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Their Fordist strategy for military reduction leaves colonial power intact – the potential for redeployment is always present as long constant threats remain on the horizon – that makes intervention and miscalculation inevitable as presence is always shifting to address crises.

Davis 2011 Sasha Davis, Department of Geography and Environmental Science, University of Hawaii at Hilo, The US Military Base Network and Contemporary Colonialism: Power Projection, Resistance, and the Quest for Operational Unilateralism, Political Geography, 2011 CSUF JmB TDI

The world-wide stretch of American military power arises from particular places and is deployed unevenly across space (Enloe, 2007). It has become taken as a given in studies of economics, geography and cultural studies to point out that processes commonly referred to as “globalization” operate in this manner (Harvey, 1990; Massey, 1994). Military power functions in much the same way. The global network of American military power is controlled from key locales (White House, Pentagon, regional command centers, bases) and affects different places around the world in different ways. Military bases and training areas are only two key nodes in this network, but they are excellent sites to examine the places where the apparatus of military power touches the ground (Woodward, 2005). Although there are some excellent analyses of global military operations (see for instance Gerson & Birchard, 1991; Johnson, 2004, 2007; Lutz, 2009; Sandars, 2000) the base network is an ever-shifting mosaic that is difficult to pin down precisely. For instance, a seemingly simple question like “How many foreign US military bases are there in 2011?” has answers ranging from 34 to 737, to 850, to well over a thousand depending on a host of factors. These factors include how one defines “military”, how one defines a “base”, how one defines “foreign”, and how one defines whether a base is a “US” base (Critchlow, 2005; Johnson, 2004, 2007). For example, some communications and spy bases are not directly under the Department of Defense (DOD) and are not technically “military”. Some “bases” do not permanently house many US troops, but are essentially empty until needed. Some US bases are hard to define as “foreign” because they have been placed in parts of the world with current or recent colonial statuses like Guam, Hawaii, the Marshall Islands, the British Indian Ocean Territory, and Puerto Rico. Lastly, some foreign bases used by US military personnel are not officially “US” bases because they are technically under the jurisdiction of the host nation or are run by private security contractors that support US military objectives. Because of these multiple difficulties of definition it is hard to show a detailed list or map of the US base network. Despite this it is possible to trace its general shifting geography. Intellectual frameworks such as the Project for a New American Century’s 2000 Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies, Forces, and Resources For A New Century and government documents such as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy in 2004, the 2005 US Global Defense Posture Review and the Quadrennial Defense Reviews (the latest in DOD, 2010), give some detailed strategies for the ways in which the network of US bases should be organized. Without glossing over the important regional differences in the kind of attention the American government directs at different parts of the world e such as the “containment” of China, providing access to petroleum in Central Asia, and maintaining the surveillance of areas with large Muslim populations e it suffices to say that there are very few places left on the globe (or in its orbit) that are deemed to be outside the interest and vision of American power. Consequently, the network of bases is global as well. Increasingly it is designed to be a permanent infrastructure that allows military power to be shifted with post-Fordist efficiency from some sites in the network to other places “just-in-time” and according to perceived crises that challenge US hegemony. For instance in 2004 both former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Undersecretary Ryan Henry discussed the new base network side-by-side with a refusal to pinpoint geographically where they thought threats to the United States might be located. Henry only commented that the US “strove to base forces in locations that supported flexibility and speed of response to anywhere in an unpredictable environment” (Critchlow, 2005, 8 emphasis added). The DOD’s geographical imagination is one where presumably the whole world is an “unpredictable environment” and the US military must be able to act everywhere. Bases outside the continental United States are no longer for defending the regions or territory of the ally where the base is located. Instead, bases are now conceptualized as jumping off points for offensive operations or counterattacks. The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review was quite explicit about this fundamental shift. The report states, “The United States can no longer expect our forward forces to fight in place; rather, for most forward-stationed U.S. forces, their purpose is to undertake operations on short notice by deploying rapidly into near or distant theaters” (p. 6, emphasis in original). Based on this view of the world the DOD envisions constructing a flexible network of existing bases that can swell or contract based on shifting threats. Ideally, the nodes of the network (bases) would not be created or decommissioned through time. Instead the network would be stable and the amount of personnel and material at any given base would respond to the geography of the threat. The general tripartite architecture of this emerging network consists of Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward perating Sites (FOSs), and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). Main Operating Bases, as the name implies, would permanently have large numbers of personnel, solid infrastructure, and training areas. These bases are scattered around the globe to give ample general coverage of the major regions of the world. For other operations, however, the US must have access to bases closer to the sites of conflict. ForwardOperating Sites (FOSs) have small rotating staffs and pre-positioned materials that are ready to increase in size if necessary. Sometimes these are referred to as “light-switch operations” because large numbers of troops can arrive and all they have to do it “turn on the lights” to start operating (Garamone, 2005). Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, which hosts thousands of American military personnel, is an example of an expanded FOS. Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) are facilities with very small numbers of personnel (or none) that can be made usable on short notice. Also, these are often not technically “American” facilities which gives them political cover in localities and countries where there may be resistance to an American presence. Commentator Robert Kaplan described CSLs this way: Often the key role in managing a CSL is played by a private contractor. In Asia, for example, the private contractor is usually a retired American noncom, either Navy or Air Force, quite likely a maintenance expert, who is living in, say, Thailand or the Philippines, speaks the language fluently, perhaps has married locally after a divorce back home, and is generally much liked by the locals. He rents his facilities at the base from the hostcountry military, and then charges a fee to the U.S. Air Force pilots transiting the base. Officially he is in business for himself, which the host country likes because it can then claim it is not really working with the American military. Of course no one, including the local media, believes this. But the very fact that a relationship with the U.S. armed forces is indirect rather than direct eases tensions. (Kaplan, 2005) This is not only Kaplan’s view of CSLs. Former Undersecretary of Defense Henry (2006) also approvingly quotes the passage of Kaplan at length in his analysis of the contemporary global base network. Within this three-level structure of bases the decision of which bases are to be enlarged and which are shrunk depends, ideally, on the whim of the Pentagon and White House according to American grand political-economic strategies and their geopolitical vision de jure. There is, however, another important factor that shapes the US base network: resistance. This resistance comes in the form of popular protests against these bases as well as in the form of political restrictions the US military feels it may be subjected to in foreign territory. These locales hosting US bases are places that the global projection of military power “touches the ground” and are therefore critical sites for both enabling it and resisting it.

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