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There is no new war or modern war but war as a product of territoriality and virtuality – the software update of US imperialism doesn’t require boots on the ground but rather the decolonization of military presence has produced nationalization and legal colonization for spaces that cannot be decolonized – this translates that the 1ACs reduction in military presence is deemed necessary because US militarism has already exerted its force of psychological warfare to be in propagandized as proxies for the US

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

From the beginning of European expansion, war was neither interior nor exterior, as the territory was in some sense a smooth space in that it had not been nationalized, much less internationalized. War took place, but it lacked the political quality that makes Foucault’s inversion possible. As such, the laws of war found in Hugo Grotius and early discussions of Christian traditions of just war were ­ flagrantly disregarded, just as they had been in the Eu­ ro­ pean Crusades. And furthermore, decolonization does not return us to the romantic image of international politics either. In the aftermath of formal-­ legal colonization, every­ thing is nationalized but virtually none of the new national spaces resembles what could be called a sovereign territory except for those spaces that cannot be fully decolonized ­ because they are settler colonies. This is similar to the period in Eu­ rope before Westphalia in which sovereignty was claimed by the Catholic Church and some kings but had little ­ bearing on the organ­ ization of war in regard to questions like territorial integrity or “balancing.” The postcolonial period following World War II is one in which sovereignty is unequally distributed to the point of needing to describe the behavior of states, like the U.S. as supersovereign. There ­ is a further anachronism in Tiqqun and other Agamben-­ influenced extensions of Foucault’s war thesis. In almost all cases of the global war ­ t heses, and more generally the revival of Carl Schmitt’s work on liberal international order, the loss of the classical state system is a result of the exceptional politics following the American state of emergency in 2001 or a component of a lateness in capitalism generally starting after ­ World War II. Others ­ peg the creeping national security state to Cold War politics following the ideological struggle also after World War II. In the American case, the slippage between war, state making, and security begins long before September 11, 2001, and the rapid securitization of life that takes place during the Cold War. Such presentist accounts require a selective forgetting of how indebted Cold War and war on terrorism practices and politics follow traditions of counterinsurgency and nation building throughout the settlement and expansion of the American colonies, before and after ­ the modern republic. Put simply, the classical mode of warfare between isomorphic, mutually recognized sovereign states occurred at best provincially within the continent of Europe for a very short time. This period from which Foucault draws his logic describes neither the brutal and deterriorialized wars of religion that raged in Eu­ rope before the Treaty of Westphalia, nor the wars exported beyond the shores of Europe thereafter. Therefore, the attempt by Foucault and others to draw a distinction, even temporarily, between security’s project of policing and the sovereign state’s external application of war, while historically significant for a fleeting moment, is not helpful for understanding war before and after ­ the eigh­ teenth century. ­ The simple ­ distinction between internal war (security) and external war (war/international relations) is consumed in the empirical forge of the actual ­ history of warfare. On this point, I concur with Antonio Negri conceptually despite our differences of origin and periodization: “War has always pretended to have an ordering finality in postmodern capitalism. . . . ​ Ontologically, re­ sis­ tance immediately denies that claim. Modernity’s order can no longer suppress postmodern disorder; Hobbes crumbles before Guernica and Fallujah.” 99 Negri’s formulation would be quite accurate if instead of postmodern capitalism it was the longue durée from 1492 to the pre­ sent. The fight is not between a once great ­ and constraining modern order and a new reckless “postmodern order” but modernity itself as a global project in the operationalization of the planet for war. This does not mean we should forget Foucault’s inversion of the Clausewitzian formula between war and politics. It is usefully provocative, even if misleading. I think it is better instead to read Foucault as an amplification of rather than an inversion of Clausewitz. To say that politics is war by other means still requires the affirmation of Clausewitz’s original formulation of “politics as war by other means,” without which Foucault’s war as politics would have no object. For Foucault, of course, modern war has the population— its ­ survival, productivity, and health— as its object, both as a target and as a site of mobilization. 100 If there is a concept to be developed, it is one of war as a force that complicates, forms, and deforms the po­ liti­ cal landscape of the planet. Therefore, there ­ ought ­ not be an escalating number of concepts called war’s ­others. Security is as intimately a part of colonial, postcolonial, and precolonial warfare as policing is a formative ele­ ment of international politics. The difference, at best, is one of intensity. Instead, as I try to develop in the previous section, particularly in the Amer­ i­ cas, state making and politics more generally in the settlement context is a martial art and inseparable from practices of vio­ lence. So in this sense, despite a kind of Foucauldian or biopo­ liti­ cal turn in international relations scholarship, there is little ­ if any historical evidence to support a con­ temporary “liberal way of war” or some more insidious humanitarian version of warfare that came about in the aftermath of 9/11, or as part of the civilizing mission of the Cold War, as those ­ seduced by Carl Schmitt’s romantic vision of “real war” or Agamben’s post-9/11 state of exception have suggested. 101 War in the five-­ hundred-­ year epoch of the Eurocene has always thrived in the interregnum of definitions, national bound­ aries, racial classifications, humanizing missions, settlement practices, and economizing proj­ ects, or even entrepreneurial efforts at reordering the planet. War did not fall from grace. The Eurocene has never known grace, only war. Therefore, while war is not timeless, it has axiomatic tendencies that run through at least the last five hundred years rather than the last twenty or the last one hundred, and war has a semiautonomous trajectory of change that proceeds and exceeds the rise and fall of ideologies and changes in modes of production— many ­ of the most supposedly outmoded like primitive accumulation still thriving in the form of resource extraction, particularly in obvious states of war. And nowhere has this transideological consistency been more true than in the colonies and subsequent postcolonies in which the continuity of war overshadows the changes in justificatory discourse. The Eurocene as a martial geology has proceeded and exceeded mercantilism, vari­ ous stages of capitalism, and communism, and ­ w ill likely continue through the “postideological” throes of our new authoritarianism. Rather than pointing to ­ e ither a mode of production or a par­ tic­ u­ lar mode of destruction, the bits and pieces of quantity theories of war, annihilation over exhaustion, capital drives, desires for order and settlement, and the technics of Eu­ rope as well as the innovations of the Amer­ i­ cas and elsewhere have found new assemblages in new environments. The Eurocene, like Sloterdijk’s “extended operational space . . . ​ of Eu­ ro­ pean earth-­users,” takes place in the creative and formative collision between the never fully exogenous refinement and expansion of war on the Eu­ ro­ pean continent and the radically brutal laboratory of free-­ fire innovation in the periphery. 102 Unlike Hannah Arendt’s description of a boomerang where ­ there is a point of origin and a return, the ecological history of the Eurocene is one of attraction and vitality, renewal and mutation, experiment and habituation. 103 The distance and difference between the continents, technics, enmities, and habitats w ­ ere for the martial assemblage of the Eurocene the “­free energy” of Schrödinger’s voracious systems devouring negative entropy. What emerged from this habitat was then leveraged and refined to create what can now be called a global order. However, what is, I think, apparent is that such an order from an ecological perspective has amplified par­ tic­ u­ lar attributes and forms of life over ­ o thers rather than equally consuming bodies and nations.

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