space, and law (Jones and Smith, 2015), some geographers have turned to the concept of “lawfare” –a term describing the waging of war through law or the weaponization of law. John Morrissey argues that the United States has deployed two forms of lawfare in waging the war on terror. The first is through detention and rendition, creating exceptional spaces where individuals lose their legal status. The second is through the protection of military personnel in forward deployed areas, where soldiers and individuals connected to the military are granted legal status in expanding new spaces of war. Both of these ways that law is extended or negated are biopolitical, Morrissey argues, and involve the regulation of life and management of populations (Morrissey, 2011, p. 285). In other words, war and violence expand through lawfare, understood by Morrissey as a technique of biopolitics, implying that biopolitics merges with geopolitics (Morrissey, 2011, p. 290). As Morrissey writes, “The US military’s liberal lawfare reveals how the rule of law is simply another securitization tactic in liberalism’s ‘pursuit of security’; a pursuit that paradoxically eliminates fundamental rights and freedoms in the ‘name of security’” (Morrissey, 2011, p. 297). Morrissey and others thus provide a way to understand how law functions as a fundamental component of contemporary war. Law is central across this scholarship, albeit in different ways, to understanding the expanding deployment of drones. Drone strikes are not exceptions to the law, but rather the law is an important factor in the production of contemporary drone wars. A chief way that this works in the Obama administration’s legal justifications is through a reimagining of territory. The mobilization of territory in these legal texts, and in particular a reworking of state power in relation to territory, is a key aspect supporting the use of drone strikes. Bringing a more dynamic concept of territory to bear on this legal framework reveals not just that war and state violence are expanding through lawfare, but that both the meaning of state sovereignty and the spatiality of the projection of force is changing similarly as well.

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