The affirmatives articulation of demilitarization as a benign anti-imperial action plays into a system of global governance that seeks to integrate all opposition into the liberal order. Imperialism isn’t about territorial acquisition; it is a structure of feeling that requires the narrative of the grateful native to sustain itself, like how the insidiousness of the aff is hidden by tropes of altruism. They actually advance and streamline the development of new counter-insurgent tactics facilitated by spatial peace-making.
Wai 14 [Zubairu Wai is an associate professor of Political Science at Lakehead University. Professor Wai's research focuses on questions about power, knowledge, identity, and representation in the discourses, and political economy of violence, conflicts, state formation, development, and international interventionism, as well as on epistemological questions regarding the conditions of Africanist knowledge, and disciplinary practices in African Studies and International Relations. “The empire's new clothes: Africa, liberal interventionism and contemporary world order,” Review of African Political Economy, 42: 142, 2014) CSUF JmB TDI
In Global Governance and New Wars (2001), British political scientist Mark Duffield tells the story of how, as a result of conflicts in the 1990s, and concerns in the West about their implications for global peace and security, a major political project was formulated, the expressed aim of which was to impose what he calls a ‘liberal peace’ on the areas in the South affected by incidents of political unrest, civil wars and armed conflicts. This liberal peace project, Duffield tells us, is produced and exerted through a strategic complex of actors and achieved through a set of practices among which is the radicalisation of development and the incorporation of conflicts and security in development discourse and practice. Discursively, underdevelopment, which was once understood as an economic condition, has now been redefined as a dangerous political condition that not only causes conflict, but also engenders a vicious circle of self-perpetrating and mutually reinforcing violence and impoverishment (38). As a result, a new politics of developmentalism, of which humanitarian interventionism is an integral part, has resulted from a fundamental shift in official aid policy towards both conflict resolution and the reconstruction and transformation of conflict societies along contemporary liberal ideologies of governance favoured by the West. The transformational aims of these policy prescriptions are thus embodied in this new global politics of development and humanitarian interventionism legislated and promoted by the major Western governments and their aid agencies, the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the International Financial Institutions, donor and aid organisations, international NGOs and so forth. Rather than merely being a technical system of support for Southern societies affected by political unrest, civil wars, armed conflicts, humanitarian disasters or ‘state failure’, these arrangements, Duffield tells us, are part of a larger system of global governance, the transformational aims of which are to pacify Southern societies and impose a liberal peace on their disorderly terrains. That is, a new politics of ‘humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy’ (2001, 11). From this per- spective, ‘liberal peace’ is an altruistic political project born out of the West’s desire to pacify the world by dealing with conflicts and humanitarian disasters which are now thought to not only constitute a development and humanitarian challenge for the societies in which they occur, but also constitute a security threat and challenge for the West. One would have expected that a scholar who has the good sense to recognise these pro- cesses along the lines he specifies would, at least, be alarmed by their political implications, if not critical of their ethos and the types of power relations they are embedded in and make possible. However, Duffield does not seem to be bothered by this liberal interventionist project. He defines it as a ‘shared system of moral responsibility’ (2001, 260) even though he argues that this new ethico-political reality represents a ‘moral rearming of the West’. He dismisses those, such as Noam Chomsky (1999) and Frank Furedi (1994) among others, who have drawn attention to the fact that this enhanced ability of the West to intervene and impose its will on Southern societies is a function of a new ideology of imperialism, as harking back to an outmoded thinking that is incapable of coming to terms with a form of power and authority that is radically different from imperialism. To Duffield, the new politics of humanitarian interventionism, and the system of global gov- ernance that potentiates it, does not represent ‘an unchanging reality’ or the reworking of old imperialist formulas. Rather it is based on ‘liberal power’, not ‘imperial power’ (which assumes that liberal power cannot in fact also be imperial power). He writes: The current concern of global governance is to establish a liberal peace on its troubled borders: to resolve conflicts, reconstruct societies and establish functioning market economies as a way of avoiding future wars. The ultimate goal of liberal peace is stability. In achieving this aim, liberal peace is different from imperial peace. The latter was based on, or at least aspired to, direct territorial control where populations were ruled through juridical and bureaucratic means of authority. The imperial power dealt with opposition using physical and juridical forms of pacification, sometimes in an extreme and violent manner. Liberal peace is different; it is a non-territorial, mutable and networked relation of governance. The aim of the strategic state – non-state complexes that embody global governance is not the direct control of territory. Ideally, liberal power is based on the management and regulation of economic, political and social processes. It is power through the control and management of non-territorial systems and networks. As a result, liberal strategic complexes are usually averse to the long-term costs and responsibilities that controlling territory implies. (Duffield 2001, 34) The implication of this argument is that the current militarisation of Africa through Western interventions in places such as Coˆte d’Ivoire, Libya, Mali, CAR, among others, should be seen as attempts by the West at pacifying a turbulent continent given to internecine conflicts, and establishing a liberal peace on the disorderly terrains of its ‘illiberal spaces’. They are not imperialistic because they do not thrive on direct territorial control, and other forms of juridical, bureaucratic and militaristic forms of rule exerted from an imperial centre of authority. What this means in turn is that, for Duffield (2001), a system of dom- ination can only be imperialistic if it is based on a territorial acquisitive logic that imposes or seeks to impose its rule spatially through physical, juridical and bureaucratic forms of power and control. This characterisation of contemporary world order converges with that of Hardt and Negri (2000), who have suggested the passage of global power from an order based on the ascendancy of the nation-state to another based on the structural irrelevance of the nation-state. They write: The boundaries defined by the modern system of nation-states were fundamental to European colonial and economic expansion: the territorial boundaries of the nation delimited the centre of power from which rule was exerted over external foreign territories through a system of chan- nels and barriers that alternately facilitated and obstructed the flows of production and circula- tion. Imperialism was really an extension of the sovereignty of the European nation-states beyond their own boundaries. Eventually nearly all the world’s territories could be parcelled out and the entire world map could be coded in European colours: red for British territory, blue for French, green for Portuguese, and so forth. Wherever modern sovereignty took root, it constructed a Leviathan that overarched its social domain and imposed hierarchical territorial boundaries, both to police the purity of its own identity and to exclude all that was other. (xii) In contrast to imperialism is what Hardt and Negri call Empire, which they posit as the new order that has, since the end of the Cold War, been effectively regulating global relations. Empire, they tell us, does not establish any territorial centre of power, nor does it rely on fixed boundaries or barriers in exerting its authority. Rather, it is ‘a decentred and deterritorialising apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontiers’ (2000, xii, emphasis in original). A geocentric order ‘com- posed of a series of national and supranational organisms united under a single logic of rule’, Empire is the political project that effectively regulates global exchanges and the new global sovereign power that governs the realm of global economic and social relations (Ibid.). The reluctance of many theorists to recognise these major shifts in global power, Hardt and Negri contend, owes largely to the fact that ‘they see that the dominant capitalist nation- states have continued to exercise imperialist domination over the other nations and regions of the globe’. While not underestimating ‘these real and important lines of continuity’, it is important, they counter, ‘that what used to be conflict or competition among several imperi- alist powers has in important respects been replaced by the idea of a single power that over- determines them all, structures them in a unitary way, and treats them under one common notion of right’ (2000, 9). The power thus involved is fundamentally new and therefore not merely a simple reformulation and perfecting of old imperialist practices, as most theorists of contemporary world order believe. It is ‘a new notion of right . . . a new inscription of authority and a new design of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts’ (7). In this sense, Empire ‘marks a paradigm shift’ in global politics (Hardt and Negri 2000, 8, emphasis in original). The United States might occupy a privileged position in this new global reconstitution of imperial authority, Hardt and Negri tell us, and this is partially explained by the continuity of its importance from being the principal figure in the struggle against international socialism and the Soviet Union to being the central figure in the newly unified imperial world order. However, it is not the centre of a new imperialism nor the new imperialist power. And, even though the power of Empire ‘is born through the global expansion of the internal US constitutional project’, the United States ‘does not, and indeed no nation can today form the centre of an imperialist project’ (2000, 182, xiv). Empire, thus, should be understood as imperial not imperialist, for in contrast with imperialism, which always seeks ‘to spread its power linearly in closed spaces and invade, destroy and subsume subject countries within its sovereignty’, Empire ‘is constructed on the model of rearticulating an open space and reinventing incessantly diverse and singular relations in networks across an unborn terrain’ (182). It therefore ‘can only be conceived as a univer- sal republic, a network of powers and counterpowers structured in a boundless and inclusive architecture. This imperial expansion has nothing to do with imperialism, nor with those state organisms designed for conquest, pillage, genocide, colonisation, and slavery. Against such imperialisms, Empire expands and consolidates the model of network power’ (166). In this regard, those which were once ‘the distinct national colours of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow’ (xiii). Liberal peace, Empire or postcolonial imperialism? It is not my intention to rehearse here the criticisms that have been levied against Duffield and, especially, Hardt and Negri, in part, because I believe that they offer compelling, even if ideologically ambivalent and depoliticised accounts of contemporary world order. What I want to do instead is call into question the problematic ways they have interpreted that order, the power which produces it, the system of domination it makes possible, and the logic that undergirds the ethos of its practice. Central to this is an origin-diffusion problem based on a ‘first in Europe then elsewhere’ structure of time (Chakrabarty 2000, 8); that is, a historicist evolutionist epistemology that posits the West as the only rational Hegelian historical subject capable of inscribing world-historical events and processes (Wai 2012). In this epistemological schema, and the Eurocentric accounts they construct, the non-west only features as areas or objects to be acted upon by a historically stalwart Western agency that for Duffield, is transforming the world in the quest for stability and thus is imposing a liberal peace on the illiberal spaces and turbulent terrain of the South; and for Hardt and Negri, has inscribed a transformational global system that originates in, and spreads outward from, the West to the rest, reconstituting world order and presiding over a number of transitions: from disciplinary society to society of control; from state- based sovereignty to geocentric sovereignty that has revealed the structural irrelevance of the nation-state, and from imperialism to Empire of capital. All of these processes are assumed to have their origins in the West, and then diffused outward to the rest of the World. Remaining faithful to epistemological schemas that construct hierarchies of power and knowledge and mobilise Eurocentric categories to colonise other ways of knowing and being, these analyses tell us very little about the role of the South, other than as areas acted upon by a historically dynamic Western agency. Coming from the dominant and dominating milieus, our authors’ interpretations thus betray a fidelity to a positionality and privilege of location that is firmly ensconced in the traditions of their ethnos. This is, in part, what pushes them to theorise global processes from the certainty of Eurocentric perspectives that prevents them from seeing the form of power that the current liberal world order is: a violent and intrusive imperialistic power that hides its will to domination in tropes of altruism and facile concerns over human rights. Linked to this is the hasty rush to judgement about the nature of an emerging world order in the immediate post-Cold War environment. The old, as Gramsci (1971) would say, was dying, but the new which was coming into being was not exactly known, so many began to speculate and, in some cases, rushed to hasty conclusions about the nature of political processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions. Disciplinary international relations scholars and globalisation theorists, for example, had a field day in trying to decipher this emerging global power-political landscape. In the ‘hysteria of naming’ (Stallybrass 1990) which followed, the race was on to coin the best phrase or come up with the best moniker and the next big idea to describe or capture the changing configurations in an emergent but still uncertain world order. Francis Fukuyama (1989), for example, inscribed his ‘end of history’ thesis on a vulgar Hegelian historicist ideological landscape (Roth 1995). In crude cultural essentialist language, Samuel Huntington (1993) warned of a ‘clash of civilisation’. An almost hysterical Robert Kaplan (1994) claimed to have detected ‘a coming anarchy’ in West Africa, a nightmarish scenario of criminal violence, bloody conflicts and state implosion, demographic stress, environmental degradation and resource scarcity that he posited as the fate of the rest of the world, depicting it in the crassest sensational journalistic language. Some of the other epithets used were ‘Jihad vs. McWorld’ (Barber 1992), ‘Clash of Fundamentalisms’ (Ali 2003), ‘Clash of Globalisa- tions’ (Gill 2003) and, for our present purpose, ‘Empire’ (Hardt and Negri 2000) and ‘Liberal Peace’ (Duffield 2001). The problem though was that the theories and concepts used were less suggestive of an emerging global power structure and more indicative of a supposedly definitive and extant world order; they were less speculative and more depictive of reality imagined as actually existing, as if the new landscape of global power were not a formative process forged out of multiple conjunctural agonistics, but one that had come into being fully formed and already crystallised into the world order imagined or speculated about. It is within this general atmosphere that Empire and Global Governance and New Wars emerged. Hardt and Negri, for example, admit to locating the conception of their project at the midpoint between the Persian Gulf War (1991) and the war in Kosovo (1999), which they understand as signal events in the construction of Empire (2000, xvii). The fact that the ‘world’ (through the United Nations) appeared to have acted in concert to militarily evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990 – 91, and Western states, under the banner of NATO, intervened against Serbian forces in Kosovo in 1999, seemed to have signalled the emergence of a world order based on a single network of power that they would go on to theorise as Empire. Conveniently forgetting the numerous other cases even during this period (Bosnia, East Timor, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc.) that tended to suggest a world in flux, this rush to judgement about processes unfolding under concrete historical conditions now came to highlight the inadequacy of a theoretical enterprise which had been predicated on the rejection of imperialism as a reality of contemporary world order, once an angry United States began to explicitly reassert its power and tried to redefine the world in its image in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Imperialism that Hardt and Negri had told us was over now stood stark and manifested itself rather forcefully, as the US and its allies grappled with the uncertainties of a rapidly changing reality of world order, and sought to gain control over it. The second issue relates to our authors’ problematic and (even static) conception of imperialism, which they see primarily as a territorial acquisitive phenomenon. For Duffield as well as Hardt and Negri, and this has already been mentioned earlier, a system of dom- ination only qualifies as imperialistic if it has a territorial acquisitive logic. Imperialism, however, is not, and has never been, a static and unchanging reality of power and domination. It does not have to function, and has never really functioned, only through a single logic of rule or method of operation. It does not have to be a territorial acquisitive phenom- enon for it to be imperialist; and though it usually does, it does not even necessarily have to have an overtly economic logic for it to be imperialist. As Edward Said (1993) often reminded us, imperialism is more than an economic or territorial acquisitive phenomenon. A system of domination, it is more than simple acts of accumulation and acquisition for it occurs on and ‘beyond the level of economic laws and political decisions’ to conquer, to annex, to dominate and to exploit. Rather, it also is an ideational phenomenon, usually ‘supported, and perhaps even impelled, by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination’ (9). These impressive ideological formations constitute a ‘structure of feeling’ about ‘empire’, which, in the words of Sherene Razack, designates a ‘deeply held belief in the need and the right to dominate others for their own good’ (2004, 10). It is this structure of feeling that defines the self-conceptions of individuals living within the imperial centres ‘believing deeply in the “illusion of benevolence” and requiring, as before, grateful natives’ (Ibid.). Imperialism is a complex and multi-faceted reality of power. It covers, as Robert Young (2001) reminds us, ‘a range of relationships of domination and dependence that can be characterised according to historical and theoretical or organisational differences’ (26). Originally used to designate ‘a political system of actual conquest and occupation’, and increasingly coming to be associated with the Marxist conception ‘as a general system of economic domination, with direct political domination being a possible but not necessary adjunct’ (Ibid.), imperialism today plays itself out more as a set of relationships (both formal and informal, direct and indirect) which involves the processes, policies and practices by which empire is established and maintained, and by which a state or group of states controls or seeks to control the effective political destinies of other states and societies, and this can be achieved by force of arms, political persuasion and collaboration, economic, social or cultural imposition, coercion and dependence (Doyle 1986, 45). It also involves ‘the practice, the theory and attitude of a dominating metropolitan centre in relation to the distant territories and peoples’ it directly or indirectly controls, dominates and exploits (Said 1993, 9). It thus can function perfectly without any formal colonisation or acquisition of territories. In fact, it can even also function against its own economic interests (Young 2001). From the preceding, I contend that that which has been conceptualised as Empire and liberal peace is in fact a neo-imperialist posture potentiated by a Western will to power and domination. It is a desire or an attempt at restructuring global power and imposing an imperial order on the world. However, this desire does not transform the violent and hierarchical form of power it is constitutive of into a decentred and deterritorialised phenomenon. Neither does it represent a disinterested reality of global do-goodism and benevolence, as is usually suggested in studies purporting to explain the current imperial moment we live in. Rather, it is a hierarchical notion of power that re-territorialises and re-centres global relations within blocks of power through spatial displacement and the redefinition of traditional notions of sovereignty, while reworking, and even perfecting, the violent and exploitative logics of imperial power that have historically violated the integrity of non-Western societies and still stand in the way of especially African self-determination into diffused networks of power and privilege. Empire and liberal peace are manifestations of this neo-imperialistic posture: a reality of imperial globality; imperialism without empire, or colonialism without colonies; in other words, postcolonial imperialism. Obviously, these relations of domination are not static and unchanging, neither are they unchallenged and haplessly absorbed, but constantly mutate and are reconstituted through hierarchical modes of power as well as through appropriating the concerns of anti-colonial forces aimed at the negation of such imperialistic orders. This imperial reality is both geopolitical, in that it aims to project the power and political, economic and ideological interests of the dominant states in the world through the production and domination of the global space; and geocentric, in projecting its power through the spatial politics of seeking to unite the entire global sphere under a single network of imperial authority. However, the fact that this notion of right is liberal, or that Western powers now broadly agree on how to approach their imperial politics of domination, does not make it post-imperialist. What this signifies instead is the intensification, or maybe even perfection, of an imperial politics of domination produced and impelled by a ‘liberal consensus’ in the West. By liberal consensus, I refer to the ideological convergence in the West about the need to remake the world and impose liberal governance mechanisms on global socio-economic and political relations (Harvey 2005). Just as nineteenth-century Europe used the occidental mantle of a ‘civilising mission’ to justify its imperial domination of the world, postcolonial imperialism has defined its political project on the basis of the need to pacify the world through the use of juridical and militaristic modes of interventions in order to structure the world in line with the ideological preferences of liberalism and Western ‘universal’ norms and cosmopolitan values. Among these are the trinity of democracy, human rights and good governance, and the imposition of neoliberal market mechanisms on global social relations: deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and financialisation.